Schweizer Aircraft CORP G 164B accident near Biggs, California, May 13, 2014
On May 13, 2014 at about 8:20 pm local time, a 1986 Schweizer Aircraft CORP G 164B, registered N3633C, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Biggs, California (Jones Ag-Viation Airport). It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under agricultural flying rules (Part 137). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The assembler’s improper fabrication of a fuel line (hose) and the subsequent failure to verify that it was not occluded, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power during takeoff.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 13, 2014 · about 8:20 pm local time · cases in 2014
- Place
- Biggs, California · Jones Ag-Viation Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Schweizer Aircraft CORP G 164B B, built 1986 · all G 164Bs on the register
- Registration
- N3633C · registry record · serial 776B
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot departed for his seventh agricultural application flight of the day with a full load of seed on board. The operator reported that, during takeoff, the engine experienced a loss of power and subsequently collided with a berm near the end of the runway. A postaccident examination of the engine and fuel-related accessories revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure. The operator had purchased a turbine conversion kit supplemental type certificate about 1 year before the accident. The engine was overhauled and reinstalled on the airplane, which was subsequently flown about 170 hours without incident. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that, during the conversion, maintenance personnel installed a fuel line (hose) from the firewall to the gascolator that was different from that shown in the engineering drawings. The installed hose was shorter and had a 90-degree fitting on one side and a straight fitting on the other rather than straight fittings on both ends. The hose was occluded by a piece of the hose's inner lining. Compressed air was directed through one end of the hose and a black piece of material ejected out the opposite side. An internal examination of the hose assembly revealed that there were flaps of loose hose where the end of the 90-degree fitting rested against the interhose walls. The flap material and the ejected piece of material both matched the material of the interhose; these materials likely completely blocked the hose, which resulted in fuel starvation to the engine. A representative from the hose manufacturer stated that, when the hose assembler starts and stops the installation of the nipple into the hose, significant heat can build up from the induced friction caused by the continuous starting and stopping motion; this can break down the binding that holds the inner tube to the outer layers of the hose and may result in the nipple digging into the inside diameter of the hose liner. In extreme cases, this can result in the inner liner twisting and lead to a complete blockage of the hose, which is likely what occurred to the accident hose. The representative further stated that, after the hose assembly process, the assembler should route a specific-sized ball through the hose assembly to ensure there is no blockage or obstruction. However, the manufacturer's hose assembly instructions did not provide detailed instructions on the assembly process or recommend how to verify that the hose was not occluded during assembly.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during takeoff defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the fuel system
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › (general) › Inadequate inspection other cases naming the fuel system
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level other cases naming the fuel system
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › (general) › Damaged/degraded other cases naming the fuel system
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › (general) › Contributed to outcome
- Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 18,300 hours in all; 2,000 in this make and model
- Last flight review: April 12, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: ctr
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,556 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, April 3, 2014; 63 hours since
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt and Whitney PT6A-34 (turboprop); 9,545 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: CL23 Biggs CA at 8:10 pm
- Destination: CL23 Biggs CA
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
- Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
- Observation at 12:53 pm from OVE, 4 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
9 documents, released by the NTSB on April 20, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Hose Examination Notes | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Maintenance Record Excerpts | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Operator Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 5 | Engine Teardown Report, Turbines Inc. | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Parker Aerospace Hose Assembly Instructions | PDF, 33 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Materials Comparison | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Record of Conversation- Parker Aerospace | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 9 | Changes to Factual Narrative 4/27/2016 | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N3633C the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N3633C on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Schweizer Aircraft Corp G-164 64 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Engine: Pratt and Whitney PT6A-34 42 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Jones/Ag-Viation Airport · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in California 9,080 since 1982 · 1,094 in the last ten years
- California 28,286 aircraft registered
- Other NTSB records under N3633C 3 records · the number may have belonged to another aircraft at the time
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR14LA201.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
