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Accidents · NTSB WPR24LA319 · Final report

Bell 206L accident near Fern Prairie, Washington, September 26, 2024

On September 26, 2024 at about 10:50 pm local time, a 1976 Bell 206L (helicopter), registered N9984K, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Fern Prairie, Washington. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An aeroelastic interaction between the helicopter’s main rotor blades and nodal beam system, which resulted in oscillations that exceeded the design limits of the tailboom. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the main rotor blade manufacturer to adequately publish the appropriate recovery technique for a known flight dynamics issue.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 26, 2024 · about 10:50 pm local time
Place
Fern Prairie, Washington · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 206L, built 1976 · all 206Ls on the register
Registration
N9984K · registry record · serial 45054
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that, while in cruise flight at about 100 kts and about 1,000 ft above ground level (agl), the helicopter suddenly exhibited a severe vertical oscillation, commonly referred to as a “vertical hop.” Believing a catastrophic mechanical failure was imminent, he lowered the collective to initiate an emergency descent. Just before landing alongside a forest road, the pilot raised the collective and slowed the helicopter, and the vertical hop subsided. After landing, the pilot exited the helicopter and observed substantial damage to the tailboom and fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed the helicopter’s tailboom was buckled around its entire circumference. The tailboom buckling was likely the direct result of abnormally high structural loads imposed on the airframe during the vertical hop. This violent oscillation generated dynamic loads exceeding the normal structural design limits of the tailboom, resulting in it buckling about 13 inches aft of the intercostal support, and displacing it downward about 15° and to the right. The full monocoque construction of the tailboom, while robust under normal flight loads, can sustain damage when under the sudden, cyclically-amplified bending forces associated with this type of resonant vibration event. Although the helicopter’s collective lever could be moved with less force than specified by the manufacturer, it is unlikely that the vertical oscillations were due to collective bounce (an interaction between the pilot’s arm and the vibration of the airframe that can be exacerbated by low friction clamp force on the collective control) because the pilot did not have his hand on the collective lever when the oscillations started. About five months before the accident, the helicopter’s metal Bell main rotor blades were replaced with composite main rotor blades produced by Van Horn Aviation (VHA). The underlying source of the vibration itself was likely an aeroelastic interaction between these main rotor blades and the helicopter's nodal beam transmission mount under a specific set of operating conditions. Based on at least 26 similar reports in Bell 206Ls dating back to 2019, VHA identified the triggering conditions as single-pilot operation, low fuel load, and airspeeds above 85 kts, all of which were present in this accident. In addition, out-of-tolerance maintenance conditions, such as main rotor blades configured with forward sweep, increased the likelihood of a helicopter exhibiting hops, and increased the severity of the oscillations when they occurred. Under these conditions, the light helicopter weight and the shift of the center of gravity aft alters rotor system dynamics, allowing a resonant vibration to develop between the rotor blades and the nodal beam mount. When encountered, this vibration can be lessened or stopped by banking, raising the collective, or slowing the helicopter. About 2.5 years before the accident (or about 2 years before the operator installed the main rotor blades on the helicopter) VHA posted a vertical hop recovery technique on social media and in a newsletter, but did not publish it in their technical library until after the accident. The use of blogs, social media, and a newsletter may have initially been an effective means of alerting operators; however, the lack of a persistent, retrievable reference in VHA’s technical library likely precluded operators from learning about the recovery technique if they had not read the newsletter or seen the posts before they were superseded by more recent posts. According to the pilot, he was not aware of the recovery techniques until after the accident. Had the pilot been aware of and implemented the appropriate recovery techniques, he likely would have been able to prevent the oscillations from reaching a structurally damaging amplitude.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft structural failure during emergency descent
  2. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Main rotor system › Main rotor blade system › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage › Rotorcraft tail boom › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Main rotor system › Main rotor blade system › Related operating info
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
  • Organizational issues › Management › Communication (organizational) › Between groups/organizations › Manufacturer

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 16,702 hours in all; 15,452 in this make and model; 273 in the last 90 days; 75 in the last 30 days; 16,567 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 28, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 25,607.6 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, August 23, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,000 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls Royce M250-C20R (turboshaft); 15,310 hours total
  • Operator: Jl Aviation INC

The flight

  • Departed from: Pigeon Springs WA at 10:33 pm
  • Destination: OR72 Boring OR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 320° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
  • Observation at 3:53 pm from KTTD, 8 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KTTD 262253Z 32004KT 10SM CLR 22/11 A2998 RMK AO2 SLP152 T02220106

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

12 documents, released by the NTSB on August 20, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR24LA319.