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Accidents · NTSB DCA19LA134 · Final report

Airbus A321 accident near New York, New York, April 11, 2019

On April 11, 2019, a 2014 Airbus A321, registered N114NN, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near New York, New York (John F Kennedy Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The captain’s excessive left rudder pedal input during the takeoff ground roll, which caused a large heading deviation and a left roll upon rotation that resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 11, 2019
Place
New York, New York · John F Kennedy Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Airbus A321 231, built 2014 · all A321s on the register
Registration
N114NN · registry record · serial 6046
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

This accident occurred when an American Airlines Airbus A321 entered a left roll during takeoff from runway 31L at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The wind at the time resulted in a 14- to 17-knot crosswind from the right, which was below the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation. The initial takeoff roll proceeded normally, with the captain (the pilot flying) applying left rudder pedal to counter the right crosswind. The captain stated that he kept the airplane near the runway centerline and that “everything was ok” when the airplane reached 80 knots. When the airplane reached the rotation speed of 156 knots while still on the ground, the captain made a large left rudder pedal input, from 8° to 25°, during a 1.5-second timeframe. In response to this large rudder pedal input, the airplane’s heading deviated to the left, and its lateral acceleration increased to a maximum of 0.32 G. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated the airplane made a “significant” turn to the left. The captain also stated that he was “looking at the runway edge” and knew he had to get the airplane into the air. Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data showed that the sidestick was pulled to its full nose-up position and a right sidestick position. During the aft sidestick and right sidestick application to rotate the airplane, the rudder remained close to its full-left deflection for 3 seconds. As the nose of the airplane lifted off the ground, the airplane began to roll to the left, and the left roll rate accelerated as the main landing gear lifted off the ground, reaching a maximum of 37° left wing down as the captain moved the rudder and sidestick to full right and to full aft. These movements arrested the left roll and allowed the airplane to continue to lift off. The large left roll angle immediately after liftoff resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground and a runway distance marker, part of which remained imbedded in the wingtip. Airbus engineering simulations performed as part of this investigation demonstrated that the several seconds of near-maximum left rudder generated a rolling moment after the gear had left the ground to impart the left roll rate that the DFDR recorded. No airplane flight control abnormalities were noted, except for a left aileron deflection as the left wingtip scraped the ground. Thus, the left roll that occurred was in response to the captain’s left rudder pedal input during rotation of the airplane. Also, Airbus’ engineering simulations demonstrated that the airplane’s deviation to the left while on the ground was in response to the captain’s rudder pedal input; no abnormalities in the airplane’s response were noted. In addition, American Airlines conducted a study of 13 months of takeoffs and found that the accident flight had a larger heading change, roll angle, maximum commanded rudder, and duration of maximum commanded rudder than the other takeoffs in the data set. Even though the crosswind that was occurring during the accident takeoff was about one-half of the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation, the accident airplane had a greater maximum deflection and a greater duration of input compared with all the other flights in the data set, including several flights with takeoffs that occurred with a stronger crosswind than the crosswind during the accident flight. Thus, the accident captain’s left rudder pedal input was excessive and not necessary for the crosswind that was present during the takeoff. .

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Abnormal runway contact during takeoff defining event
  2. Runway excursion during takeoff

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Yaw control › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Crosswind correction › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Not attained/maintained
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Lateral/bank control › Not attained/maintained

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight engineer, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 19,654 hours in all; 3,005 in this make and model; 2,975 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: December 21, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight engineer
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 10,103 hours in all; 1,824 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 6, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 18,408.5 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 10, 2019
  • Maximum gross weight: 205,030 lb
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 18,409 hours total
  • Engine 2: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 18,409 hours total
  • Operator: American Airlines

The flight

  • Departed from: JFK New York NY
  • Destination: LAX Los Angeles CA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 31L, 14,511 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 330° at 15 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi6
Flight crew2
Passengers102

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

20 documents, released by the NTSB on June 14, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Weather Study PDF, 19 pages View Download
2 Operational Factors/human Performance Group Report PDF, 34 pages View Download
3 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 1 - Flight Crew Interview Summaries and Statements PDF, 21 pages View Download
4 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 2 - Cabin Crew Statements PDF, 4 pages View Download
5 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 3 - Following Aircraft Captain's Statement PDF, 2 pages View Download
6 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 4 - Flight Crew Schedules PDF, 3 pages View Download
7 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 5 - Flight Crew Flight Hours PDF, 2 pages View Download
8 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 6 - Flight Crew Training Records [excerpts] PDF, 4 pages View Download
9 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 7 - Accident Flight Release PDF, 31 pages View Download
10 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 8 - Accident Flight Closeout Paperwork PDF, 7 pages View Download
11 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 9 - Accident Flight Acars Communication [excerpt] PDF, 11 pages View Download
12 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 10 - American Airlines Operations Manuals Volume 1 and 2 [excerpts] PDF, 21 pages View Download
13 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 11 - American Airlines Quick Reference Handbook [excerpts] PDF, 7 pages View Download
14 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 12 - American Airlines Aqp Volume 1 [excerpt] PDF, 3 pages View Download
15 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 13 - American Airliens Weight and Balance Manual [excerpt] PDF, 3 pages View Download
16 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 14 - Airbus Safety First Crossiwnd Devlopment and Certification [article] PDF, 6 pages View Download
17 Operational Factors/human Performance Attachment 15 - Group Party Forms PDF, 3 pages View Download
18 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (Compressed FDR Tabular Data for Event Flight) zip file Download
19 Flight Data Recorder - Specialista��s Factual Report PDF, 9 pages View Download
20 Cockpit Voice Recorder PDF, 34 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.