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Accidents · NTSB WPR15FA158 · Final report

Piper PA 46 350P accident near Spokane, Washington, May 7, 2015

On May 7, 2015 at about 11:04 pm local time, a 1996 Piper PA 46 350P, registered N962DA, was destroyed in an accident during takeoff near Spokane, Washington (Felts Field). It was a flight test under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The mechanic's incorrect installation of two aileron cables and the subsequent inadequate functional checks of the aileron system before flight by both the mechanic and the pilot, which prevented proper roll control from the cockpit, resulting in the pilot's subsequent loss of control during flight. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic's and the pilot's self-induced pressure to complete the work that day.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 7, 2015 · about 11:04 pm local time
Place
Spokane, Washington · Felts Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA 46 350P, built 1996 · all PA 46 350Ps on the register
Registration
N962DA · no longer on the register · serial 46-36031
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Flight test · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was departing on a local post-maintenance test flight in the single-engine airplane; Four aileron cables had been replaced during the maintenance. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began to roll right. As the climb progressed, the roll became more pronounced, and the airplane entered a spiraling dive. The pilot was able to maintain partial control after losing about 700 ft of altitude; he guided the airplane away from the airport and then gradually back for a landing approach. During this period, he reported to air traffic control personnel that the airplane had a "heavy right aileron." As the airplane passed over the runway threshold, it rolled right and crashed into a river adjacent to the runway. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the aileron balance and drive cables in the right wing had been misrouted and interchanged at the wing root. Under this condition, both the left and right ailerons would have deflected in the same direction rather than differentially. Therefore, once airborne, the pilot was effectively operating with minimal and most likely unpredictable lateral control, which would have been exacerbated by wind gusts and propeller torque and airflow effects. The sections of the two interchanged cables within the wing were about equal lengths, used the same style and size of termination swages, and were installed into two same-shape and -size receptacles in the aileron sector wheel. In combination, this design most likely permitted the inadvertent interchange of the cables, without any obvious visual cues to maintenance personnel to suggest a misrouting. The maintenance manual contained specific and bold warnings concerning the potential for cable reversal. Although the misrouting error should have been obvious during the required post-maintenance aileron rigging or function checks, the error was not detected by the installing mechanic. Although the installing mechanic reported that he had another mechanic verify the aileron functionality, that other mechanic denied that he was asked or that he conducted such a check. The mechanic who performed the work also signed off on the inspection; this is allowed per Federal regulations, which do not require an independent inspection by someone who did not perform the maintenance. The pilot did perform a preflight check; the preflight checklist included confirmation of "proper operation" of the primary flight controls from within the cockpit. Although the low-wing airplane did not easily allow for a differential check of the ailerons during the walk-around, both ailerons could be seen from the pilot's seat; therefore, the pilot should have been able to recognize that the ailerons were not operating differentially. The accident occurred at the end of the business day, and the airplane had been undergoing maintenance for a longer-than-anticipated period. The airplane's owner was flying in from another part of the country via a commercial airline to pick up the airplane the following morning. The accident pilot, who was an engineer at the company and typically flew post-maintenance test flights, was assisting with returning the airplane to service. He also had an appointment with an FAA medical examiner the next morning (Friday), and he typically did not work on Fridays. It is likely that the mechanic and pilot felt some pressure to be finished that day so the owner could depart in the morning and the pilot could attend his appointment.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
  2. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during prior to flight
  3. Loss of control in flight during takeoff defining event
  4. Attempted remediation/recovery during initial climb
  5. Loss of control in flight during landing
  6. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Lateral/bank control › Attain/maintain not possible
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • factor Environmental issues › Task environment › Pressures/demands › Time/schedule pressure › Effect on personnel
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of maintenance › Maintenance provider

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 5,800 hours in all; 950 in this make and model; 50 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 5,800 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 1, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot-Rated Passenger

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 122 hours in all; 0 in this make and model; 1 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days; 122 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: May 22, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,170.6 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 7, 2015; 0 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,299 lb
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Pratt And Whitney PT6-35A (turboprop); 1,412 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SFF Spokane WA at 10:53 pm
  • Destination: SFF Spokane WA
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 22R, 4,499 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 020° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 7,000 ft
  • Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg
  • Observation at 10:53 pm from KSFF

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

20 documents, released by the NTSB on August 24, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.