North American AT 6 accident near Mesa, Arizona, May 18, 2016
On May 18, 2016 at about 1:42 am local time, a 1942 North American AT 6, registered N3198G, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Mesa, Arizona (Falcon Fld airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's inability to return to the departure airport due to an unspecified in-flight emergency for reasons that could not be determined during a postaccident examination of the airplane.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 18, 2016 · about 1:42 am local time
- Place
- Mesa, Arizona · Falcon Fld · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- North American AT 6, built 1942 · all AT 6s on the register
- Registration
- N3198G · no longer on the register · serial 84-7721
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airline transport pilot and a passenger departed on a local flight as part of a flight of two airplanes in daytime visual meteorological conditions. Shortly after takeoff, witnesses heard the engine popping; another witness reported a possible loss of power. The airplane entered a right turn and appeared to slow. It subsequently impacted the ground and a postimpact fire ensued. Recorded communication obtained from the air traffic control tower revealed that the pilot transmitted a mayday call before the accident; however, he did not state the nature of the emergency. Postaccident examination of the airframe, flight control system, and the engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was originally equipped with left- and right-wing fuel tanks, as well as a reserve tank located within the left tank. Maintenance records revealed that the fuel system was modified from its original configuration to remove the reserve tank and interconnect the left and right tanks, therefore allowing for an "On/Off" selection and eliminating the need to switch tanks in flight. The fuel system was again reconfigured; however; no entries in the maintenance records were found regarding this modification. Postaccident examination of the airplane and interviews with the operator revealed that the tank interconnect had been removed, and that the reserve port on the fuel selector valve had been plugged with a blanking cap. The fuel selector valve face displayed four quadrants, one each for the Left, Right, and Off positions, and a blank quadrant where the Reserve position had been previously. Although the Reserve position was not marked, the selector could still be moved to that position, which would result in a loss of fuel flow to the engine. During the wreckage examination, the fuel selector valve was found in a position consistent with the reserve position; however, the fuel selector valve position at the time of the accident could not be determined. It is possible that, if the airplane experienced a momentary loss of power, and in accordance with the practice most commonly used by T-6 pilots, the pilot would have selected what was the "reserve" position (although not marked), even though that port was plugged. This would have led to a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Attain/maintain not possible
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
- Flight time: 12,531 hours in all; 241 in the last 90 days; 119 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: unk
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,693.4 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 13, 2016
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: P&W R1340 SERIES (piston); 1,318 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: FFZ Mesa AZ at 1:40 am
- Destination: FFZ Mesa AZ
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 22L, 5,101 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 280° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 45 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; scat at 11,000 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 29.78 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
