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Accidents · NTSB WPR16FA059 · Final report

Piper PA 24-260 accident near Santa Rosa, California, January 29, 2016

On January 29, 2016 at about 2:57 am local time, a 1969 Piper PA 24-260, registered N9362P, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Santa Rosa, California (Charles M Schulz - Sonoma Coun airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during an instrument approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in a collision with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of recent experience in night instrument meteorological conditions.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 29, 2016 · about 2:57 am local time
Place
Santa Rosa, California · Charles M Schulz - Sonoma Coun · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Piper PA 24-260 260C, built 1969 · all PA 24-260s on the register
Registration
N9362P · no longer on the register · serial 24-4862
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot and his wife departed on a visual flight rules cross-country flight to their home airport. About 46 nautical miles from the destination airport, the pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance and was subsequently cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach at the destination airport. GPS data indicated that the airplane followed a straight course with minimal variation during its cruise flight in a manner consistent with use of the autopilot. The airplane's course movements became more erratic when the airplane neared the destination airport, which suggests that the pilot began to hand-fly the airplane. A combination of radar data, GPS data, and air traffic control audio showed that the pilot complied with the controller's instructions. After the pilot intercepted the glideslope, he maintained a shallow descent rate until the final approach fix. The pilot subsequently crossed the final approach fix 1,000 ft above the intercept altitude on a heading track to the right of the localizer. The tower controller reported multiple deviations over the radio to the pilot, but the pilot did not make appropriate corrections. Radar data showed the airplane enter progressively steeper descent rates after passing the final approach fix, and the airplane began to deviate to the left of the localizer. In the final moments of the flight, the airplane turned to the right about 50°, crossed the localizer, and then immediately began a 60° steep left turn at an approximate 1,200-fpm descent rate. Debris path signatures indicated the airplane was in a high-speed, steep left turn with a nose-down attitude when it impacted a field about 1.5 nautical miles south of the runway approach end. The proximity of the accident site to the final GPS data point and the similarity between the impact signatures and the track shown by the last few GPS data points indicates that the last data points closely represent the airplane's final movements before impact. Examination of the wreckage and of engine analyzer data did not reveal any evidence of preimpact anomalies with the airframe or engine. Circumferential scoring from the gyros was found on the case of the heading indicator and both attitude indicators, which indicates that these instruments were likely functioning normally at the time of impact. The pilot obtained weather information from an online service about 24 hours before the flight; however, the forecasts he received were not valid at the time of his departure. In his communication to an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller, the pilot asked, "what are they doing for approaches?" which indicated that he was aware of possible instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the destination airport. The pilot's audio transmissions to ARTCC did not indicate that he had received current Airport Terminal Information System weather. Further, the ARTCC controller did not provide the pilot with the current weather as required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedure, and the airport tower controller had not been disseminating pilot reports, also required by FAA procedure. The pilot's flight instructors commended his aeronautical decision-making skills; however, the investigation was unable to confirm if the pilot obtained current weather and if knowledge of the low-visibility weather conditions would have altered his decision to continue the flight despite his desire to return home that night. Two months before the accident, the pilot completed an instrument proficiency check and made a night flight to fulfill the night currency requirement. Other than these two events, the pilot had no recent instrument or night flight experience. Further, the pilot's flight records did not show any evidence that he had completed a flight in night IMC in nearly 3 years. Given the pilot's lack of recent experience in night IMC, he was most likely overwhelmed by the complexity of hand-flying the airplane on an ILS approach in night IMC. Once the pilot crossed the final approach fix, he doubled his descent rate to correct for his high crossing altitude and then deviated from the localizer course line. The airplane's final movements suggest that the pilot likely lost control of the airplane during the large heading adjustment he made to correct his course and was not able to regain control.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Other weather encounter during approach (IFR final approach)
  2. Course deviation during approach (IFR final approach)
  3. Loss of control in flight during approach (IFR final approach) defining event
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach (IFR final approach)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low ceiling › Effect on operation
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on personnel
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Recent instrument experience › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,291 hours in all; 133 in this make and model; 10 in the last 90 days; 1.2 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: May 15, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,315.1 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, August 20, 2015; 31 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,200 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-N1A5 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PSP Palm Springs CA at 11:35 pm
  • Destination: STS Santa Rosa CA
  • Flight plan: VFR
  • Runway 32, 6,000 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Visibility: 2.5 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 400 ft
  • Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.20 inHg
  • Observation at 3:00 am from STS, 2 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.