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Accidents · NTSB WPR16LA019 · Final report

American Eurocopter LLC AS350B3 accident near Folsom, California, October 24, 2015

On October 24, 2015 at about 11:33 pm local time, a 2008 American Eurocopter LLC AS350B3 (helicopter), registered N911WL, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Folsom, California. It was an instructional flight under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight instructor's failure to perform simulated engine failure training in accordance with manufacturer guidance, including his improper recovery from the maneuver, which resulted in an overshoot of the intended landing zone when the engine did not respond as expected; his selection of an unsuitable landing area; and his decision to perform the maneuver near the helicopter's maximum gross weight, which resulted in a hard landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 24, 2015 · about 11:33 pm local time
Place
Folsom, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
American Eurocopter LLC AS350B3, built 2008
Registration
N911WL · registry record · serial 4587
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The purpose of the public helicopter flight was to perform a patrol mission with a tactical flight officer onboard, while the flight instructor also trained the pilot under instruction (PUI), who had recently been hired by the sheriff's department. The plan was to perform a routine patrol mission to introduce the PUI to the operation of the helicopter's systems, then practice autorotations, which the PUI had not previously performed in the accident helicopter make and model. After the patrol, they practiced a series of uneventful autorotations over flat areas. They then conducted an autorotation to a pinnacle in the middle of a peninsula. The flight instructor was flying the helicopter throughout the maneuver; during the power recovery phase of the autorotation, he applied engine power by moving the throttle twist grip from the idle to the flight position as the helicopter passed through 100 ft. The engine did not respond as he expected, and, unable to reach the pinnacle, he maneuvered the helicopter to a forced landing on downsloping terrain. The helicopter landed hard and tipped forward, resulting in substantial damage to the tailboom and aft fuselage structure. Postaccident examination of the engine and airframe did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and the engine met its nominal performance parameters during a subsequent test run. The helicopter's flight manual recommended that autorotation training be conducted within gliding distance of a suitable running landing area. The flight instructor's choice of a raised landing area, which was surrounded by soft and rocky downsloping terrain, did not represent a suitable area for such practice. Additionally, the slope did not allow a sufficient maneuvering envelope for the appropriate control inputs required to safely control the helicopter in the event of a delayed engine response or loss of engine power. Also, although physically close to a town, the location was relatively remote, because accessing the site by road would have required a long on- and off-road drive by first response vehicles around the lake. Therefore, the chosen location placed the crew in additional danger should a more serious accident have occurred. About 3 months before the accident, the helicopter manufacturer issued a safety information notice regarding the high exposure to accidents and incidents during simulated engine-off landing training. The notice issued a series of procedural updates, including a recommendation that minimal crew be onboard, and that power recoveries should be initiated as the helicopter passed through 200 ft above ground level (agl) rather than 70 ft agl, as recommended in the flight manual. The notice reiterated the need to be prepared to conduct an engine-off landing if power recovery was unsuccessful, along with the reminder that a higher gross weight increases the risk of a hard landing. Therefore, the flight instructor's choice of a power recovery initiation altitude (100 ft) lower than recommended left him with a reduced margin for recovery when the anomaly occurred. Further, the decision to keep the tactical flight officer onboard during the autorotation portion of the training represented an unnecessary risk both to him and the mission. The helicopter was loaded near its maximum gross weight, increasing the risk of a hard landing. The flight instructor did not hold a valid medical certificate at the time of the accident due to a recent Type 1 diabetes diagnosis. However, as a public operation, the sheriff's department was responsible for oversight of its own operation and allowed the instructor to fly with another pilot present.  The instructor was not exhibiting any symptoms of the condition, and there was no evidence to suggest his diagnosis contributed to the outcome of the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Autorotation Miscellaneous/other
  2. Loss of control in flight during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
  3. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Instructor/check pilot
  • Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Instructor/check pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Instructor/check pilot
  • factor Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Sloped/uneven terrain › Decision related to condition
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Sloped/uneven terrain › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,580 hours in all; 1,658 in this make and model; 64 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 5,328 as pilot in command; 208 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 17, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, military
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,491.1 hours in all; 12.1 in this make and model; 15.3 in the last 90 days; 12.1 in the last 30 days; 801.2 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: October 3, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,451.1 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 9, 2015; 9 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,225 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca 2B1 (turboshaft); 1,320 hours total
  • Operator: Placer County Sheriff'S Department

The flight

  • Departed from: MCC Sacramento CA at 11:18 pm
  • Destination: AUN Auburn CA
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 280° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.94 inHg
  • Observation at 11:35 pm from KMCC, 13 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.