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Accidents · NTSB WPR16LA021 · Final report

MD Helicopter 369D accident near Sedro-Woolley, Washington, November 3, 2015

On November 3, 2015 at about 7:30 pm local time, a 1981 MD Helicopter 369D, registered N510PA, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Sedro-Woolley, Washington. It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of engine power due to fuel starvation as a result of naphthenate fuel contamination, which blocked the fuel flow through the start pump.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 3, 2015 · about 7:30 pm local time
Place
Sedro-Woolley, Washington · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
MD Helicopter 369D, built 1981
Registration
N510PA · registry record · serial 811073D
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot reported that, while conducting longline operations, the helicopter lost engine power. The pilot entered the helicopter into an autorotation and attempted to land at the bottom of a hill on flat terrain, but the helicopter touched down on a slope; the tailboom, followed by the skids, impacted the side of a hill, and the helicopter then came to rest on its side. During postaccident examination of the airframe and engine, debris was found throughout the fuel system. The start pump was removed, and the fuel bypass valve inlet port screen was found covered with a brown, spongelike debris. Normal operation is with the start pump off (except when using alternate fuel mixtures or emergency fuels). When the start pump is not in use, fuel passes through the fuel bypass valve inlet port screen. The debris located on the fuel pump bypass valve inlet port screen, throughout the inside of the pump, and embedded in the centrifugal pump prevented the pump from producing sufficient fuel flow, which starved the engine of fuel and resulted in the power loss. Although the operator reported that it monitored for fuel contamination in the accident helicopter and its other company helicopters in accordance with the helicopter manufacturer's maintenance procedures, these procedures did not require that the fuel bypass valve inlet port screen be checked unless a cockpit warning indication light was activated. The light had not activated in the accident helicopter; therefore, the operator had not checked the screen. Following the accident, the helicopter manufacturer revised its procedures to require that the screen be checked whenever fuel contamination was identified. Testing of the debris was consistent with naphthenates, which are surfactants that reduce the surface tension between the fuel and free water and allow the two liquids to mix. Refinery processing should remove all traces of naphthenic acid and its corresponding metal salts; however, in some refining processes, small amounts of the naphthenates can get carried through with the jet fuel, which can lead to microbial growth in the fuel. About 1 month before the accident, the operator found microbial growth in company fuel and treated the fuel with a microbiocide to destroy biological growth. However, there is no evidence that the microbiocide used by the operator contributed to the dissolution of the naphthenates, and the reason for the separation of naphthenates from the fuel could not be determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Autorotation Off-field or emergency landing
  2. Fuel contamination during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › (general) › Not specified
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid condition
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Sloped/uneven terrain › Contributed to outcome
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel pumps › Not specified

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,049.5 hours in all; 582.7 in this make and model; 182.3 in the last 90 days; 77 in the last 30 days; 966.2 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: November 15, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 9,329.4 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 15, 2015; 43 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls Royce 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Olympic Air INC

The flight

  • Departed from: AWO Arlington WA at 3:00 pm
  • Destination: AWO Arlington WA
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: scat
  • Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 6:55 pm from KBVS, 13 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.