Bell 407 accident near Gulf Of Mexico, GM, December 7, 2019
On December 7, 2019 at about 3:18 pm local time, a 1996 Bell 407 (helicopter), registered N79LP, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Gulf Of Mexico, GM. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power due to the failure of the engine’s Nos. 3 and 4 bearings and the power turbine pinion gear, and subsequent loss of main rotor rpm, which resulted in a loss of control and impact with the water.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 7, 2019 · about 3:18 pm local time
- Place
- Gulf Of Mexico, GM · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 407 No Series, built 1996 · all 407s on the register
- Registration
- N79LP · no longer on the register · serial 53027
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter was flying over the Gulf of Mexico between two oil platforms. Flight track data showed the helicopter in cruise flight at 700 ft mean sea level (msl) before it gradually descended to 375 ft msl. Just before the data ended, the helicopter entered a left turn, descended to 150 ft msl, and slowed from about 115 knots (kts) groundspeed to about 75 kts groundspeed. The helicopter impacted the water and sank to the sea floor. The main wreckage was eventually located on the sea floor about 350 ft southwest of the last recorded flight track point. Examination of the engine revealed that the power turbine pinion gear teeth were significantly worn and smeared, which ultimately resulted in the engine’s inability to provide power to the rotor system. While the majority of the No. 3 bearing was not recovered, the significant thermal damage and loss of material of the power turbine pinion gear shoulder, to which the No. 3 bearing inner race was installed, indicated that the bearing likely failed first, but the cause of the No. 3 bearing failure could not be determined because the bearing was not recovered. The failure of the No. 3 bearing could result in misalignment of the gear mesh between the power turbine pinion gear and the torquemeter gear, which likely caused the pinion gear teeth to rapidly degrade and/or fracture. The initial failure of the No. 3 bearing would have resulted in the failure of the No. 4 bearing and the power turbine pinion gear. The reasons why damage to the Nos. 3 and 4 bearings and the power turbine pinion gear did not result in an engine chip light or oil filter contamination, leading to a filter bypass indication, could not be determined based on the available evidence. The blockages observed in the oil delivery tube and oil nozzle were consistent with corrosion, likely due to postaccident saltwater immersion; therefore, whether there were any preexisting anomalies of the oil delivery tube jets and/or the oil nozzle, such as oil coking, could not be determined. However, the remainder of the recovered engine bearings and gears did not show evidence of damage associated with a widespread lubrication issue. Analysis of the caution and warning panel bulb filaments showed that several annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact, consistent with the effects of a loss of engine power due to a failure of the power turbine pinion gear. The main rotor rpm warning light would have illuminated within a second of the loss of engine power as main rotor speed (Nr) decreased, and the hydraulic system and transmission oil pressure annunciator lights would have illuminated once Nr decreased to critical levels. The data downloaded from the helicopter’s engine control unit was also consistent with a loss of engine power and subsequent loss of Nr. While collective pitch was reduced for a few seconds after the loss of engine power, collective pitch was subsequently increased, which led to a quicker decay of Nr. The substantial decrease in Nr would have affected controllability of the helicopter and ultimately resulted in a loss of control. The pilot’s cyclic and pedal inputs, as well as the helicopter’s attitude and airspeed, at the time of the loss of engine power were not known. Therefore, it could not be determined if the pilot successfully entered autorotation or the reasons why the pilot increased collective control about 3 seconds after the loss of engine power. There was no evidence that the emergency flotation system was deployed. While flight track data for the accident flight was available, the last few data points were discontinuous and could not be reliably matched with the recorded engine data; therefore, it could not be determined if the pilot was in a position to deploy the emergency flotation system following the loss of power.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise)
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Accessory drives › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,180 hours in all; 500 in this make and model; 180 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: May 13, 2019
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,500.8 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 12, 2019; 118.7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,501 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls Royce 250-C47 (turboshaft); 7,583 hours total
- Operator: Panther Helicopters Inc
The flight
- Departed from: Oil Platform Wd109 GM
- Destination: Oil Platform Wd73 GM
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 800 ft
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
10 documents, released by the NTSB on August 26, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 12 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual Report | PDF, 24 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual Report - Attachment 1 (Ecu Data) | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Rolls-royce Materials Evaluation Report | PDF, 135 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Computed Tomography Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 66 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Maintenance Records Excerpts | PDF, 22 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Photos | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 8 | FAA ADS-B Tabular Data | data file | Download |
| 9 | Oil Platform Area Map | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 10 | Miscellaneous Information - Pilot Background Information | PDF, 8 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
