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Accidents · NTSB ERA16LA200 · Final report

Aeronca 7AC accident near Toughkenamon, Pennsylvania, June 1, 2016

On June 1, 2016 at about 1:00 pm local time, a 1946 Aeronca 7AC, registered N83547, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR go-around) near Toughkenamon, Pennsylvania (New Garden Airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The student pilot’s inadvertent actuation of the fuel shutoff valve, which led to a total loss of engine power, forced landing, and impact with a hangar. Contributing to the outcome was maintenance personnel’s inadequate inspection of the fuel shutoff system during the most recent annual inspection. Contributing to the flight instructor’s injuries was the detachment of the rear seat shoulder harness assembly.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 1, 2016 · about 1:00 pm local time
Place
Toughkenamon, Pennsylvania · New Garden Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Aeronca 7AC NO SERIES, built 1946 · all 7ACs on the register
Registration
N83547 · no longer on the register · serial 7AC-2225
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The student pilot and flight instructor were practicing takeoffs and landings on grass next to a runway. The pilot reported that, on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the instructor directed the student to demonstrate a simulated engine failure, followed by a go-around. When the airplane was about one-quarter of the way down the parallel runway, he told the student to go around. Shortly later, the engine “sputtered” and then lost all power. While attempting to maneuver the airplane during the subsequent forced landing attempt, the airplane struck a hanger. The airplane was substantially damaged, and the student and instructor sustained minor injuries. Following the accident, the student reported that, when he attempted to put the carburetor heat back in, it was possible that he inadvertently closed the fuel shutoff valve. Postaccident examination and a test run of the engine revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Given this information, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of the student pilot’s inadvertent actuation of the fuel shutoff valve instead of the carburetor heat. Postaccident examination of the airplane further revealed that the fuel shutoff valve assembly was missing a grommet. When installed, the grommet provided support to the fuel shutoff rod and resistance to motion. Additionally, the aperture in which the grommet was typically installed was elongated. Examination of the universal joints attached to the fuel shutoff lever and valve revealed that they were worn and moved easily. All these factors resulted in the fuel shutoff lever being allowed to move easily. The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed about 3 months before the accident, during which maintenance personnel should have noted the discrepancies with the fuel shutoff system. Additionally, the airplane was not equipped with an optional fuel shutoff valve guard. Had these discrepancies been rectified, and had the optional guard been installed, it is possible that the student pilot might not have inadvertently activated the fuel shutoff valve. The airplane had originally only been equipped with lap belts; however, shoulder harnesses were found installed on both the front and rear seats. The investigation could not determine who manufactured the shoulder harness assembly because it resembled many previously and currently manufactured aftermarket shoulder harness assemblies, and it had no part or serial numbers on it. Review of the airplane’s maintenance records did not reveal when or by whom the shoulder harness assemblies had been installed on the airplane. During the impact sequence, the rear seat shoulder harness assembly pulled loose from its mounting location. Examination of the rear seat shoulder harness assembly revealed that it was not bolted, fastened, or positively secured to the airplane’s tubular structure but was instead clamped over two, 5/8-inch-diameter tubes with upper and lower triangular attachment brackets just forward of where the tubes intersected with the top longeron. Examination of the attachment brackets revealed that, during the impact sequence, the bracket assembly likely either mechanically pulled or slid over the airplane’s structural tubing. It was noted that the back seat occupant was more seriously injured than the front seat occupant, whose shoulder harness did not separate from the structure. On the basis of this evidence, it is likely that the detachment of the rear shoulder harness assembly contributed to the instructor’s injuries because it allowed him to strike the front seatback and his control stick.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Student/instructed pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Inadequate inspection
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Flight compartment equipment › Failure

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 10,000 hours in all; 200 in this make and model; 40 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 9,500 as pilot in command; 4,500 on instruments
  • Last flight review: October 22, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: minor injuries

Dual student

  • Certificate: student
  • Flight time: 279 hours in all; 180 in this make and model; 20 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Sport Pilot
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,452 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 8, 2016
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,220 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming A-65-8 (piston); 2,209 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: N57 Toughkenamon PA at 12:15 pm
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 06, 3,695 ft by 50 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
  • Observation at 12:55 pm from MQS, 10 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

12 documents, released by the NTSB on March 22, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.