Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2 accident near Lebanon, Tennessee, November 8, 2025
On November 8, 2025 at about 7:41 pm local time, a 2015 Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2, registered N107VU, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Lebanon, Tennessee. It was an other work-use flight under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was killed and 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this accident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 8, 2025 · about 7:41 pm local time
- Place
- Lebanon, Tennessee · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 2 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2, built 2015 · all EC 130 T2s on the register
- Registration
- N107VU · no longer on the register · serial 8109
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Other work-use flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record
On November 8, 2025, at 1341 central standard time, an Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2, N107VU, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lebanon, Tennessee. The pilot and flight paramedic were seriously injured, and the flight nurse was fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air medical flight. The helicopter, callsign "LifeFlight1" (LF1), was operated by Air Methods LLC. dba Vanderbilt LifeFlight as part of Vanderbilt University Medical Center’s (VUMC) critical care air medical transport service for VUMC and the Monroe Carell Jr. Children's Hospital. As part of the program, Air Methods provided all air transportation services and VUMC provided all medical staffing, patient care, and clinical services. The pilot was employed by air methods, and the flight paramedic and flight nurse, were employed by VUMC. The program had 8 bases. One of which was in Gallatin, Tennessee. About 1334, LF1 departed from the Gallatin base in response to a launch request in Rutherford County, Tennessee. About 1337, the crew was informed by the operator’s communications center (AIRCOM) that the request had been cancelled. According to preliminary ADS-B data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), shortly thereafter, the helicopter made a 180° turn back toward Gallatin. At the time, the helicopter was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet msl. A review of radio communications recorded by the operator’s communications center revealed that at 1339, they received a radio call from LF1 stating: “Aircom…LF1…we have a medical emergency onboard with our pilot…uh were gonna…we will advise.” No further transmissions were received from the flight. During a post-accident interview, the flight paramedic recalled that after receiving the cancellation from AIRCOM, the pilot turned the helicopter around. The flight paramedic acknowledged the cancellation via radio and advised that they were returning to base (RTB). After that point, he noticed that the pilot didn’t make any noticeable movements, which was unusual because typically, the pilots would nod or give a thumbs up to acknowledge. After he did not get confirmation from the pilot that they were turning around, the flight paramedic leaned forward and tapped the pilot on the shoulder. The pilot then looked at him and the flight paramedic said “Did you hear that? We are RTB.” He received no response from the pilot. He then asked the pilot if he was okay and saw that the pilot’s expression was a “complete blank stare.” The flight paramedic recalled that around that time he remembered looking outside and thinking they were high. He then attempted to get the pilot’s attention several more times, but he did not receive a response. He further described that the pilot’s eyes were open, but there was no emotion. He saw that the pilot was trying to make an input into the GPS or possibly the autopilot, but he couldn’t put his finger on the button. The pilot was still not responding or making any purposeful movement of the flight controls. The flight paramedic then took off his restraints and leaned forward to see what the autopilot was doing. He did not see that the autopilot was engaged, and he realized that he needed to slow the helicopter down. The flight paramedic had never touched a cyclic control stick in flight before, as they were not allowed to, but from watching pilots’ hands in flight, he knew that small inputs would result in small reactions, and he needed a large reaction. He then grabbed the cyclic on top of the pilot’s hand, which remained on the cyclic, and pulled it back. The pilot did not resist this control input. The helicopter responded much more than he was expecting, after which he made smaller inputs to slow down. He knew from watching pilots land that he had to decrease the power, so he also reached across the pilot’s lap and tapped down on the collective control because he knew that would slow them down. The flight paramedic tried to get the helicopter into a level attitude and got to a point where it was slowing. The helicopter was in stable flight but still moving fast. There was a lot of farm land around, and the flight paramedic and the flight nurse were telling the pilot to land the helicopter. The flight paramedic pointed out a field to the pilot just left of their centerline. At this time the flight paramedic was out of his seat and kneeling over the console to reach the flight controls. The only coherent reaction he got from the pilot was when he acknowledged where the flight paramedic was pointing and said to him “there, no there…” and he pointed to a field further away and much more wide open. The flight paramedic then looked up and saw a bright yellow field lined with trees with descending terrain. While the flight paramedic was leaning over the console trying to control the helicopter, it struck the tops of the trees while approaching the field. About 10-20 feet above the ground, the flight paramedic made a hard flare and the helicopter then impacted the ground. The helicopter was last observed by ADS-B at 1341, at a GPS altitude of 775 feet, about 0.31 miles from the accident site. This was the helicopter’s last ADS-B-observed position. About 1345, personnel in the operator’s AIRCOM determined that the helicopter had “landed” at an unplanned location. AIRCOM then initiated the operator’s post-accident initiation plan, and received confirmation from emergency services in the vicinity of the accident site that the helicopter had been involved in an accident. The AIRCOM personnel also received a telephone call from the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center indicating that the helicopter's emergency locator transmitter had activated. The helicopter impacted the ground and rolled on to its left side, coming to rest on upsloping terrain oriented on a magnetic heading of 275o. All major components of the helicopter remained intact with the wreckage. The crew and passenger compartment remained intact with the forward windshield being removed by first responders. The left door was open and bent back 180 degrees. The right and left sliding doors were intact but could not be opened due to crush damage by the skid step. Both skids remained attached to the helicopter and were compressed evenly. The left skid fractured in the center of the skid. The tailboom remained attached to the fuselage. The tailboom was bent downward staring at the center about 10 degrees. The tail rotor driveshaft was separated at the center hanger bearing. The right horizontal stabilizer showed no signs of damage. The left horizontal stabilizer was bent upwards about 30 degrees. The Fenestron had damage to the underside of the Fenestron housing. All variable pitch rotor blades and fixed blades were attached and showed no signs of impact damage. The tail rotor gearbox showed no signs of damage. The main transmission mounts were fractured and displaced from their attachment points. All three hydraulic servos remained attached to their lower attachment points and the non-rotating swash plate and pitch hors. The three main rotor blade retention pins remained installed and the main rotor blades remained attached to the blade grips. The main rotor head remained intact but exhibited impact damage. All three main rotor blades display damage consistent with being under power at the time of impact. The engine data recorder information was downloaded and reviewed and showed no recorded abnormalities of the engine. The fuel system integrity remained intact with no apparent fuel leaving the fuel tanks. There was no postimpact fire. Overall, the postaccident examination revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failure that would have precluded normal operation at the time of impact. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot’s most-recent second-class medical certificate was issued by the FAA on May 17, 2025, with limitations relating to the use of corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards and that the certificate was not valid for any class after (its second-class expiration). According to FAA airman records, the pilot had accrued 4,500 total hours of flight experience as of his most recent medical certificate application.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during maneuvering defining event
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 5,512 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: fixed
- Operator: Air Methods LLC
The flight
- Departed from: NONE Galltin TN at 7:33 pm
- Destination: NONE Lebanon TN
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 48°F (9°C)
- Altimeter: 29.78 inHg
- Observation at 2:10 pm from M54
Weather report (METAR): METAR KM54 082010Z AUTO 00000G10KT 10SM CLR 22/09 A2979 RMK A01=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | 1 | ||
| Flight crew | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 6 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photograph 1 – Accident Helicopter
Photograph 2 – Empennage Damage
Photograph 3 – Fenestron Damage
Photograph 4 – Main Rotor Damage
Photograph 5 – Fuselage/Cabin Damage
Photograph 6 – Damage to Underside of HelicopterThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
12 documents, released by the NTSB on September 11, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
