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Accidents · NTSB NYC04FA117 · Final report

Eurocopter AS-350BA accident near Brooklyn, New York, May 4, 2004

On May 4, 2004 at about 10:20 pm local time, a Eurocopter AS-350BA (helicopter), registered N4NY, was destroyed in an accident near Brooklyn, New York. It was an other work-use flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the helicopter after a loss of hydraulic system pressure due to a failure of the hydraulic pump belt. Factors in this accident were the pilot's misidentification of a hydraulic failure, the pilot's subsequent failure to perform the appropriate emergency procedure, and the improper installation of the hydraulic pump belt by maintenance personnel.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 4, 2004 · about 10:20 pm local time
Place
Brooklyn, New York · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Eurocopter AS-350BA · all AS-350BAs on the register
Registration
N4NY · registry record · serial 2121
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The helicopter was hovering at 1,000 to 1,200 feet, during an electronic news gathering flight, when it experienced a loss of hydraulic system power. The pilot stated he did not have any specific recollection regarding the beginning of the accident sequence. He said that he felt the helicopter was not responding to his control inputs, "the way it should be." He also did not recall reporting any specific problems over the radio; however, review of communication recordings revealed that the pilot stated he experienced a "tail rotor failure." Another helicopter captured the accident sequence from its onboard video camera. The accident helicopter was observed entering a steep descent and quickly leveling off. A fairly constant, level attitude and heading were briefly maintained before the helicopter came to an unstable hover and began an approximate two revolution left rotation about its vertical axis. During the rotation, the helicopter descended and struck the roof parapet of a 4-story building, before it impacted and came to rest on the roof of an adjacent 2-story building. Examination of the helicopter's hydraulic system revealed that the hydraulic pump drive belt had been installed inside-out and failed due to an overload, leading to a full hydraulic system failure. According to Eurocopter's emergency procedures for the helicopter, the pilot action following a hydraulic system failure would be to "calmly reduce collective pitch and adjust the airspeed to between 40 and 60 knots in level flight" and then cut off the hydraulic pressure, by moving the toggle switch located on the collective pitch lever to off. The procedures further state that when the accumulators are exhausted, the control forces become significantly higher, but "not unmanageable." The helicopter could be controlled without the main and tail rotor servo actuators being hydraulically powered, but this would require the pilot to apply "non-negligible" forces that are substantially different than the forces required with the hydraulic system operating properly. The hydraulic system toggle switch was found in the "on" position. The "flat" hydraulic pump drive belt had accumulated about 440 hours, and had a service life limit of 600 hours. On May 11, 2004, Eurocopter issued a service bulletin which recommended the installation of a"Poly-V" hydraulic pump belt. The improved belt comprised multiple longitudinal "V" shapes on its inner surface that mated with similar surfaces on the hydraulic pump pulley and had a service life limit of 1,500 hours. Eurocopter recommended that all "flat" drive belts be replaced with the "Poly-V" belts.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter
  • Flight time: 6,500 hours in all; 450 in this make and model; 50 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: September 1, 2003
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 8,377 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 1, 2004; 48 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,630 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 1B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Helinet Aviation

The flight

  • Departed from: TEB Teterboro NJ at 8:30 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 310° at 14 knots, gusting 20
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 6,500 ft
  • Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
  • Observation at 10:29 pm from JFK, 9 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers11

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.