Beech A36 and Piper PA-30 accident near Pawtucket, Rhode Island, June 6, 2008
On June 6, 2008 at about 9:45 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Beech A36 (N27199) and Piper PA-30 (N7660Y), were involved in the same accident near Pawtucket, Rhode Island (North Central Airport). 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Both pilots' failure to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the accident was the air traffic controllers failure to notify either pilot of the potential conflict.
Both pilots' failure to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the accident was the air traffic controllers failure to notify either pilot of the potential conflict.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 6, 2008 · about 9:45 pm local time
- Place
- Pawtucket, Rhode Island · North Central Airport · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft 1
- Beech A36 · all A36s on the register
- Registration
- N27199 · no longer on the register · serial E-2321
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Piper PA-30 · all PA-30s on the register
- Registration
- N7660Y · no longer on the register · serial 30-738
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Beech A36 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Piper PA-30 was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions and was cleared for an instrument approach. As the Piper approached the missed approach point, the pilot visually acquired the airport, and notified the air traffic controller to cancel his IFR flight plan. According to the Piper pilot, after the controller acknowledged the cancellation request, the pilot retuned his radio to the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) and announced his intention for landing. Due to the wind direction, the Piper pilot elected to circle and land on Runway 15, which was in the opposite direction of his approach. The pilot of a Beech A36, who was ready to depart from Runway 5 of the same airport, and who was also on an IFR flight plan, requested permission to take off but was told to "hold for release" by the controller. However, the controller did not explicitly inform the Beech pilot of the reason for the delay. Less than a minute later, the controller released the Beech. The two airplanes collided near the intersection of the two runways. Both pilots reported that they were not aware of the other airplane until immediately prior to the collision. Several witnesses heard the Beech pilot announce his intentions multiple times, but did not hear the Piper pilot's transmissions. The investigation also revealed that the two controllers were both aware of the proximity of the two airplanes, but neither one communicated that information to either of the pilots. A review of the recorded communications also revealed that the approach controller had a brief personal conversation with another controller just prior to the accident. The lack of received position or intent transmissions from the Piper, and the controllers' failure to inform the pilots of the proximity of the two airplanes, deprived the pilots of information that was critical to the pilots' situational awareness, and which could have enabled one or both pilots to prevent this accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA-30 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Piper PA-30 was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions and was cleared for an instrument approach. As the Piper approached the missed approach point, the pilot visually acquired the airport, and notified the air traffic controller to cancel his IFR flight plan. According to the Piper pilot, after the controller acknowledged the cancellation request, the pilot retuned his radio to the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) and announced his intention for landing. Due to the wind direction, the Piper pilot elected to circle and land on Runway 15, which was in the opposite direction of his approach. The pilot of a Beech A36, who was ready to depart from Runway 5 of the same airport, and who was also on an IFR flight plan, requested permission to take off but was told to "hold for release" by the controller. However, the controller did not explicitly inform the Beech pilot of the reason for the delay. Less than a minute later, the controller released the Beech. The two airplanes collided near the intersection of the two runways. Both pilots reported that they were not aware of the other airplane until immediately prior to the collision. Several witnesses heard the Beech pilot announce his intentions multiple times, but did not hear the Piper pilot's transmissions. The investigation also revealed that the two controllers were both aware of the proximity of the two airplanes, but neither one communicated that information to either of the pilots. A review of the recorded communications also revealed that the approach controller had a brief personal conversation with another controller just prior to the accident. The lack of received position or intent transmissions from the Piper, and the controllers' failure to inform the pilots of the proximity of the two airplanes, deprived the pilots of information that was critical to the pilots' situational awareness, and which could have enabled one or both pilots to prevent this accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Beech A36 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during takeoff defining event
- Runway excursion during takeoff
The NTSB's findings
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › ATC personnel
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › (general) › Effect on operation
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,640 hours in all; 1,100 in this make and model; 11 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 1,492 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: January 4, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,662 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, October 1, 2007
- Maximum gross weight: 3,650 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Teledyne Continental IO-550-8 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: SFZ Pawtucket NJ at 9:44 pm
- Destination: MMU Morristown NJ
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 05, 5,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 600 ft; ovct at 600 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 9:35 pm from SFZ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
The factual record for the Piper PA-30 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › ATC personnel
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › (general) › Effect on operation
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,215 hours in all; 2,965 in this make and model; 62 in the last 90 days; 34 in the last 30 days; 2,250 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 1, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,278 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, April 1, 2008; 50 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,725 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming IO320B1A (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming IO320B1A (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: ACK Nantucket MA at 9:10 pm
- Destination: SFZ Pawtucket NJ
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 15, 3,210 ft by 75 ft
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.