Cessna 182 accident near Canoncito, New Mexico, October 16, 2018
On October 16, 2018 at about 10:22 pm local time, a 1971 Cessna 182, registered N9326G, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (descent) near Canoncito, New Mexico. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The partial loss of engine power due to induction system icing. Contributing to the accident was the fractured carburetor heat control cable, which rendered the carburetor heat inoperative.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 16, 2018 · about 10:22 pm local time
- Place
- Canoncito, New Mexico · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 182 P, built 1971 · all 182s on the register
- Registration
- N9326G · no longer on the register · serial 18260866
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when the airplane had a loss of engine power while descending through an area of precipitation and icing conditions. He was unable to restore normal engine operation using carburetor heat, which resulted in a forced landing. The airplane struck the terrain in a right wing down attitude and cartwheeled upon impact. Shortly after the accident, an individual observed several pieces of structural ice on the ground below the airplane’s left wing leading edge. After the accident, the engine demonstrated the ability to produce rated horsepower during an engine test. However, the carburetor heat control cable was found fractured and exhibited evidence of prolonged polishing wear against the cable sheathing. It is likely that the carburetor heat control cable had failed in overstress due to its reduced cross section from the polishing wear. Additionally, based on contaminants observed on the cable and fracture surfaces, the carburetor heat control cable had been fractured for an extended period before the flight. The airplane was not approved for flight in known icing conditions; however, if inadvertently flown in icing conditions, the carburetor heat should be engaged to avoid a loss of engine power due to induction air filter icing and/or carburetor icing. It is likely the loss of engine power during the flight was due to an accumulation of ice on the induction air filter and/or to the carburetor, and the pilot was unable to restore engine power because the fractured control cable had rendered the carburetor heat inoperative. According to the airplane’s operating handbook, pilots are to verify the proper operation of the carburetor heat during an engine runup before each flight. A review of the airplane’s flight track and weather data indicated the airplane had flown through areas of precipitation that were consistent with freezing drizzle and supercooled liquid water droplets favorable for structural icing conditions. There was no record that pilot had received a weather briefing before the flight and, as such, his awareness of the icing conditions before the flight could not be determined.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Structural icing during enroute (descent)
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (descent) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Dragged wing/rotor/float/other during landing
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Effect on operation
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › Air intake › Inoperative
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › Air intake › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 6,492.8 hours in all
- Last flight review: October 12, 2017
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Pilot-Rated Passenger
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 111 hours in all
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 11,200.2 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, October 4, 2018; 21 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,950 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Continental O-550-F/TS (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: HII Lake Havasu AZ at 7:34 pm
- Destination: AEG Albuquerque NM
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 140° at 17 knots, gusting 23
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 4,700 ft
- Temperature: 45°F (7°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.25 inHg
- Observation at 10:18 pm from AEG, 12 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
24 documents, released by the NTSB on November 2, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
