Robinson R22 accident near Winder, Georgia, October 18, 2020
On October 18, 2020 at about 2:59 pm local time, a 2008 Robinson R22 (helicopter), registered N566BC, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Winder, Georgia (Winder Barrow County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel’s failure to properly secure the engine cooling fan attachment bolts, leading to vibration of the cooling fan, the overextension of the tension belt actuator, the failure of the drive system vee-belts, and the loss of power to the rotor system. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the operator to incorporate the manufacturer’s service bulletin addressing the prevention of belt tension actuator overextension, and the failure of maintenance personnel and the pilot to observe the loose fanwheel bolts during the most recent 100-hour inspection and during the preflight inspection of the helicopter (respectively).
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 18, 2020 · about 2:59 pm local time
- Place
- Winder, Georgia · Winder Barrow County · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Robinson R22 BETA, built 2008 · all R22s on the register
- Registration
- N566BC · registry record · serial 4358
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was practicing touch-and-go landings during a personal flight in a helicopter. As the helicopter was turning onto a left crosswind during the fifth circuit around the pattern, the pilot heard a “metal against metal” noise, and the helicopter “jerked.” As he began to look for a clearing to land the helicopter, it jerked again, and the pilot thought that the helicopter was losing power. The pilot was unable to reach a clear area, and the helicopter descended “straight down” through trees and collided with the ground, resulting in substantial damage to the helicopter’s fuselage, tailboom, main rotor, and tail rotor and serious injuries to the pilot. Postaccident examination of the wreckage found that most of the drive system vee-belts were missing; only a small 2-ft portion of one vee-belt was found. Further examination of the wreckage revealed that the engine cooling fan attachment bolts were loose and could be easily turned with a wrench. The paint around the fanwheel-to-hub hardware was displaced, and surface corrosion and fretting residue were found on the exposed metal around the hardware. This evidence was indictive of the bolts having been loose for a period of time, and it is likely that the condition of the bolts would have resulted in the cooling fan imparting vibratory loads to the helicopter. The cooling fan vibration likely allowed the belt tension actuator to incrementally overextend, resulting in the failure of the vee-belts and the loss of power to the rotor system. The helicopter operator had not complied with a service bulletin that addressed an issue with the belt tension actuator. According to the airframe manufacturer, taking the action described in the service bulletin would have prevented the actuator from overextending by incorporating an electronic time delay. Also, there was no record of fanwheel replacement at the most recent overhaul, which was required by the manufacturer. The fanwheel hardware should also have been inspected by maintenance personnel at the last 100-hour inspection and by the pilot during the preflight inspection.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › (general) › Inadequate inspection
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
- Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Owner/builder
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 168 hours in all; 154 in this make and model; 7 in the last 90 days; 2 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: June 15, 2019
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,384 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 20, 2020; 84 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,370 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-J2A (piston); 2,384 hours total
- Operator: Blue Ridge Helicopters Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: LZU Lawrenceville GA at 2:00 pm
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 5, 3,607 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 30.39 inHg
- Observation at 10:55 am from KWDR, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KWDR 181455Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 13/06 A3039 RMK AO2
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on December 15, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.