Piper PA23 accident near Chatsworth, Georgia, July 1, 2017
On July 1, 2017 at about 8:44 pm local time, a 1966 Piper PA23, registered N44HJ, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Chatsworth, Georgia. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The noninstrument-rated pilot's continued visual flight rules flight into adverse weather conditions, which resulted in an encounter with severe convective activity, spatial disorientation, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's inadequate preflight weather planning.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 1, 2017 · about 8:44 pm local time
- Place
- Chatsworth, Georgia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA23 250, built 1966 · all PA23s on the register
- Registration
- N44HJ · no longer on the register · serial 27-3303
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The noninstrument-rated private pilot and three passengers departed on a visual flight rules cross-country flight in the multi-engine airplane. The pilot was not in contact with air traffic control at any time during the flight and there was no evidence that the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing from an official, access-controlled source. Witnesses near the accident site reported that a thunderstorm was advancing toward the area and that the sky was becoming very dark; although it was not yet raining, they heard thunder in the distance, and it was windy. They heard an airplane flying above, then saw pieces of the airplane falling from the sky. The wreckage was scattered over a large area consistent with an in-flight breakup. Examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Review of air traffic control and weather radar data revealed that the accident airplane flew at altitudes between 3,500 and 5,000 ft mean sea level north toward its destination and a large area of convective activity. As the airplane neared the southern edge of the convective system, it turned east, then back to the north before turning east again. Radar contact was lost shortly thereafter. Given the proximity of the airplane to the convective activity, it is likely that it was operating in highly turbulent conditions amidst the updraft/downdraft boundary along the leading edge of the advancing convection, and possibly in an area of reduced visibility. Review of weather information indicated that the airplane would have been operating in visual meteorological conditions for most, if not all, of its approach toward this large convective system, and the presence of convective activity ahead of the airplane should have been apparent to the pilot. An Area Forecast issued about an hour before the flight departed and valid for the accident time advised of scattered clouds at 3,500 ft and 5,500 ft, rain showers and thunderstorms with moderate rain, and possible severe thunderstorms with cumulonimbus clouds with tops to 45,000 ft. A convective SIGMET was issued about 45 minutes before the airplane reached the area of the accident site. At that time, the accident site was located very close to the boundary of the SIGMET advisory area. The pilot's lack of an instrument rating, turbulence, maneuvering flight, and the possible restricted visibility conditions are all factors known to be conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the in-flight breakup is consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. It is likely that, upon encountering the conditions associated with the leading edge of a large area of convective activity, the pilot became spatially disoriented, which resulted in a loss of control, subsequent exceedance of the airplane's design stress limitations, and an in-flight breakup.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
- Windshear or thunderstorm during enroute (cruise)
- Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Aircraft structural failure during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Total instrument experience › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Qualification/certification › Pilot
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather › Thunderstorm › Effect on operation
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Lateral/bank control › Not attained/maintained
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Awareness of condition
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Effect on operation
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › (general) › (general) › Capability exceeded
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weather planning › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 362 hours in all; 100 in this make and model; 9 in the last 90 days; 270 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: January 30, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,446 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, January 3, 2017
- Maximum gross weight: 3,180 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming TIO-540-J4A5 (piston); 5,446 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming TIO-540-J4A5 (piston); 5,446 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: 06A Tuskegee AL at 8:00 pm
- Destination: MMI Athens TN
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 020° at 8 knots, gusting 18
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 1,400 ft; scat at 900 ft
- Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
- Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
- Observation at 8:55 pm from DNN, 7 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
7 documents, released by the NTSB on October 3, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Witness Statements | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot Logbook Excerpts | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Maintenance Records | PDF, 35 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Meteorological Factual Report | PDF, 20 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Attachment 1 to Meteorological Factual Report | PDF, 16 pages | View Download |
| 6 | radar Data Plot/tabular Data | PDF, 21 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Wreckage Examination Summary | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N44HJ the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
