Robinson Helicopter Company R22 and Piper PA-28-181 mid-air collision near Chandler, Arizona, October 1, 2021
On October 1, 2021 at about 2:40 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Robinson Helicopter Company R22 (N412TL) and Piper PA-28-181 (N2868H), were involved in a mid-air collision near Chandler, Arizona (Chandler Muni airport). 2 people were killed; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the pilots onboard the airplane to see and avoid the helicopter while maneuvering in the traffic pattern, which resulted in a midair collision.
The failure of the pilots onboard the airplane to see and avoid the helicopter while maneuvering in the traffic pattern, which resulted in a midair collision.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 1, 2021 · about 2:40 pm local time
- Place
- Chandler, Arizona · Chandler Muni · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed; 2 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Robinson Helicopter Company R22, built 2015
- Registration
- N412TL · registry record · serial 4689
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Piper PA-28-181, built 1979 · all PA-28-181s on the register
- Registration
- N2868H · no longer on the register · serial 28-7990508
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Robinson Helicopter Company R22 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A low-wing airplane and a helicopter, both of which were operating as instructional flights with flight instructors onboard, were performing takeoffs and landings at the tower-controlled airport in day visual meteorological conditions. The helicopter was performing right traffic patterns to the taxiway that paralleled the runway, while the airplane was performing right traffic patterns, outside of and above the helicopter pattern, to the runway. The helicopter had been cleared for “the option” to the taxiway, while the airplane was cleared to land shortly thereafter. After receiving landing clearance, the instructor onboard the airplane elected to conduct a simulated engine failure to a full-stop landing, reducing the engine power to idle abeam the approach end of the runway, but did not advise the tower controller of his intentions. While on final approach, the instructor took control of the airplane and entered a forward slip. The instructor and student then heard and felt a loud “bang” and the instructor declared an emergency, thinking that the airplane had impacted birds. Flight track information, witness statements, and damage to the airplane indicated that the airplane descended into the helicopter while both aircraft were on final approach for landing. Review of tower control communications indicated that the accident airplane had been advised and was aware of helicopters operating to the parallel taxiway. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land behind a twin-engine airplane, and advised of a helicopter low and to the airplane's right (the accident helicopter). The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the failure of the pilots onboard the airplane to see and avoid the helicopter during landing approach, resulting in a collision with the helicopter. It is possible that the airplane’s low-wing configuration and steep descent while in the forward slip may have contributed to the pilots’ failure to see the helicopter below them.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA-28-181 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A low-wing airplane and a helicopter, both of which were operating as instructional flights with flight instructors onboard, were performing takeoffs and landings at the tower-controlled airport in day visual meteorological conditions. The helicopter was performing right traffic patterns to the taxiway that paralleled the runway, while the airplane was performing right traffic patterns, outside of and above the helicopter pattern, to the runway. The helicopter had been cleared for “the option” to the taxiway, while the airplane was cleared to land shortly thereafter. After receiving landing clearance, the instructor onboard the airplane elected to conduct a simulated engine failure to a full-stop landing, reducing the engine power to idle abeam the approach end of the runway, but did not advise the tower controller of his intentions. While on final approach, the instructor took control of the airplane and entered a forward slip. The instructor and student then heard and felt a loud “bang” and the instructor declared an emergency, thinking that the airplane had impacted birds. Flight track information, witness statements, and damage to the airplane indicated that the airplane descended into the helicopter while both aircraft were on final approach for landing. Review of tower control communications indicated that the accident airplane had been advised and was aware of helicopters operating to the parallel taxiway. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land behind a twin-engine airplane, and advised of a helicopter low and to the airplane's right (the accident helicopter). The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the failure of the pilots onboard the airplane to see and avoid the helicopter during landing approach, resulting in a collision with the helicopter. It is possible that the airplane’s low-wing configuration and steep descent while in the forward slip may have contributed to the pilots’ failure to see the helicopter below them.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Robinson Helicopter Company R22 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent rate › Related operating info
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 566 hours in all; 513 in this make and model; 213 in the last 90 days; 88 in the last 30 days; 468 as pilot in command; 283 on instruments
- Last flight review: May 25, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 26 hours in all; 26 in this make and model; 26 in the last 90 days; 21 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,775.3 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 28, 2021; 14 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 1,370 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-J2A (piston); 63,298 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 04R, 4,870 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 040° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 48°F (9°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 6:47 am from KCHD
Weather report (METAR): KCHD 011347Z 04004KT 10SM SKC 20/09 A3000
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
The factual record for the Piper PA-28-181 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent/approach/glide path › Incorrect use/operation
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Flight crew
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 425 hours in all; 115 in this make and model; 46 in the last 90 days; 14 in the last 30 days; 344 as pilot in command; 32 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 23, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 15 hours in all; 15 in this make and model; 14 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,509.7 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 26, 2021
- Maximum gross weight: 2,550 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-4AM (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Flight Operations Academy LLC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
17 documents, released by the NTSB on September 29, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.