Bombardier CL600-2B19 incident near Covington, Kentucky, May 8, 2002
On May 8, 2002 at about 3:00 pm local time, a Bombardier CL600-2B19, registered N709CA, was involved in an incident near Covington, Kentucky. It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 18 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The manufacturer's failure to provide inspection criteria for the BPSU compartment aileron control pulleys, which resulted in eventual pulley corrosion, and subsequent control stiffness when seized pulleys and water-soaked aileron cables froze together at altitude. Factors included leaking BPSU bay access panel seals, precipitation, and freezing temperatures.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 8, 2002 · about 3:00 pm local time
- Place
- Covington, Kentucky · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 18 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Bombardier CL600-2B19 · all CL600-2B19s on the register
- Registration
- N709CA · registry record · serial 7044
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Bombardier CL600-2B19 regional jet experienced aileron control stiffness during cruise flight. The airplane was pushed back during a period of moderate to heavy rain. After pushback, the airplane was held on the taxiway for about 30 minutes while the rain continued. Takeoff also occurred during a period of heavy rain. After leveling off at flight level 280, while in cruise flight, the "AP TRIM IS LWD" caution annunciator illuminated. The first officer disconnected the autopilot, and found the aileron controls to be "stiff and binding." The captain then took control of the airplane, and also found the aileron controls to be stiff and binding. The captain applied "light to moderate" roll input and felt a snap. Aileron control then operated normally. The captain executed left and right turns with no additional problems or binding noted. The crew re-engaged the autopilot, and the flight continued to an uneventful landing. On the same date, two other CL600 regional jets from the same airline also experienced aileron stiffness after taking off at the same airport and in similar weather conditions. Both airplanes landed uneventfully. One of the airplanes diverted to an alternate airport. The investigation revealed that approximately 40 Bombardier CRJ CL-600-2B19 regional jets experienced in-flight aileron control stiffness after standing/taxiing in, or taking off during rainy conditions, then climbing to freezing temperatures. When the jets descended to above-freezing temperatures, the aileron control stiffness ceased. Testing revealed that aileron circuit binding occurred in the area of the Brake and Position Sensor Unit (BPSU) bay. Typically, within the bay, horizontally-oriented pulleys in the aileron control circuit would seize, and the aileron cable, after being subjected to water soaking, would freeze to the pulley. Water ingress to the bay most likely occurred via an aging self-contouring sealing pad on an access panel directly above the pulleys. The horizontal orientation of the pulleys, which had been used without difficulty in transport category aircraft for over 20 years, and the dished cross section of the pulley face allowed the retention of water when the airplane was parked. In addition, the drying of pulley grease over time, combined with water migration from rain, could temporarily allow the bearing to seize when the airplane reached altitude. A test on a dry-bearing pulley revealed that when water was applied to the pulley face, it remained pooled until the pulley was moved, when it flowed into the bearing. Prior to the incidents, the manufacturer had not issued specific instructions to inspect pulleys in the BPSU bay. Subsequent service letters and airworthiness directives to inspect the pulleys, grease the aileron cables and replace aging and seized pulleys, resulted in over 60 seized and deteriorating pulleys being found fleet wide. There have been no further aileron control stiffness events on aircraft which had undergone the new inspection/maintenance procedures.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 51,000 lb
- Seats: 53
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: General Electric CF-34 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF-34 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: CVG Covington KY
- Destination: OMA Omaha NE
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 100° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 0.8 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 1,000 ft; scat at 500 ft
- Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 2:38 pm from CVG
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 3 | |||
| Passengers | 15 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
