Eurocopter EC 130 B4 and Dehavilland DHC 6 300 accident near Boulder City, Nevada, July 25, 2014
On July 25, 2014 at about 11:46 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Eurocopter EC 130 B4 (N154GC) and Dehavilland DHC 6 300 (N190GC), were involved in the same accident near Boulder City, Nevada (Boulder City airport). No one was hurt; 9 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The airplane flight crew’s failure to exercise the necessary vigilance and precautions and yield the right of way to the landing helicopter, which resulted in the airplane colliding with the helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the helicopter pilot’s decision to continue his descent without positively determining that the airplane did not pose a collision hazard.
The airplane flight crew’s failure to exercise the necessary vigilance and precautions and yield the right of way to the landing helicopter, which resulted in the airplane colliding with the helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the helicopter pilot’s decision to continue his descent without positively determining that the airplane did not pose a collision hazard.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 25, 2014 · about 11:46 pm local time
- Place
- Boulder City, Nevada · Boulder City · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 9 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Eurocopter EC 130 B4, built 2010 · all EC 130 B4s on the register
- Registration
- N154GC · registry record · serial 7077
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
- Aircraft 2
- Dehavilland DHC 6 300 310, built 1970 · all DHC 6 300s on the register
- Registration
- N190GC · registry record · serial 285
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative for the Eurocopter EC 130 B4 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial helicopter pilot was operating on his first day of revenue service for the aerial tour company and was returning to the nontowered airport at the completion of a tour with six passengers. The pilot complied with the published arrival procedures, including flying the prescribed route and making the appropriate radio position callouts on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). Concurrent with the helicopter's arrival, the captain and first officer of an aerial tour airplane were beginning the taxi-out for departure of the positioning flight. The airport arrival procedures, layout, and wind conditions resulted in the two aircraft having to use the same portion of taxiway Delta, in the same direction, for their respective operations. The helicopter pilot reported that he first saw the airplane when the helicopter was turning westbound and descending over Delta; at that time, the airplane was taxiing southbound on the ramp toward Delta. The helicopter pilot announced his location and intentions and continued descending along Delta. When the airplane reached Delta, the first officer announced on the CTAF that the airplane was planning to proceed westbound on Delta. The captain reported that he looked but did not see any helicopters and that he then proceeded to turn westbound onto Delta, which placed the airplane directly into and under the helicopter's flightpath and prompted the helicopter pilot to radio that he was "right above" the airplane and repeat his landing intentions. The helicopter pilot continued the descent based on his hearing a "double-click" on the CTAF, which he interpreted as the airplane flight crew's acknowledgement that they saw and would avoid the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter collided with the airplane; damage patterns indicated that the two aircraft were aligned in nearly the same direction (westbound) at the time of impact. Because the helicopter was approaching from the airplane's left, along taxiway Delta, and was close in, it should have been readily visually detectable by the captain. Given that the first officer was aware of the inbound helicopter and should have been aware of its location and intentions based on the radio calls, the airplane's flight crew should have recognized the high potential for conflict and operated the airplane in a manner to ensure that a collision would not occur. In addition, the helicopter, as the landing aircraft, had the right of way over the departing airplane. The simplest and most effective method to prevent any conflict would have been for the airplane flight crew to stop on the ramp and not proceed onto taxiway Delta until the helicopter was positively determined to no longer pose a collision threat. However, there was no evidence that the airplane stopped before it turned from the ramp onto taxiway Delta. The evidence indicated that the airplane taxied out just ahead of and below the descending but faster moving helicopter, which significantly reduced the helicopter pilot's ability to avoid the airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Dehavilland DHC 6 300 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial helicopter pilot was operating on his first day of revenue service for the aerial tour company and was returning to the nontowered airport at the completion of a tour with six passengers. The pilot complied with the published arrival procedures, including flying the prescribed route and making the appropriate radio position callouts on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). Concurrent with the helicopter's arrival, the captain and first officer of an aerial tour airplane were beginning the taxi-out for departure of the positioning flight. The airport arrival procedures, layout, and wind conditions resulted in the two aircraft having to use the same portion of taxiway Delta, in the same direction, for their respective operations. The helicopter pilot reported that he first saw the airplane when the helicopter was turning westbound and descending over Delta; at that time, the airplane was taxiing southbound on the ramp toward Delta. The helicopter pilot announced his location and intentions and continued descending along Delta. When the airplane reached Delta, the first officer announced on the CTAF that the airplane was planning to proceed westbound on Delta. The captain reported that he looked but did not see any helicopters and that he then proceeded to turn westbound onto Delta, which placed the airplane directly into and under the helicopter's flightpath and prompted the helicopter pilot to radio that he was "right above" the airplane and repeat his landing intentions. The helicopter pilot continued the descent based on his hearing a "double-click" on the CTAF, which he interpreted as the airplane flight crew's acknowledgement that they saw and would avoid the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter collided with the airplane; damage patterns indicated that the two aircraft were aligned in nearly the same direction (westbound) at the time of impact. Because the helicopter was approaching from the airplane's left, along taxiway Delta, and was close in, it should have been readily visually detectable by the captain. Given that the first officer was aware of the inbound helicopter and should have been aware of its location and intentions based on the radio calls, the airplane's flight crew should have recognized the high potential for conflict and operated the airplane in a manner to ensure that a collision would not occur. In addition, the helicopter, as the landing aircraft, had the right of way over the departing airplane. The simplest and most effective method to prevent any conflict would have been for the airplane flight crew to stop on the ramp and not proceed onto taxiway Delta until the helicopter was positively determined to no longer pose a collision threat. However, there was no evidence that the airplane stopped before it turned from the ramp onto taxiway Delta. The evidence indicated that the airplane taxied out just ahead of and below the descending but faster moving helicopter, which significantly reduced the helicopter pilot's ability to avoid the airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Eurocopter EC 130 B4 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during landing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 1,102 hours in all; 9 in this make and model; 9 in the last 90 days; 9 in the last 30 days; 1,019 as pilot in command; 844 on instruments
- Last flight review: July 22, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,057 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 25, 2014; 3 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,350 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 2B1 (turboshaft); 8,015 hours total
- Operator: Papillon Airways INC
The flight
- Departed from: BVU Boulder City NV
- Destination: BVU Boulder City NV
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 240° at 15 knots, gusting 19
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 104°F (40°C), dew point 48°F (9°C)
- Altimeter: 29.86 inHg
- Observation at 11:56 pm from HND, 13 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 6 |
The factual record for the Dehavilland DHC 6 300 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during taxi (to runway) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot of other aircraft
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-27 (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-27 (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: Grand Canyon Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: BVU Boulder City NV
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.