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Accidents · NTSB ERA21LA275 · Final report

Bell 206 accident near Rome, New York, June 29, 2021

On June 29, 2021 at about 5:47 pm local time, a 1974 Bell 206 (helicopter), registered N134VG, was substantially damaged in an accident near Rome, New York (Griffiss Intl airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's improper termination of a practice autorotation with power recovery, which resulted in low rotor rpm, an unstable landing, and a rollover. Contributing to the accident was the evaluator's inadequate oversight.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 29, 2021 · about 5:47 pm local time
Place
Rome, New York · Griffiss Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 206 B, built 1974 · all 206s on the register
Registration
N134VG · no longer on the register · serial 1512
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident occurred during a Part 135 competency check ride for the pilot. On board were two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspectors, one seated in the left seat performing the check ride and another in the left rear seat providing oversight and on-the-job training to the other inspector. After performing maneuvers, the flight returned to the airport where the pilot was to perform a straight-in autorotation with power recovery. As the recovery began, the pilot recalled that he advanced the throttle to the full open position, which the FAA inspector confirmed by attempting to rotate the throttle to the open position, and noted the power turbine and rotor RPM needles were in the green arc. As the pilot raised the collective for recovery, the low rotor warning light and low rotor warning horn both activated. The helicopter impacted the runway hard, rotated right and rolled over on its left side with the engine still operating. The engine continued to run until the inspector in the left seat was able to reach and rotate the right throttle grip “several times” until the engine stopped. The helicopter’s fuselage was substantially damaged. Examination of the helicopter after the accident did not reveal any preaccident malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. According to the inspector in the left seat, as the pilot began the recovery and rotated the throttle, the inspector checked the throttle position, attempting to rotate the (left side) throttle grip towards the open position, and it did not move. In retrospect, the inspector considered, when he attempted to rotate the throttle grip and it did not move, that it may not have been in the fully open position and the resistance he felt in the (left) grip may have been a result of the pilot holding his (right) throttle grip tightly. The pilot had been holding the controls somewhat tightly during the flight. If the throttle were not in the fully open position during the recovery from the autorotation, the governor would not automatically maintain the rotor RPM. As the pilot raised to collective to flare, this could result in a reduction of rotor RPM and apparent partial loss of power.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Autorotation Hard landing defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › (general) › Instructor/check pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, remote
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,542 hours in all; 2,500 in this make and model; 55 in the last 90 days; 16 in the last 30 days; 4,690 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 29, 2021
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

Pilot (unmanned)

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 17,557 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, April 19, 2021; 60 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,200 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Allison M250-C20J (turboshaft); 10,520 hours total
  • Operator: Aviation Services Unlimited LLC

The flight

  • Runway 33, 11,821 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 260° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.15 inHg
  • Observation at 1:49 pm from RME, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KRME 291749Z 26009KT 10SM CLR 32/22 A3015 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

9 documents, released by the NTSB on September 7, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.