Amateur-built Lancair IV P accident near Stafford, Virginia, August 11, 2008
On August 11, 2008 at about 12:39 pm local time, a amateur-built Lancair IV P, registered N731SJ, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Stafford, Virginia (Stafford Regional airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's decision to install voltage regulators in the engine compartment where they were susceptible to water intrusion, which resulted in a malfunction of the standby electrical system's voltage regulator and a subsequent in-flight fire.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 11, 2008 · about 12:39 pm local time
- Place
- Stafford, Virginia · Stafford Regional · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built Lancair IV P
- Registration
- N731SJ · no longer on the register · serial LIV-575
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was equipped with a dual battery system. After takeoff the pilot turned on the standby battery switch to charge the standby battery. He smelled smoke which became “very heavy and thick.” After landing, he opened the door and the smoke evacuated. He observed "billowing clouds of black and gray acrid smoke," toward the rear of the airplane. After opening the baggage compartment door, and removing the compartment floor, the pilot discharged a fire extinguisher into the area of the standby battery. He observed a flame, and discharged the fire extinguisher again. He then observed a red glow in the battery box. During construction of the airplane, the pilot had coated the inside of the battery box with room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) silicone. Examination revealed, remnants of a charred wood block (a combustible organic material), and the RTV silicone which had charred, melted, and adhered to the top of the standby battery and its partially melted vent caps. Holes with charring along the upper edge of one side of the battery case were evident where the battery outgassed since its vents caps were blocked. Lead acid batteries must be protected from overcharging and sources of ignition, as hydrogen gas can explode when ignited. Sulfuric acid in contact with combustible and/or organic materials can cause fire or explosion. The airplane’s voltage regulators were mounted in the engine compartment. Their cases were metal, they were rectangular in shape, and a plastic terminal strip protruded from a slot in the case on one side. The regulators were not potted, the internal circuit board was not conformally coated, and no weather seal existed between the plastic terminal strip and the case. Water staining and evidence of arcing were present on the inside of the standby regulator. The manufacturer recommended the regulators be installed in a location that would protect them from heat, vibration, and water on the pilot side of the firewall, or inside the cabin. The pilot was aware of the recommendation, but thought that the heat in the airplane would be worse in the cockpit than in the engine compartment. He also believed the regulators were "sealed in Bakelite," and it would provide "ease of access" to mount them on the firewall.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Electrical system malf/failure during maneuvering defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during maneuvering
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › DC regulator › Malfunction
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Battery/charger › Failure
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,100 hours in all; 80 in this make and model; 6,700 as pilot in command; 4,500 on instruments
- Last flight review: July 1, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 96 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, October 28, 2007
- Maximum gross weight: 3,700 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental TSIO-550-E (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire in flight and on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: RMN Stafford VA at 12:36 pm
- Destination: RMN Stafford VA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 33, 5,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 310° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 29.88 inHg
- Observation at 12:40 pm from RMN
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
