Airbus Industrie A-300B4-605R incident near San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 9, 1998
On July 9, 1998 at about 2:07 pm local time, a Airbus Industrie A-300B4-605R, registered N80057, suffered minor damage in an incident near San Juan, Puerto Rico (Luiz Munoz Marin Int'L airport). It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 28 people had minor injuries; 224 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An in-flight engine fire resulting from (1) the failure of the engine overhaul facility to install, and the failure of American Airlines to ensure installation of, the proper adapter bolt inserts to preclude fuel leakage and the failure of the engine overhaul facility to notify the aircraft operator and the engine manufacturer, and request correction, of an error in Service Bulletin (SB) 72-743; and (2) and the failure of General Electric Aircraft Engines to specify the proper adapter bolt insert and to correct SB 72-743 after notification of the error. Contributing to the severity of the incident were (1) the flight crew's failure immediately to complete the in-flight engine fire procedures and (2) the failure of Airbus Industrie and American Airlines to provide all necessary information in the in-flight engine fire procedures.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 9, 1998 · about 2:07 pm local time
- Place
- San Juan, Puerto Rico · Luiz Munoz Marin Int'L
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- 28 people had minor injuries; 224 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Industrie A-300B4-605R A300B4-605 · all A-300B4-605Rs on the register
- Registration
- N80057 · no longer on the register · serial 465
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Shortly after takeoff, as the flight climbed through 3,100 feet, the No. 1 engine fire warning activated. About 20 seconds later, the captain, who was the pilot flying, moved the No. 1 throttle to idle and asked the first officer to declare an emergency with air traffic control. About 47 seconds after the first officer identified the No. 1 engine fire warning, the captain asked the first officer to perform the engine fire emergency procedures checklist. The engine fire warning system deactivated because of fire damage to one of the fire loops, about 88 seconds after the fire warning activated and 2 seconds before the first officer moved the No. 1 fuel lever to the off position, shutting down the No. 1 engine. The flight crew did not notice the warning that the No. 1 fire loop system was inoperative. The engine fire warning system uses two loops. If one loop should no longer sense a fire or become inoperative because of fire damage, the engine fire warning will deactivate and a fire loop warning will be displayed to the flight crew. The flight crew must deactivate the faulty loop to regain the engine fire warning. The crew elected to stop the procedure after shutting down the No.1 engine because the fire light went out, and therefore did not activate the No.1 fire handle. Pressurized fuel continued to be supplied to the engine and feed the engine fire. The flight crew turned back to the departure airport. At 2,000 feet, about 3 minutes from landing, a flight attendant reported that a mechanic in the back had stated that the No. 1 engine was still smoking or on fire. The flight crew did not take any action and landed. About 1 minute after stopping, the captain ordered an emergency evacuation of the airplane, with instructions not to use the left overwing exits. About 1 minute 55 seconds after landing, the flight crew pulled the engine and auxiliary power unit fire handles and discharged the fire bottles into the No. 1 engine. In 1995, Airbus changed the engine fire procedure to allow for discontinuing the fire procedure and keeping an engine running at idle after an engine fire warning once the fire warning has gone out and after the throttle has been moved to idle. This change was made because of the high number of bleed air leak activated fire warnings. Postincident examination of the No. 1 engine showed that all the accessory gearbox idler adapter attachment bolt inserts had backed out, allowing fuel lines to unseat and spray pressurized fuel onto hot engine parts and ignite. On September 26, 1995, the accessory gear box idler adapter had been reworked per General Electric Aircraft Engine Service Bulletin 72-743 during engine overhaul at a vendor's facility. Smaller-than-required adapter bolt inserts had been installed.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 17,100 hours in all; 3,705 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 27,845 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 28, 1998; 326 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 375,890 lb
- Seats: 280
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Ge CF6-80C2A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: American Airlines, INC.
The flight
- Departed from: SJU at 2:05 pm
- Destination: MIA Miami FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 8, 10,002 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 070° at 13 knots, gusting 20
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 3,700 ft
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 79°F (26°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 1:54 pm from SJU, 2 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 9 | |||
| Passengers | 28 | 215 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N80057 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
1999-07-15NYC99LA177 · accident near Jamaica, NY · substantial damage · no injuries
1988-11-28MIA89IA043 · incident near San Juan, PR · minor damage · minor injuries
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.