Schweizer 269C accident near Kindred, North Dakota, August 16, 2018
On August 16, 2018 at about 3:30 pm local time, a 1985 Schweizer 269C (helicopter), registered N3625Z, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Kindred, North Dakota. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to adequately inspect the lower coupling driveshaft during his preflight inspection and his non-compliance with an applicable airworthiness directive, which resulted in the failure of the forward drive splines of the lower coupling driveshaft during cruise flight. Co-causal to the accident was the pilot’s failure to maintain control of the helicopter during the autorotation landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 16, 2018 · about 3:30 pm local time
- Place
- Kindred, North Dakota · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Schweizer 269C, built 1985 · all 269Cs on the register
- Registration
- N3625Z · no longer on the register · serial S1194
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was conducting a personal flight when he heard a loud "snap" that was followed by a significant yaw of the helicopter during cruise flight. He stated that the throttle still controlled engine speed, but the main rotor speed did not respond to throttle changes. He immediately entered an autorotation and landed the helicopter level on its skids in a nearby wheat field. The helicopter still had forward ground speed at touchdown, it pitched up briefly, and then slowly rolled onto its right side. The pilot moved the mixture control into the fuel cutoff position to shut down the engine after the accident. The helicopter caught fire a few minutes after the accident and was subsequently destroyed. Postaccident examination revealed that the forward drive splines of the lower coupling drive shaft were missing and exhibited evidence of significant rotational damage. The pilot was unaware of the flight manual’s preflight checklist requirement to check the free-play and to verify the proper lubrication of the lower coupling drive shaft, nor had he ever completed those preflight inspection tasks during the 18 years that he had owned the helicopter. Had he completed an adequate preflight inspection of the helicopter, the pilot would have been aware of the lack of lubrication and/or excessive free-play of the lower coupling driveshaft and that maintenance was required before the helicopter could be flown safely. A review of available maintenance documentation revealed that the helicopter was not in compliance with an airworthiness directive that required the disassembly of the lower coupling drive shaft components for a recurring inspection. The helicopter had exceeded the initial 25-hour time-in-service inspection requirement by about 44 hours when the accident occurred. The pilot, who was the sole owner and operator of the helicopter, was responsible for ensuring compliance with the airworthiness directive. The pilot’s non-compliance with the required inspection contributed to the failure of the lower coupling drive shaft.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
- Loss of control on ground during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Roll over during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Main rotor drive › Engine/transmission coupling › Failure
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Main rotor drive › Engine/transmission coupling › Not inspected
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: balloon; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 4,089.4 hours in all; 930 in this make and model; 33 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 390.6 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 26, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,474.5 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, September 1, 2017
- Maximum gross weight: 2,050 lb
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming HIO-360-A1A (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: Mcleod ND at 3:15 pm
- Destination: FAR Fargo ND
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
- Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
- Observation at 3:53 pm from FAR, 17 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
8 documents, released by the NTSB on July 15, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Memorandum of Conversation (Thomas Nagle) | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | FAA Inspector Statement and Email Message | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Maintenance Logbooks (Excerpts) | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 5 | FAA Airworthiness Directive 93-17-13 | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 6 | FAA Airworthiness Directive 2017-14-06 | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Weather Data | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | Photos | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N3625Z the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
