Airbus A321-271N and Cessna 172N incident near Long Beach, California, October 27, 2023
On October 27, 2023 at about 1:01 am local time, 2 aircraft, Airbus A321-271N (N216HA) and Cessna 172N (N24CV), were involved in the same incident near Long Beach, California (Long Beach (Daugherty Fld) airport). No one was hurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The local controller’s poor judgment in prioritization of their ground traffic ahead of their airborne traffic, that became a distraction and led to a loss of situational awareness resulting in a near midair collision. Contributing to the incident was the controller in charge’s ineffective oversight.
The local controller’s poor judgment in prioritization of their ground traffic ahead of their airborne traffic, that became a distraction and led to a loss of situational awareness resulting in a near midair collision. Contributing to the incident was the controller in charge’s ineffective oversight.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 27, 2023 · about 1:01 am local time
- Place
- Long Beach, California · Long Beach (Daugherty Fld) · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Airbus A321-271N 271N, built 2018 · all A321-271Ns on the register
- Registration
- N216HA · registry record · serial 8471
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
- Aircraft 2
- Cessna 172N, built 1977 · all 172Ns on the register
- Registration
- N24CV · registry record · serial 17270186
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A321-271N final · quoted from the NTSB record
Hawaiian Airlines flight 70 (HAL70), N2165HA, an Airbus A321, and a Textron Aviation, Inc. C172N, N24CV, were involved in a near mid air collision (NMAC) over the point where runway 30 and the final approach path for runway 26L intersect at Long Beach (Daugherty Field) Airport (LGB). At the time of the incident, the local control 1 (LC1), local assist, and ground control positions were combined to the LC1 position in the LGB air traffic control tower and staffed by a single certified professional controller. According to ATC transcripts and a post-- event interview, the LC1 controller turned N24CV on a base leg to runway 26L and cleared N24CV to land on 26L when the aircraft was approximately one mile from the runway. About this same time, the LC1 controller also cleared HAL70 to land on runway 30, when the flight was on a four-mile final. The LC1 controller did not realize that N24CV continued another half mile before starting their base turn, an event which led to both aircraft arriving at the airport at nearly the same time. In the three minutes leading to the incident, the LC1 controller received multiple calls on the ground control frequency from aircraft requesting push-back. He also initiated a call to the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) to request a release for another aircraft. These events distracted the LC1 controller from the local control operation at the time of the incident. This duty prioritization was not consistent with guidance contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, Air Traffic Control, 2-1-1, ATC Service and 2-10-3, Tower Team Position Responsibilities. The controller in charge (CIC) stated in the post event interview that he heard the LC1 controller calling TMU for the release and said he should have made the call instead, and this was a failure on his part. This would have allowed the LC1 controller to concentrate on traffic. The CIC also stated he was not actively monitoring the LC1 controller frequencies and stated he should have been a second set of eyes for the LC1 controller. This was not consistent with guidance contained in the LGB7110.3G SOP, Chapter 3-1-1, Clearance Delivery, Chapter 7-1-1, Front Line Manger/Controller in Charge and 7-2-1, subsection f.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172N final · quoted from the NTSB record
Hawaiian Airlines flight 70 (HAL70), N2165HA, an Airbus A321, and a Textron Aviation, Inc. C172N, N24CV, were involved in a near mid air collision (NMAC) over the point where runway 30 and the final approach path for runway 26L intersect at Long Beach (Daugherty Field) Airport (LGB). At the time of the incident, the local control 1 (LC1), local assist, and ground control positions were combined to the LC1 position in the LGB air traffic control tower and staffed by a single certified professional controller. According to ATC transcripts and a post-- event interview, the LC1 controller turned N24CV on a base leg to runway 26L and cleared N24CV to land on 26L when the aircraft was approximately one mile from the runway. About this same time, the LC1 controller also cleared HAL70 to land on runway 30, when the flight was on a four-mile final. The LC1 controller did not realize that N24CV continued another half mile before starting their base turn, an event which led to both aircraft arriving at the airport at nearly the same time. In the three minutes leading to the incident, the LC1 controller received multiple calls on the ground control frequency from aircraft requesting push-back. He also initiated a call to the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) to request a release for another aircraft. These events distracted the LC1 controller from the local control operation at the time of the incident. This duty prioritization was not consistent with guidance contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, Air Traffic Control, 2-1-1, ATC Service and 2-10-3, Tower Team Position Responsibilities. The controller in charge (CIC) stated in the post event interview that he heard the LC1 controller calling TMU for the release and said he should have made the call instead, and this was a failure on his part. This would have allowed the LC1 controller to concentrate on traffic. The CIC also stated he was not actively monitoring the LC1 controller frequencies and stated he should have been a second set of eyes for the LC1 controller. This was not consistent with guidance contained in the LGB7110.3G SOP, Chapter 3-1-1, Clearance Delivery, Chapter 7-1-1, Front Line Manger/Controller in Charge and 7-2-1, subsection f.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Airbus A321-271N from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during approach defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Workload management › Task overload › ATC personnel
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › ATC personnel
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Seats: 222
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Iae PW1133G-JM (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Iae PW1133G-JM (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Hawaiian Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: HNL Honolulu HI
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 12/3, 10,000 ft by 200 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
- Altimeter: 29.99 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 pm from KLGB
Weather report (METAR): METAR KLGB 270353Z 00000KT 10SM CLR 19/14 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP154 T01890144=
The factual record for the Cessna 172N from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Flight planning/navigation › ATC personnel
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › ATC personnel
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-320 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: SBA Santa Barbara CA at 2:57 am
- Flight plan: VFR
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.