North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80 accident near Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, February 1, 2008
On February 1, 2008 at about 8:42 pm local time, a North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80, registered N3RP, was substantially damaged in an accident during taxi (to runway) near Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdal Executive airport). It was a ferry flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The depletion of pressure in the normal hydraulic system for an undetermined reason, and the pilots' failure to properly operate the emergency braking system. Contributing to the accident was an inoperative hydraulic system aural warning.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 1, 2008 · about 8:42 pm local time
- Place
- Ft. Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdal Executive · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- North American Rockwell Corp. NA-265-80
- Registration
- N3RP · registry record · serial 38042
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Ferry flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during taxi (to runway)
- Ground collision during taxi (to runway) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Flight crew
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › (general) › Not specified
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, indicating system › Malfunction
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, auxiliary system › Incorrect use/operation
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,500 hours in all; 350 in this make and model; 50 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 7,500 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 1, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 14,400 hours in all; 360 in this make and model; 2 in the last 90 days; 13,651 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 1, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,825 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, January 31, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 23,000 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: General Electric CF700 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF700 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: FXE Ft. Lauderdale FL
- Destination: BKV Brookesville FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 130° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 6,900 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 pm from FXE
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N3RP the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.