Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1 incident near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, November 7, 2006
On November 7, 2006 at about 8:10 am local time, a Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1 (helicopter), registered N522ME, suffered minor damage in an incident near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (Harrisburg Hospital Heliport airport). It was an other work-use flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's inadequate preflight preparation, which resulted in the cyclic stick lock not being disengaged prior to lift-off, and his subsequent inability to control the helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the operator's inadequate procedures, the unmarked cyclic lock, and the excessive breakout force required.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 7, 2006 · about 8:10 am local time
- Place
- Harrisburg, Pennsylvania · Harrisburg Hospital Heliport · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1
- Registration
- N522ME · registry record · serial 0144
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After flying a patient to a rooftop hospital helipad, the medical crew and pilot decided to "hot offload" the patient (engines running). After the medical personnel and patient were unloaded, the "thumbs up" was given to the pilot verifying the helicopter's doors were secure and all equipment had been secured. The pilot then completed the before takeoff checklist. The pilot "pulled" the collective pitch lever, the helicopter became airborne, and began to "back up." He then discovered that he had forgotten to disengage the cyclic control lock mechanism after items, which had been carried on the front left seat, had been removed during the "hot offload." Fearing that the rearward movement of the helicopter may have taken him over the edge of the helipad, the pilot "immediately" lowered collective pitch, resulting in a hard landing. Examination of the incident aircraft's cyclic stick locking mechanism revealed that the locking mechanism installed on the helicopter was non-contrasting, and dark gray in color. Only three different cyclic stick locking mechanism color schemes had been produced by the manufacturer (light gray, black, or light gray with a yellow tip) and prior to the accident, a service bulletin had been issued, recommending that a yellow area be painted on the end of the older locking mechanisms to provide contrast. All aircraft produced subsequent to the service bulletin came equipped with a light gray and yellow cyclic stick locking mechanism. The cyclic stick locking mechanism was secured by means of a locking pin mounted on the underside of the instrument panel. In the event of an emergency, due to it not having been unlocked by the pilot, the locking pin was designed to be "sheared through" by a "jerky movement" of the cyclic stick, which would then allow it to move freely. The manufacturer evaluated the breakout force to be approximately 26.98 pounds of force at the stick grip. During a post incident interview, the pilot advised that he was unable to disconnect the cyclic stick locking mechanism even though he attempted to "jerk the stick." During an examination of the incident helicopter, breakout force was measured at approximately 44 pounds during one test and 42 pounds during another. Review of the operator developed checklist for the helicopter revealed that there was no reference to use of the cyclic stick locking mechanism, or inclusion of requirement to verify that the flight controls were free and correct. Additionally, the company operations manual did not address use of the cyclic stick locking mechanism during hot loading or unloading of passengers.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 4,890 hours in all; 419 in this make and model; 36 in the last 90 days; 21 in the last 30 days; 4,157 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 1, 2006
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,198.6 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 1, 2006; 33.4 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,798 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Turbomeca Arrius 2B1 (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Turbomeca Arrius 2B1 (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Operator: Cj Systems Aviation Group
The flight
- Departed from: 5PN9 Harrisburg PA at 8:10 am
- Destination: MDT Harrisburg PA
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 34°F (1°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
- Altimeter: 30.30 inHg
- Observation at 7:56 am from CXY, 3 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
