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Accidents · NTSB WPR15FA125 · Final report

Bae Systems MK-67 HAWK accident near Yuma, Arizona, March 11, 2015

On March 11, 2015 at about 6:49 pm local time, a 1992 Bae Systems MK-67 HAWK, registered N506XX, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Yuma, Arizona (Yuma Mcas/Yuma Intl airport). It was a public-use flight under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s initiation of an early rotation during takeoff, which led to an aerodynamic stall and loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's use of noseup pitch trim and the operator's policy to use nose-up pitch trim during takeoff and the lack of oversight of the operator by the US Air Force. Contributing to the severity of the accident were US Marine Corps airport policies that allowed construction activities immediately adjacent to an active runway, which resulted in the airplane's collision with a truck.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 11, 2015 · about 6:49 pm local time · cases in 2015
Place
Yuma, Arizona · Yuma Mcas/Yuma Intl · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bae Systems MK-67 HAWK, built 1992 · all MK-67 HAWKs on the register
Registration
N506XX · no longer on the register · serial 67-506
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The swept-wing advanced trainer/light attack airplane was privately owned and contracted to provide support to the US Air Force (USAF) under public aircraft provisions. It was equipped with wing-mounted external fuel tanks and bomb rack/dispensers loaded with practice ordinance. During takeoff, the airline transport pilot was unable to maintain airplane control following rotation. The airplane did not climb, departed the left side of the runway, and struck a pickup truck, which was involved in construction activities and parked about 150 ft from the runway edge. The occupant of the truck was killed, the pilot and his passenger (who was flying as a "ride along") were not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The entire accident sequence was captured by an onboard video camera, which was positioned inside the canopy at the rear of the cockpit. The camera recorded some engine instruments, the primary flight instruments, the back of the pilot's head, and the runway and horizon. Analysis of the recording revealed that the pilot initiated rotation about 8 knots before reaching the correct indicated airspeed and that the airplane lifted off the ground about 10 knots early, about the same time as it reached its target pitch attitude. The video image, which up until this point had been smooth, then began to shudder in a manner consistent with the airplane experiencing the buffet of an aerodynamic stall. The airplane immediately rolled aggressively left, and the main landing gear struck the ground hard. The airplane then pitched up aggressively and began a series of roll-and-pitch oscillations, bouncing from left to right with the outboard bomb dispensers and landing gear alternately striking the ground as the pilot attempted to establish control. The airplane passed beyond the runway edge and reached its target takeoff speed just before striking the truck, but by this time, it had departed controlled flight, was in a steep right bank at almost twice its target pitch attitude, indicating that it had likely aerodynamically stalled. The pilot reported that he felt the airplane's nose become light as the airplane approached rotation speed, and the video revealed that the nose was oscillating lightly up and down a few seconds before rotation, consistent with his statement. The pilot stated that, before takeoff, he set the pitch trim to 3 degrees nose up, which was consistent with the operator's policy for takeoff with external stores. The policy was in place to relieve stick pressure on rotation; however, the airplane's flight manual specified that 0 degrees pitch trim should be used for takeoff in all configurations. During the postaccident examination, the airplane's pitch trim was found at almost full nose up for reasons that could not be determined. It is likely that the pilot initiated an early rotation instinctively as the airplane's nose became light due to the excessive nose-up pitch trim. The operator stated that the company policy for nose-up trim on takeoff was intended to give the airplane control stick pressures on rotation comparable to other U.S. fighter aircraft, such as the FA-18 and F-16. Although the operator had used this technique without incident on many prior missions, it was in direct contrast with the manufacturer's takeoff recommendations and likely increased the risk of early rotation. Postaccident examination of the airframe and flight control systems did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The primary engine components were undamaged, and the video revealed that the engine appeared to operate uninterrupted and at high power levels throughout the accident sequence. The external fuel tanks were partially filled with fuel, which was allowed per the airplane's flight manual, (assuming the airplane was flown at the correct airspeeds). The bomb dispensers were not on the airplane manufacturer's list of approved weapons; therefore, the operator had commissioned an Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-designated engineering representative to prepare a structural comparison report to assess the viability of installing the alternate dispensers. Although the report concluded that the use of the alternate dispensers was structurally satisfactory, it did not take into account the aerodynamic effects of using the alternate dispensers. It is possible that the airplane's stall margin was eroded further by the use of the alternate dispensers, along with a shift in the center of gravity due to the partially filled fuel tanks. The majority of the airport was operated and governed by the Department of Defense (DoD), specifically the US Marine Corps (USMC). It was operated as a "shared use" airport concurrently supporting both military and civilian operations, although the accident runway was used almost exclusively for military flights. A USMC construction crew was preparing the area immediately adjacent to the runway for the installation of an arresting gear system. The operation was composed of about 20 people, along with support vehicles and construction equipment, and the group occupied the space from the runway edge outward about 150 ft. The truck that was struck was located on the outer edge of the space, farthest from the runway, and was occupied by a Marine Lance Corporal who was providing operational escort and safety support for the construction crew. USMC airport-specific station orders did not prohibit construction activities in this area, and no notice to airmen relating to construction was issued at the time of the accident nor was one required. If the airport had been under operating under Part 139 regulations and full FAA oversight, no such construction activities would have been permitted while the runway was active, and the ground fatality would have been avoided. About 21 months before the accident, the DoD issued a directive that all aircraft owned, leased, operated, used, designed, or modified by DoD must have undergone an airworthiness assessment in accordance with the applicable military department policy and that management authorities within the military departments should be established to provide ongoing oversight. The directive allowed the use of DoD or FAA airworthiness certification standards. Under the auspices of this directive, the operator had undergone a series of oversight inspections from the Naval Air Systems Command and interim flight clearance was granted to perform missions for the USMC. Although the accident flight departed from a USMC base, it was operating in support of the USAF, and the USAF chose to place the responsibility of certification and ongoing oversight with the FAA. However, because the airplane's missions were flown under the umbrella of "public aircraft," the FAA was not providing, nor was it required to provide, any oversight beyond issuance of the airplane's initial airworthiness certificate. As such, the operator was effectively operating without oversight at the time of the accident. This lack of oversight likely enabled the continued operating philosophy, which resulted in the difference in takeoff procedure between the operator and the manufacturer and the use of inadequately evaluated weapons system components.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Abrupt maneuver during takeoff defining event
  2. Aerodynamic stall/spin during takeoff
  3. Loss of control in flight during takeoff
  4. Runway excursion during takeoff
  5. Collision during takeoff/land during takeoff

