Cessna 208 and Dudek Paragliders Solo 21 mid-air collision near Fulshear, Texas, December 21, 2021
On December 21, 2021 at about 3:26 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 208 (N1116N) and Dudek Paragliders Solo 21 (UNREGISTERE), were involved in a mid-air collision near Fulshear, Texas. 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept as a method for self-separation of aircraft, which resulted in an inflight collision. Contributing to the accident was the absence of collision avoidance technology on both aircraft.
The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept as a method for self-separation of aircraft, which resulted in an inflight collision. Contributing to the accident was the absence of collision avoidance technology on both aircraft.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 21, 2021 · about 3:26 pm local time
- Place
- Fulshear, Texas · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Cessna 208 B, built 1994 · all 208s on the register
- Registration
- N1116N · no longer on the register · serial 208B0417
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
- Aircraft 2
- Dudek Paragliders Solo 21, built 2021
- Registration
- UNREGISTERE · no longer on the register · serial P-231031
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · ultralight rules (Part 103)
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 208 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Cessna 208B airplane collided with a powered paraglider during cruise flight at 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in Class E airspace. Based on video evidence, the powered paraglider operator impacted the Cessna’s right wing leading edge, outboard of the lift strut attachment point. The outboard 10 ft of the Cessna’s right wing separated during the collision. The Cessna impacted terrain at high vertical speed in a steep nose-down and inverted attitude. The powered paraglider operator was found separated from his seat style harness. The paraglider wing, harness, and emergency parachute were located about 3.9 miles south of the Cessna’s main wreckage site. Based on video evidence and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the Cessna and the powered paraglider converged with a 90° collision angle and a closing speed of about 164 knots. About 8 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider operator suddenly turned his head to the right and about 6 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider maneuvered in a manner consistent with an attempt to avoid a collision with the converging Cessna. Research indicates that about 12.5 seconds can be expected to elapse between the time that a pilot sees a conflicting aircraft and the time an avoidance maneuver begins. Additionally, research suggests that general aviation pilots may only spend 30-50% of their time scanning outside the cockpit. About 8 seconds before the collision (when the powered paraglider operator’s head suddenly turned to the right), the Cessna would have appeared in the powered paraglider operator’s peripheral view, where research has demonstrated visual acuity is very poor. Additionally, there would have been little apparent motion because the Cessna and the powered paraglider were on a collision course. Under optimal viewing conditions, the powered paraglider may have been recognizable to the Cessna pilot about 17.5 seconds before the collision. However, despite the powered paraglider’s position near the center of his field of view, the Cessna pilot did not attempt to maneuver his airplane to avoid a collision. Further review of the video evidence revealed that the powered paraglider was superimposed on a horizon containing terrain features creating a complex background. Research suggests that the powered paraglider in a complex background may have been recognizable about 7.4 seconds before the collision. However, the limited visual contrast of the powered paraglider and its occupant against the background may have further reduced visual detection to 2-3 seconds before the collision. Thus, after considering all the known variables, it is likely that the Cessna pilot did not see the powered paraglider with sufficient time to avoid the collision. The Cessna was equipped with a transponder and an ADS-B OUT transmitter, which made the airplane visible to the air traffic control system. The operation of the powered paraglider in Class E airspace did not require two-way radio communication with air traffic control, the use of a transponder, or an ADS-B OUT transmitter and therefore was not visible to air traffic control. Neither the Cessna nor the powered paraglider were equipped with ADS-B IN technology, cockpit display of traffic information, or a traffic alerting system. Postmortem toxicological testing detected the prescription antipsychotic medication quetiapine, which is not approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen but the test results did not provide sufficient basis for determining whether he was drowsy or otherwise impaired at the time of the collision (especially in the absence of any supporting details to suggest quetiapine use). Testing also detected ethanol at a low level (0.022 g/dL) in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen, but ethanol was not detected (less than 0.01 g/dL) in another muscle specimen. Based on the available results, some, or all of the small amount of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the accident. The Cessna pilot likely did not have sufficient time to see and avoid the powered paraglider (regardless of whether he was impaired by the quetiapine) and, thus, it is unlikely the effects of quetiapine or an associated medical condition contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Dudek Paragliders Solo 21 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Cessna 208B airplane collided with a powered paraglider during cruise flight at 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in Class E airspace. Based on video evidence, the powered paraglider operator impacted the Cessna’s right wing leading edge, outboard of the lift strut attachment point. The outboard 10 ft of the Cessna’s right wing separated during the collision. The Cessna impacted terrain at high vertical speed in a steep nose-down and inverted attitude. The powered paraglider operator was found separated from his seat style harness. The paraglider wing, harness, and emergency parachute were located about 3.9 miles south of the Cessna’s main wreckage site. Based on video evidence and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the Cessna and the powered paraglider converged with a 90° collision angle and a closing speed of about 164 knots. About 8 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider operator suddenly turned his head to the right and about 6 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider maneuvered in a manner consistent with an attempt to avoid a collision with the converging Cessna. Research indicates that about 12.5 seconds can be expected to elapse between the time that a pilot sees a conflicting aircraft and the time an avoidance maneuver begins. Additionally, research