The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB CEN15LA416 · Final report

Cessna R172 accident near College Station, Texas, September 17, 2015

On September 17, 2015 at about 6:30 pm local time, a 1976 Cessna R172, registered N180CM, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near College Station, Texas. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The total loss of engine power due to the fatigue failure of the No. 1 connecting rod. Contributing to the accident was the manufacturer’s exclusion of the accident engine (by serial number) in a revision of a service bulletin.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 17, 2015 · about 6:30 pm local time
Place
College Station, Texas · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna R172, built 1976 · all R172s on the register
Registration
N180CM · no longer on the register · serial R1722213
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airline transport pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, during cruise flight, he heard a loud "pop or bang" and that the airplane started vibrating. The engine subsequently lost power. During the forced landing to a road, the airplane struck a building and then a truck. An examination of the engine found two holes in the crankcase. Further examination revealed that the No. 1 connecting rod had failed due to fatigue. The engine manufacturer had previously issued a service bulletin (SB), which recommended the examination and potential replacement of the connecting rods in the accident engine due to wear or fatigue; the SB included both the accident engine's serial number and the connecting rod's forging stamp identification. The engine manufacturer subsequently revised the SB; the revision excluded the accident engine by serial number but the connecting rods were still included. However, it would not be possible for a mechanic to identify the connecting rod serial numbers without taking the engine apart. A review of the maintenance records revealed that the accident engine was last overhauled about 5 years after the issuance of the revised SB; no entry was found indicating that the connecting rods were examined in accordance with the SB, and no subsequent maintenance occurred that would have allowed for the examination of the connecting rods. However, because this was a Part 91 operation, such an inspection was not mandatory. Despite the fact that the SB was not mandatory, because the manufacturer removed the engine serial number from the revised SB, a mechanic would have very little way of knowing whether the connecting rods should be inspected.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Related maintenance info
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Ground vehicle › Contributed to outcome
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Residence/building › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 25,557 hours in all; 95 in this make and model; 16.7 in the last 90 days; 6.5 in the last 30 days; 17,779 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: December 18, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,754.8 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 1, 2015
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,300 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-360-K (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 1TA7 Canton TX
  • Destination: KRAS Port Aransas TX
  • Flight plan: VFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 190° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from KCLL, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on June 29, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.