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Accidents · NTSB WPR14LA271 · Final report

Cessna 182Q accident near Big Creek, Idaho, June 29, 2014

On June 29, 2014 at about 2:10 pm local time, a 1979 Cessna 182Q, registered N132K, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern base) near Big Creek, Idaho (Big Creek airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s execution of a traffic pattern that did not put the airplane in position for a normal final approach and the pilot’s decision to continue the landing attempt instead of initiating a go-around, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall at an altitude too low to prevent ground impact.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 29, 2014 · about 2:10 pm local time · cases in 2014
Place
Big Creek, Idaho · Big Creek · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 182Q, built 1979 · all 182Qs on the register
Registration
N132K · no longer on the register · serial 18266782
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The owner/pilot was participating in a fly-in to a backcountry airport that he had flown into once about 2 years before. He was the last of his group to arrive in the airport vicinity, and he reported that he was using his GPS, published guidance, and information from fellow pilots to navigate to and enter the airport's traffic pattern. The pilot stated that on the base leg, he determined that the airplane was higher and much closer to the runway than he anticipated. In response, he initiated a left-wing-down slip to lose altitude, and shortly thereafter, while concurrently attempting to maintain the slip, he initiated a left turn to align with the final approach path. Almost immediately after the turn began, the airplane stalled, descended, and impacted trees and terrain about 800 feet short of the runway threshold. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot reported that he extended the flaps to 40 degrees on the downwind leg, the flaps were found extended to 15 degrees. A published arrival procedure suggested a traffic pattern altitude of 800 to 1,000 ft above field elevation (AFE) and a final leg about 1 mile in length. A ridge between the runway and the downwind leg limited pilots' view of the airport while on downwind, and the 1-mile final provided an opportunity to detect airborne or ground traffic sufficiently early to allow pilots to safely compensate for the traffic. Analysis of data from an onboard GPS device revealed that the pilot's traffic pattern differed significantly from the published pattern. His downwind leg began at an altitude of about 800 ft AFE but then descended continuously at a rate of about 400 ft per minute. Also, the pilot made about a 70 degree turn to base leg when the airplane was abeam the threshold. Turning less than 90 degrees resulted in a base leg oriented away from the runway and necessitated a turn of about 110 degrees to align with the final approach course. Further, turning early rather than continuing until the airplane was about 1 mile from the threshold, as suggested, put the airplane on a base leg that was very close to the runway. Despite the descending downwind leg, the airplane's position at the point that the pilot began his turn to final required a steep approach slope (about 10 degrees) to arrive near the threshold in position for a normal landing. When the pilot recognized that the airplane was too high and too close to the runway to use a normal approach slope (about 4 degrees), he could have opted to discontinue the landing attempt and execute a go-around. However, the pilot stated that he continued the approach because he believed that successful completion of the landing was well within his and the airplane's capabilities. The pilot reported that he used approach speeds similar to the airplane's original certificated airspeeds, but the investigation was unable to determine the pilot's actual traffic pattern airspeeds. The investigation was also unable to determine the reason for the difference between the pilot's reported flap setting of 40 degrees and the as-found setting of 15 degrees; it is possible that the pilot began retracting the flaps after the airplane stalled. If the flaps were set to 15 degrees when the pilot believed them to be at 40 degrees, and if he was flying at the lower airspeed appropriate for the greater flap extension, this would have reduced his stall margin. Finally, the pilot's intentional slipping of the airplane while in the turn to final resulted in a steep, uncoordinated turn, which increased the airplane's susceptibility to a cross-control stall. The airplane was extensively modified from its original Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificated design by the installation of five significant aerodynamic or performance-related modifications that were approved through the FAA's supplemental type certificate (STC) process. Although this combination of STC modifications was commonly installed on the same airplane, each of the STC modifications was developed by a different company with very limited or no coordination between them. In addition, only two of the STCs were approved by the same FAA office, and there was very limited or no coordination between any of the other FAA offices. Although the STCs were primarily marketed as modifications that would provide short takeoff and landing capability to the airplane, the FAA-approved performance data that was provided with the STCs differed significantly from and did not support some of the advertised performance gains. In addition, in some cases, the STCs' pilot's operating handbook supplements provided conflicting performance data, and there was no guidance provided regarding which performance data was applicable to the final airplane configuration. Further, those STC modifications that were made to the accident airplane were frequently installed together on the same airplane, yet no definitive FAA-approved performance data was available to the pilot to operate the airplane. Further, in this accident, the pilot could also have been motivated to operate the airplane in a manner that capitalized on the advertised performance benefits of the installed STCs.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern base)
  2. Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment › (general) › (general) › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,267 hours in all; 520 in this make and model; 15 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 1,200 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,918 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, June 4, 2014; 8 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,100 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-550 SERIES (piston); 551 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: MYL Mccall ID at 1:43 pm
  • Destination: U60 Big Creek ID
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 19, 3,550 ft by 110 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
  • Observation at 1:51 pm from KMYL, 42 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

25 documents, released by the NTSB on December 11, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 10 pages View Download
2 Pilot Statement July 9 2014 PDF, 1 page View Download
3 Record of Conversation Pilot August 6 2014 PDF, 4 pages View Download
4 Record of Conversation Pilot December 4 2015 PDF, 2 pages View Download
5 Record of Conversation Eyewitness PDF, 2 pages View Download
6 Airframe and Engine Examination PDF, 31 pages View Download
7 POH Excerpts PDF, 4 pages View Download
8 STC Provider Questions and Answers PDF, 3 pages View Download
9 Peterson Responses to NTSB Questions PDF, 2 pages View Download
10 Record of Communication Peterson November 19 2015 PDF, 2 pages View Download
11 Record of Communication Peterson November 24 2015 PDF, 1 page View Download
12 Peterson Web Site Information PDF, 4 pages View Download
13 POH Supplement STC SA00152WI Excerpts PDF, 7 pages View Download
14 POH Supplement STC SA03608AT Excerpts PDF, 4 pages View Download
15 POH Supplement STC SA00276NY Excerpts PDF, 4 pages View Download
16 STC Summaries PDF, 4 pages View Download
17 Record of Communication FAA PDF, 2 pages View Download
18 Stall Speed Information PDF, 8 pages View Download
19 Electronic Devices Factual Report PDF, 13 pages View Download
20 Electronic Devices ATTACH1 GPS Data data file Download
21 Electronic Devices Att 2 Engine Monitor Data data file Download
22 GPS and EDM Time Comparison PDF, 1 page View Download
23 GPS Track and Approach Information PDF, 6 pages View Download
24 Record of Conversation Ida PDF, 1 page View Download
25 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 2 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

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Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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