suggests that general aviation pilots may only spend 30-50% of their time scanning outside the cockpit. About 8 seconds before the collision (when the powered paraglider operator’s head suddenly turned to the right), the Cessna would have appeared in the powered paraglider operator’s peripheral view, where research has demonstrated visual acuity is very poor. Additionally, there would have been little apparent motion because the Cessna and the powered paraglider were on a collision course. Under optimal viewing conditions, the powered paraglider may have been recognizable to the Cessna pilot about 17.5 seconds before the collision. However, despite the powered paraglider’s position near the center of his field of view, the Cessna pilot did not attempt to maneuver his airplane to avoid a collision. Further review of the video evidence revealed that the powered paraglider was superimposed on a horizon containing terrain features creating a complex background. Research suggests that the powered paraglider in a complex background may have been recognizable about 7.4 seconds before the collision. However, the limited visual contrast of the powered paraglider and its occupant against the background may have further reduced visual detection to 2-3 seconds before the collision. Thus, after considering all the known variables, it is likely that the Cessna pilot did not see the powered paraglider with sufficient time to avoid the collision. The Cessna was equipped with a transponder and an ADS-B OUT transmitter, which made the airplane visible to the air traffic control system. The operation of the powered paraglider in Class E airspace did not require two-way radio communication with air traffic control, the use of a transponder, or an ADS-B OUT transmitter and therefore was not visible to air traffic control. Neither the Cessna nor the powered paraglider were equipped with ADS-B IN technology, cockpit display of traffic information, or a traffic alerting system. Postmortem toxicological testing detected the prescription antipsychotic medication quetiapine, which is not approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen but the test results did not provide sufficient basis for determining whether he was drowsy or otherwise impaired at the time of the collision (especially in the absence of any supporting details to suggest quetiapine use). Testing also detected ethanol at a low level (0.022 g/dL) in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen, but ethanol was not detected (less than 0.01 g/dL) in another muscle specimen. Based on the available results, some, or all of the small amount of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the accident. The Cessna pilot likely did not have sufficient time to see and avoid the powered paraglider (regardless of whether he was impaired by the quetiapine) and, thus, it is unlikely the effects of quetiapine or an associated medical condition contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Cessna 208 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Radar services/coverage › En route › Effect on operation
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Not specified
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Not specified
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Not specified
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: unmanned (suas)
- Flight time: 3,500 hours in all
- Last flight review: November 23, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 13,125 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, October 19, 2021; 65.7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 8,750 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-114A (turboprop); 5,676 hours total
- Operator: Martinaire Aviation LLC
The flight
- Departed from: IAH Houston TX at 3:10 pm
- Destination: VCT Victora TX
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 6 statute miles
- Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
- Altimeter: 30.20 inHg
- Observation at 9:15 am from TME, 10 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KTME 211515Z AUTO 05005KT 6SM BR 08/07 A3020 RMK AO2
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Dudek Paragliders Solo 21 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during maneuvering defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Radar services/coverage › En route › Effect on operation
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Communications system › (general) › Not installed/available
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Not specified
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Not specified
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Not specified
Pilot
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: sngl
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Maximum gross weight: 220 lb
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Nirvana Paramotors Rodeo 125 Blu (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: Fulshear TX
- Flight plan: none
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
20 documents, released by the NTSB on February 15, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ATC Communications Summary | PDF, 3 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 2 | ATC Data Plots | PDF, 4 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 3 | FAA ADS-B Data (Raw Data) | data file · our copy | Download |
| 4 | FAA ADS-B Data (NTSB Processed) | data file · our copy | Download |
| 5 | FAA radar Data (Raw Data) | data file · our copy | Download |
| 6 | FAA radar Data - Hou Sensor with Beacon Code 4643 and Primary Returns Along Route of Flight (NTSB Processed) | data file · our copy | Download |
| 7 | Onboard Image Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 13 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 8 | NTSB Human Performance Factual Report | PDF, 9 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 9 | NTSB Wreckage Examination Summary | PDF, 11 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 10 | Pilot Information (Cessna 208B) | PDF, 29 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 11 | NTSB Medical Factual Report | PDF, 8 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 12 | Toxicology Report for Cessna 208B Pilot | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 13 | Toxicology Report for Powered Paraglider Occupant | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 14 | Maintenance Due Report for Cessna 208B (N1116N) | PDF, 4 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 15 | Work Completed History for Cessna 208B (N1116N) | PDF, 73 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 16 | Flight Log for Previous Flight Leg for Cessna 208B (N1116N) | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 17 | NTSB Weather Summary | PDF, 3 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 18 | NTSB Wreckage Release | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 19 | NTSB Party Forms | PDF, 3 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 20 | Memo to Revise Factual Report | PDF, 2 pages · our copy | View Download |
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.