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Accidents · NTSB WPR24LA243 · Final report

Mcdonnell Douglas Helicopter 369E accident near Cottonwood, Arizona, July 13, 2024

On July 13, 2024 at about 5:45 pm local time, a 1991 Mcdonnell Douglas Helicopter 369E, registered N473E, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Cottonwood, Arizona (Cottonwood airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s low-speed, high-power maneuvering in high density altitude and near maximum gross weight, which resulted in an uncommanded right yaw due to a loss of tail rotor effectiveness and a subsequent hard landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 13, 2024 · about 5:45 pm local time
Place
Cottonwood, Arizona · Cottonwood · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Mcdonnell Douglas Helicopter 369E, built 1991 · all 369Es on the register
Registration
N473E · registry record · serial 0473E
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The sightseeing helicopter pilot made a slow, high-powered maneuver near a canyon tour site with three passengers on board in light gusting wind conditions. As the pilot tried to fly away from the area, an uncommanded right yaw occurred. The pilot applied full left pedal control, but the helicopter maintained its right yaw. Shortly after, the low rotor rpm audio warning sounded, and the temperature caution light flashed. The pilot performed a low-level autorotation, and the right yaw stopped, but the helicopter landed hard and bounced. The left skid separated, and the helicopter slid forward, balanced on the right skid. The pilot then departed back to the operator’s base airport and made an emergency landing on one skid, at which time the passengers safely disembarked. Shortly after, the pilot relocated the helicopter to an open grass area at the airport to shut down the helicopter, after which the helicopter came to rest on its side and the drivetrain sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported a possible tail control rigging issue; however, postaccident examination of the 4-bladed tail rotor assembly and the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. Flight control and drivetrain continuity were confirmed from the cockpit to all main and tail rotor flight control surfaces. Conditions reported by the pilot showed that he was operating at a high density altitude with a high gross weight while the helicopter was in a low-speed, high-powered, descending maneuver. As such, the pilot’s maneuvering was in an environment and flight profile that was conducive to the onset of loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE). According to the manufacturer and FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95, the 4-bladed tail rotor assembly configuration is susceptible to LTE while operating with a low airspeed (typically below translational speed) with high power setting, and near or above maximum gross weight. It is likely that the pilot flew a flight profile that resulted in an uncommanded rapid yaw due to LTE, which was only mitigated by a low-altitude autorotation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of tail rotor effectiveness during maneuvering (hover) defining event
  2. Aerodynamic stall/spin during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  3. Autorotation Hard landing

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind › Gusts › Effect on equipment
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › High density altitude › Effect on equipment
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor › (general) › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 9,221 hours in all; 15 in this make and model; 35 in the last 90 days; 25 in the last 30 days; 8,354 as pilot in command; 500 on instruments
  • Last flight review: April 5, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls-Royc 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Heliventure LLC

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 97°F (36°C), dew point 41°F (5°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.24 inHg
  • Observation at 10:55 am from KSEZ, 14 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KSEZ 131755Z AUTO VRB05G18KT 10SM CLR 36/05 A3024 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on July 16, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR24LA243.