Piper PA-32R-301 accident near Carthage, Mississippi, June 12, 2003

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The non-instrument rated pilot twice phoned an FAA Automated Flight Service Station, the first and second phone calls were made 47 minutes and 29 minutes respectively, before the flight departed. During the first phone call the pilot advised that the flight would be proceeding under instrument flight rules, and the briefing specialist provided convective sigmet and airmet information. During the second phone call the pilot requested an abbreviated weather briefing and the briefing specialist provided winds aloft. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan during the second phone call. After takeoff, air traffic control communications were transferred to several facilities. The flight proceeded towards the destination and while in contact with Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center, the pilot contacted briefly the Greenwood Automated Flight Service Station and advised the briefing specialist that the flight was located in the Meridian MOA but he did not provide an exact location, and questioned whether he would "...beat that line of storms uhh that was headed eastbound." The pilot was advised of a severe thunderstorm watch. The briefing specialist also advised the pilot that his, "...best bet is to probably to turn and land at meridian at this point and time I don't think [your] going to be able to beat that." The pilot responded, "do that we are going to change our course and we're going to land at meridian thank you for your help." The pilot re-established contact with Memphis ARTCC, and requested to land at Meridian. At 1112, the controller advised the pilot that there was a large cell of heavy weather between his position and Meridian, and that better weather conditions existed near Greenwood, Mississippi. The pilot advised the controller that he would proceed to the destination airport heading 187 degrees. At 1121, the pilot requested to descend to 6,000 feet, but air traffic communications were transferred to Jackson Air Traffic Control Tower. At 1120, the pilot established contact with that facility, and he was provided the altimeter setting. Radar and radio contact were lost with that facility at 1124; the communications with the facility were not recorded. Review of NTSB plotted radar data revealed that from 1030 until the time of the accident, the airplane was proceeding in a southwesterly direction until flying near Starkville, Mississippi, at which time the airplane turned to a westerly course. The airplane continued on the westerly direction until flying near Kilmichael, Mississippi, at which time the airplane turned left and proceeded until 1121:51, on a heading of 180 degrees flying at 8,000 feet, at an average ground speed of approximately 125 knots. At that time, the airplane began a right turn to heading 220 degrees, and descended at 440 feet-per-minute. At 1123:03, the airplane began a right descending turn in excess of 6,000 feet-per-minute descent, with the last recorded radar target at 1124:03, at 1,500 feet. The last recorded radar target was located at 32 degrees 41 minutes 21 seconds North latitude, and 089 degrees 40 minutes 57 seconds West longitude. A search for the airplane was initiated, it was located the following day. A NTSB weather report indicates that better weather conditions existed in Greenwood, Mississippi, at the time the controller advised the pilot that better weather conditions existed there. Additionally, the airplane entered an area of high reflectivity (about 45 dBZ), which equates to a very strong cell. Additionally, clouds existed throughout the region. The main wreckage consisting of the fuselage was located approximately 243 degrees and .24 nautical mile from the last radar target. The airplane crashed into a heavily wooded area. Examination of the airplane revealed the left wing and both sides of the horizontal stabilator were separated from the airplane; no evidence of preexisting cracks were noted on the fracture surfaces. Examination of the flight controls and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A review of the pilot's logbooks revealed he logged 24 hours of simulated instrument instruction after receiving his private pilot certificate. He logged 1.0 hour of actual instrument conditions; the entry did not have a signature by a certified flight instructor. He did log 4.2 hours of actual instrument flight with a flight instructor. Toxicological analysis of specimens of the pilot performed by the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory indicated tetrahydrocannabinol (.0034 ug/ml, ug/g) was detected in blood. Tetrahydrocannabinol Carboxylic Acid (.0167 ug/g, and .2324 ug/g) was detected in blood and bile respectively. Doxylamine was detected but not quantified in blood and liver. Located in the wreckage was drug paraphernalia and a green colored leaf type substance that was consistent with marijuana. No in-flight or post crash fire was noted on any wreckage component.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.