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Accidents · NTSB WPR24FA072 · Final report

Kubicek BB85Z accident near Eloy, Arizona, January 14, 2024

On January 14, 2024 at about 2:47 pm local time, a 2011 Kubicek BB85Z (balloon), registered N4961D, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Eloy, Arizona. It was an other work-use flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured; 8 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s decision to open the rapid deflation valve during flight as a means of descending, which resulted in the deflation of the envelope and hard impact with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 14, 2024 · about 2:47 pm local time
Place
Eloy, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
4 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured; 8 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Kubicek BB85Z, built 2011
Registration
N4961D · registry record · serial 851
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The balloon departed with the pilot, eight skydivers, and four passengers on a sightseeing passenger and skydiving (commercial) flight. Interviews with the skydivers revealed that after about 35 minutes, the balloon reached an altitude of about 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and all 8 skydivers departed from the basket in 4 groups numbering 3, 2, 1 and 2 jumpers, respectively. The four passengers and pilot remained in the basket. After the jumpers exited the basket, the pilot pulled the red rapid deflation valve line 12 times to open the rapid deflation valve. This action resulted in a rapid loss of air that deformed the envelope, causing the deflation system’s control lines to drop in and around the basket, which pinched the Red-White line in the flying cables. About 46 seconds later, the pilot attempted to add hot air to the envelope and attempted to close the rapid deflation valve but, was unsuccessful. During the descent the envelope continued to deflate until it was in a streamer-type configuration. Additionally, at times a burner flame under the deflated envelope was observed, as the pilot attempted to inflate the balloon envelope. The balloon continued to descend until it impacted the terrain. Witnesses saw the balloon descending toward the ground. A review of multiple mobile phone videos revealed that the balloon was descending with the envelope deflated and trailing above the basket. Postaccident examination of the balloon did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. According to the balloon flight manual, the rapid deflation system was designed for fast and efficient deflation of the envelope during landing below 6.5 ft above ground level to prevent the basket from being dragged in windy conditions. If the pilot had used the parachute valve to manage the descent, he likely would have been able to land the balloon without injuries. Several online videos showed the pilot using the rapid deflation system while at high altitudes in other flights, indicating that that this was a common practice for him.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Physical › Impairment/incapacitation › Illness/injury › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › (general) › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: balloon
  • Flight time: 500 hours in all; 100 in the last 90 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: ctr
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: none
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: serious injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Operator: Droplyne LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: N/A Casa Grande AZ at 12:30 pm
  • Destination: N/A Eloy AZ
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 050° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 37°F (3°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.99 inHg
  • Observation at 7:56 am from KCGZ, 16 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KCGZ 141456Z AUTO 05004KT 10SM CLR 03/M03 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP160 6//// T00331033 53005 PNO $

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers318

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

21 documents, released by the NTSB on July 22, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
2 Witness Statement-west PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
3 Witness Statement-wentz PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
4 Droplyne Waiver-copy PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
5 Maintenance Logbook Excerpt-last Inspection PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
6 Kubicek K60TT Basket Information PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
7 Kubicek Z Series Balloon Envelope Information PDF, 7 pages · our copy View Download
8 Kubicek Flight Manual EXCERPT-4.3 Preparation, Assembling the Balloon and Take-off PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
9 Kubicek Flight Manual Excerpt-dropping of Parachutists PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 Kubicek Flight Manual Excerpt-emergency Procedures, Deflation System Malfunction PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
11 Kubicek Flight Manual Excerpt-smart Vent Illustration PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
12 Winds Aloft Data PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
13 NTSB Accident Site and Wreckage Follow-up Examination Report PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
14 Toxicology Report-pilot PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
15 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation-bfa PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
16 Letter from Bfa on Party Representative PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
17 FAA Balloon Flying Handbook-descents and Rapid Descents PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
18 FAA Balloon Flying Handbook-prelaunch Check PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
19 Medical Factual Report PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
20 Faa-pilot Toxicology Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
21 Video Files - Factual Report of Group Chair PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N4961D the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2005-07-20LAX05CA240 · accident near North Las Vegas, NV · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.