Rockwell International 690A accident near Palmyra, Virginia, May 5, 2024
On May 5, 2024 at about 12:54 pm local time, a 1975 Rockwell International 690A, registered N690BM, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Palmyra, Virginia. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s loss of control following an encounter with structural icing, which resulted in an inflight breakup of the airplane.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 5, 2024 · about 12:54 pm local time
- Place
- Palmyra, Virginia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Rockwell International 690A NO SERIES, built 1975 · all 690As on the register
- Registration
- N690BM · registry record · serial 11311
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was in cruise flight at 20,000 ft on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight when the pilot reversed course. When an air traffic controller queried the pilot, he replied, “we have lost…we need to climb.” The controller then asked the pilot, “what is your issue?” and the pilot responded, “we have lost autopilot.” There were no further communications received from the pilot and radar contact with the airplane was lost shortly thereafter. A witness who saw the airplane as it descended toward ground impact described that it was on fire. The wreckage of the airplane was heavily fragmented and scattered amongst a wooded area, with a debris path over 3 miles long. The left wing, left engine, left propeller, and empennage were heavily burnt and found at the main wreckage site. The right wing was separated at the wing root and was found 1/4-mile north of the main wreckage. The right wing was fire damaged, and the right engine and right propeller were not located. The vertical and horizontal stabilizers were found about 3/4-mile north of the main wreckage. All fractures exhibited overstress features consistent with an in-flight breakup. Mapping of the wreckage indicated that the tail components likely separated first, followed by the right wing. This structural failure resulted in the horizontal and vertical stabilizers deforming and subsequently separating from the airplane. The lack of heat damage indicated that this separation occurred before the fire and that the inflight fire observed by the witness was likely a result of the inflight breakup. No evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have preceded the inflight breakup was found during the postaccident wreckage examination. Review of data provided by a preflight planning application vendor revealed that before the accident flight, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan and received a weather briefing. The briefing included an AIRMET for moderate icing with the freezing level between 9,000 and 13,000 ft, with tops at 24,000 ft, which included a portion of the intended route of flight. This AIRMET was active at the time of the accident. Satellite imagery of the accident area and upper air sounding model data depicted cloudy, instrument meteorological conditions across the region from the surface to above 30,000 ft. Upper air data and computer modeling also identified the potential for some icing as the airplane climbed above 11,000 ft, and it is possible that some trace icing could have accumulated on the airplane’s structure during this time. Weather radar reflectivity values indicated that along the final portion of the accident flight path, the potential for an encounter with more significant structural airframe icing was greater, though the severity of that icing could not be definitively quantified. The airplane was equipped with de-ice boots on the leading edges of the wings, horizontal stabilizer, and vertical stabilizer. Most of the components of the airplane’s de-ice system were destroyed during the accident sequence and could not be examined. Review of maintenance logbooks did not reveal evidence of any anomalies or preexisting discrepancies that would have precluded normal operation of the de-ice system before the accident flight. The pilot’s statement to air traffic control that he had “lost the autopilot,” shortly before radar contact with the airplane was lost and the airplane broke up in flight, suggest that he may have been experiencing difficulty controlling the airplane, either with or without the aid of the autopilot. The airplane’s pilot’s operating handbook contained an airworthiness directive (AD) that explicitly warned pilots who encountered certain types of structural icing in flight not to utilize the autopilot, as it could mask tactile cues indicative of adverse changes in the airplane’s handling characteristics. Given this information, it is likely that the pilot’s loss of control that ultimately resulted in the airplane’s inflight breakup was preceded by an accumulation of structural ice that altered the airplane’s handling characteristics in a way that the pilot had not anticipated and was unable to recover from.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Structural icing during enroute (cruise)
- Aircraft structural failure during uncontrolled descent
- Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Response/compensation
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,817 hours in all; 18 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,069 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 27, 2023
- Maximum gross weight: 10,250 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Airesearch TPE331-5&6SER (turboprop); 11,882 hours total
- Engine 2: Airesearch TPE331-5&6SER (turboprop); 12,100 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: HEF Manassas VA at 12:29 pm
- Destination: GGE Georgetown SC
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 2 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 900 ft; scat at 300 ft
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.15 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 am from CHO, 20 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KCHO 051253Z 00000KT 2SM BR SCT003 BKN009 OVC014 13/11 A3015 RMK AO2 RAB02E12 SLP207 P0000 T01330111
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on April 22, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA24FA209.
