Boeing 757-232 accident near Tampa, Florida, June 23, 2003
On June 23, 2003 at about 11:10 am local time, a Boeing 757-232, registered N633DL, was involved in an accident near Tampa, Florida (Tampa International Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 3 people were seriously injured and 27 people had minor injuries; 144 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
a torching of the right engine caused by an abnormally high flow fuel during engine start for undetermined reasons. The torching resulted in an unwarranted evacuation of the airplane and serious injuries to three passengers . A contributing factor in the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to abort the engine start due to abnormally high fuel flow indication during the right engine start.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 23, 2003 · about 11:10 am local time
- Place
- Tampa, Florida · Tampa International Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were seriously injured and 27 people had minor injuries; 144 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 757-232 · all 757-232s on the register
- Registration
- N633DL · no longer on the register · serial 23614
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was pushed back from the gate and the left engine was started with no discrepancies reported. During the starting of the right engine, numerous passengers saw torching aft of the tailpipe. A commotion ensued which drew the attention of the three of the four flight attendants who reported seeing an orange glow either inside or outside the airplane. The captain later reported there were no abnormal engine indications in the cockpit, but he then secured the right engine. The captain secured the left engine after simultaneously noticing passengers on the ramp and illumination of entry door lights. A flight attendant reported a male passenger (who was bigger than her) approached her at door 2L and attempted to open the door by partially rotating the 2L door handle. The door did not open completely but was 'cracked.' The flight attendant eventually opened the door fully and locked it against the fuselage. The male passenger exited immediately, followed by several other passengers. She then opened the 2R door and passengers exited it as well. Passengers also evacuated the airplane via the 3L and 3R doors, which a flight attendant opened. Readout of the flight data recorder revealed that at the time the fuel cutoff switch for the right engine was recorded to be in the "run" position, the recorded fuel flow was 1,696 PPH. Within approximately 2 seconds of the right engine fuel cutoff switch being in the "run" position, the fuel flow was recorded to be 3,136 PPH. The maximum recorded fuel flow of 6,272 PPH occurred 2 seconds before the fuel cutoff switch was recorded to be in the "cutoff" position, or 24 seconds after the fuel cutoff switch was in the "run" position. In contrast, within 4 seconds of the left engine fuel cutoff switch being in the "run" position for engine start, the recorded fuel flow was 544 PPH. Further review of the previous eight engine starts revealed the left and right fuel flows were nearly matched, with no recorded fuel flow value greater than 580 PPH within the first 4 seconds after the fuel cutoff switch was recorded to be in the "run" position. The flight crews are trained that during hot starts, the fuel flow almost immediately exceeds 700PPH. The engine start procedures checklist indicates the engine start is to be aborted if abnormally high or fluctuation fuel flow is noted.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 9,378 hours in all; 1,933 in this make and model; 124 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: May 16, 2002
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,919 hours in all; 1,264 in this make and model; 14 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: February 6, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 52,381.9 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, June 2, 2003; 22.6 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 232,000 lb
- Seats: 191
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney PW2037 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Delta Air Lines, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: KTPA Tampa FL at 7:05 am
- Destination: KATL Atlanta GA
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; scat at 3,100 ft
- Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 11:53 am from KTPA
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 5 | ||
| Passengers | 3 | 26 | 139 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N633DL the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