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Other government
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
  • factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation › Other government
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Ground vehicle › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, military
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,116 hours in all; 67 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: January 19, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,625.3 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 10, 2015; 5 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 20,056 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Rolls Royce Adour MK.861 (turbojet); 3,783 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Air USA INC

The flight

  • Departed from: NYL Yuma AZ at 6:48 pm
  • Destination: NYL Yuma AZ
  • Runway 03L, 13,300 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 18,000 ft; scat at 12,000 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 34°F (1°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 6:57 pm from KNYL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

23 documents, released by the NTSB on March 22, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 NTSB Airframe Examination Report PDF, 27 pages View Download
2 NTSB Aileron and Tailplane Power Control Unit Examination Report PDF, 14 pages View Download
3 NTSB Flap Actuator Examination Report PDF, 8 pages View Download
4 Yuma Airport Authority Security Video PDF, 1 page View Download
5 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
6 Accident Site Photos PDF, 15 pages View Download
7 Flap Drumswitch Photos PDF, 5 pages View Download
8 Photo of N506XX in Accident Configuration PDF, 1 page View Download
9 Witness Statements PDF, 14 pages View Download
10 Experimental Operating Limitations N506XX PDF, 8 pages View Download
11 Fuel Logs PDF, 12 pages View Download
12 Department of Defense Directive 5030.61 - Change 1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
13 FAA Yuma Airport Certification Manual PDF, 118 pages View Download
14 Dod Unified Facilities Criteria Ufc 3-260-01 PDF, 459 pages View Download
15 N506XX Weight and Balance PDF, 6 pages View Download
16 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page View Download
17 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 11 pages View Download
18 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 5 pages View Download
19 Party Submission - Air USA PDF, 2 pages View Download
20 On Board Image Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 10 pages View Download
21 On Board Image Recorder - Attachment 1 to Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 3 pages View Download
22 On Board Image Recorder - Attachment 2 to Group Chairman's Factual Report data file Download
23 Video Study Report PDF, 6 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR15FA125.json.

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Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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