Boeing 737-823 and Airbus 321 incident near Sarasota, Florida, February 17, 2023
On February 17, 2023 at about 1:59 am local time, 2 aircraft, Boeing 737-823 (N976NN) and Airbus 321 (CFJQH), were involved in the same incident near Sarasota, Florida (Sarasota- Bradenton Internati airport). No one was hurt; 372 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The local controller’s failure to prioritize and properly monitor the runway and airport environment along with his erroneous assumption that ROU 1633 would depart from runway 14 before AAL2172 arrived to land on the same runway, which resulted in a loss of separation between both airplanes.
The local controller’s failure to prioritize and properly monitor the runway and airport environment along with his erroneous assumption that ROU 1633 would depart from runway 14 before AAL2172 arrived to land on the same runway, which resulted in a loss of separation between both airplanes.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 17, 2023 · about 1:59 am local time
- Place
- Sarasota, Florida · Sarasota- Bradenton Internati · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 372 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Boeing 737-823, built 2015 · all 737-823s on the register
- Registration
- N976NN · registry record · serial 33243
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
- Aircraft 2
- Airbus 321 211
- Registration
- CFJQH · no longer on the register · serial 6805
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 737-823 final · quoted from the NTSB record
At the time of the incident, the flight crews of Air Canada Rouge flight 1633 (ROU1633) and American Airlines flight 2172 (AAL2172) were in communications with and were operating in the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) airspace. Two FAA controllers were on duty at the time, but one was on break, and the local control (LC) controller was the only person in the tower at that time. All ATCT positions including that of the operational supervisor were combined, and the workload was stated as normal for the time of day and for one controller being in the ATCT cab. NTSB postincident examination of SRQ radar data revealed that AAL2172 was about twelve miles northwest of SRQ on a visual approach to runway 14 when communications were established with the FAA local controller (LC). The LC then cleared AAL2172 to land on Runway 14. About three minutes later, the LC asked ROU1633 if they were ready for departure, and ROU1633 responded affirmatively. The LC then cleared ROU1633 for takeoff on Runway 14, with instructions to fly the runway heading, and issued ROU1633 a traffic advisory that AAL2172 was on a 3-mile final. The LC stated that he then turned while at the LC position and picked up flight strips and talked to another aircraft. ADS-B data indicated that AAL2172 was about 4.1 nm from the threshold of runway 14. About 13 seconds later, when AAL2172 was on 3.4-mile final, the LC issued AAL2172 a traffic advisory informing AAL2172 that ROU1633 was departing runway 14. When AAL2172 was on a 2.5-mile final, ROU1633 asked the LC to confirm the departure heading, to which the LC affirmed that ROU1633 was to fly the runway heading. The LC further stated that ROU1633 had not yet started their takeoff roll. He stated that he then turned away from his position and walked to the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) equipment located on the other side of the tower cab to update the latest ATIS information. About 53 seconds later, while at the ATIS equipment, the local controller heard that AAL2172 was executing a pilot-initiated go-around, and he looked and saw that ROU 1633 was passing the intersection of runway 14/22 and climbing, and AAL2172 was abeam taxiway C2 on the go-around. The controller relied on visually monitoring both airplanes to ensure that their courses diverged, and that lateral separation was assured. However, the local controller turned his attention to a lower priority task before confirming that ROU1633 had departed. The estimated closest proximity between ROU1633 and AAL2172 was 0.6 miles horizontally and about the same altitude; ROU1633 was departing runway 14 and climbing through 100 feet, and AAL2172 was about 100 feet, and crossing over the runway 14 numbers. Figure 1. Position of aircraft involved when local controller looked up and outside the ATCT cab after hearing AAL2172 report “going around”.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus 321 final · quoted from the NTSB record
At the time of the incident, the flight crews of Air Canada Rouge flight 1633 (ROU1633) and American Airlines flight 2172 (AAL2172) were in communications with and were operating in the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) airspace. Two FAA controllers were on duty at the time, but one was on break, and the local control (LC) controller was the only person in the tower at that time. All ATCT positions including that of the operational supervisor were combined, and the workload was stated as normal for the time of day and for one controller being in the ATCT cab. NTSB postincident examination of SRQ radar data revealed that AAL2172 was about twelve miles northwest of SRQ on a visual approach to runway 14 when communications were established with the FAA local controller (LC). The LC then cleared AAL2172 to land on Runway 14. About three minutes later, the LC asked ROU1633 if they were ready for departure, and ROU1633 responded affirmatively. The LC then cleared ROU1633 for takeoff on Runway 14, with instructions to fly the runway heading, and issued ROU1633 a traffic advisory that AAL2172 was on a 3-mile final. The LC stated that he then turned while at the LC position and picked up flight strips and talked to another aircraft. ADS-B data indicated that AAL2172 was about 4.1 nm from the threshold of runway 14. About 13 seconds later, when AAL2172 was on 3.4-mile final, the LC issued AAL2172 a traffic advisory informing AAL2172 that ROU1633 was departing runway 14. When AAL2172 was on a 2.5-mile final, ROU1633 asked the LC to confirm the departure heading, to which the LC affirmed that ROU1633 was to fly the runway heading. The LC further stated that ROU1633 had not yet started their takeoff roll. He stated that he then turned away from his position and walked to the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) equipment located on the other side of the tower cab to update the latest ATIS information. About 53 seconds later, while at the ATIS equipment, the local controller heard that AAL2172 was executing a pilot-initiated go-around, and he looked and saw that ROU 1633 was passing the intersection of runway 14/22 and climbing, and AAL2172 was abeam taxiway C2 on the go-around. The controller relied on visually monitoring both airplanes to ensure that their courses diverged, and that lateral separation was assured. However, the local controller turned his attention to a lower priority task before confirming that ROU1633 had departed. The estimated closest proximity between ROU1633 and AAL2172 was 0.6 miles horizontally and about the same altitude; ROU1633 was departing runway 14 and climbing through 100 feet, and AAL2172 was about 100 feet, and crossing over the runway 14 numbers. Figure 1. Position of aircraft involved when local controller looked up and outside the ATCT cab after hearing AAL2172 report “going around”.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Boeing 737-823 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › ATC personnel
The aircraft
- Seats: 162
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24E (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24E (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: American Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: KCLT Charlotte NC
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 14L, 9,500 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 200° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 pm from SRQ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 6 | |||
| Passengers | 172 |
The factual record for the Airbus 321 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during takeoff defining event
- Runway incursion veh/AC/person during takeoff
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › ATC personnel
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Operator: Air Canada Rouge
The flight
- Destination: CYYZ Toronto OF
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 6 | |||
| Passengers | 188 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on February 26, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 AA2172 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Employee Statements - AA2172 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | Air Traffic Control Group Factual Report | PDF, 21 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 1 - Interview Transcriptions | PDF, 100 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 2 - Srq Local Control Audio | audio | View Download |
| 6 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 3-SRQ Atis | audio | View Download |
| 7 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 4 -tpa 1L Sector Audio | audio | View Download |
| 8 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 5 - Tpa 1S Sector Audio | audio | View Download |
| 9 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 6 - ADS-B Data | zip file | Download |
| 10 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 7 -faa radar Data | zip file | Download |
| 11 | Air Traffic Control - Attachment 8 - Srq ATC Administrative Documents | PDF, 84 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.