Airbus A220 incident near Côte-D'Or Region, Outside the U.S., September 16, 2019
On September 16, 2019 at about 7:25 pm local time, a 2017 Airbus A220, registered HBJCA, was involved in an incident during enroute (change of cruise level) near Côte-D'Or Region, Outside the U.S.. It was flown under non-U.S. commercial rules. No one was hurt; 77 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation due to a high cycle fatigue crack (HCF) that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. The HCF crack developed because of a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation and blade flutter response. The excitation was driven by an acoustic tone generated by turbulent airflow passing over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity while the engine was operating at high speeds in specific flight conditions. A primary contributor to the failure mode was an electronic engine control (EEC) software update that changed the LPC vane schedule and increased the likelihood of LPC stage 1 IBR blade flutter onset within the engine operating range.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 16, 2019 · about 7:25 pm local time
- Place
- Côte-D'Or Region, France · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 77 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- conditions the NTSB did not record
- Aircraft
- Airbus A220 300, built 2017
- Registration
- HBJCA · no longer on the register · serial 55010
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · non-U.S. commercial rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The No. 1 engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) failure was caused by a stage 1 IBR high cycle fatigue crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Multiple analytical methods, including two-dimensional (2D) computational fluid dynamics (CFD), acoustic testing, and instrumented flight testing identified a coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR instability caused by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine N1 speeds, the stage 3 IBR blade tips generate vortices/turbulent airflow and given the right conditions, the turbulent airflow can create an acoustic tone as it passes over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC stage 3 IBR (Figure 1). The acoustic tone drove a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode excitation that was then mechanically transferred through the LPC module and excited a LPC stage 1 IBR stiffwise bending mode that was present at the same approximate frequency. The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the IBR 3 / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic Interaction Factors that contributed to the LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR acoustic coincidence and blade excitation within the engine operating range were: installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and the low time rub in period on the LPC IBR blade tip clearances. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 changed the LPC inlet guide vane schedule to rotate the IGV’s in the closed direction at specific high power engine conditions to improve engine stall/surge margin. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for generation of the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity acoustic tone and IBR mode excitation. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The reduced clearance created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling/flutter response. After a rub in period, the clearance increases, and the occurrence of flutter onset is reduced. This incident was the second of four Airbus A220-300 PW1500G LPC stage 1 IBR separations that occurred between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020. The findings from the first LPC stage 1 IBR failure investigation are available in the NTSB investigation number ENG19IA029 docket.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (change of cruise level) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Compressor section › Failure
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Compressor section › Design
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 16, 2019
- Maximum gross weight: 143,301 lb
- Seats: 152
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PW1524G-3 (turbofan); 333 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PW1524G-3 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Swiss International Air Lines
The flight
- Departed from: GVA Geneva OF
- Destination: LHR London OF
- Flight plan: not recorded
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 3 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 72 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
4 documents, released by the NTSB on May 3, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report | PDF, 35 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Metallurgical Investigation of Swiss International Air Lines PW1524G Engine No. 736195 | PDF, 21 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Flight Data Recorder - Specialista��s Factual Report | PDF, 26 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 2 (FDR Tabular Data for Event Flight) | data file | Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.