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Accidents · NTSB MIA02FA041 · Final report

Convair Div. Of Gen. Dynamics 340-580STC accident near Sunny Isles Bch, Florida, December 7, 2001

On December 7, 2001 at about 3:58 am local time, a Convair Div. Of Gen. Dynamics 340-580STC, registered N582HG, was substantially damaged in an accident near Sunny Isles Bch, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The inadequate dispatch of the airplane by company personnel prior to the first leg of the flight due to failure of company personnel to prepare a new flight release and weight and balance after considerable time on the ground with the engines operating. Also causal, was the inadequate preflight of the airplane by the captain by which he failed to note the low level of fuel in the fuel tanks before departure resulting in total loss of engine power of both engines due to fuel exhaustion and subsequent ditching of the airplane. A finding in the accident was the inaccurate fuel quantity gauges.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 7, 2001 · about 3:58 am local time
Place
Sunny Isles Bch, Florida · Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Convair Div. Of Gen. Dynamics 340-580STC
Registration
N582HG · no longer on the register · serial 46
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airline completed weight and balance and dispatch release forms for the initial flight showed an incorrect fuel load at the time the engines were started. The first officer performed a walk-around before the first flight leg which included checking the fuel tanks. A total of 460 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks, and a delay loading cargo occurred. After both engines were started to begin the first flight, the engines remained operated for between 9-10 minutes before they were secured due to a radio problem. Maintenance personnel reracked the VHF radios, and again the engines were started where the airplane remained on the ramp 3-4 minutes before taxiing to the runway. The airplane remained at the runway hold short area for between 20 and 25 minutes before returning to the ramp due to a radio problem. The engines were secured, and a new VHF radio was purchased and installed. The company did not prepare new dispatch release, or weight and balance forms for the flight taking into account the additional fuel consumed with the engines operating. The engines were started, and the airplane was taxied to the runway and departed for the planned first leg. The airplane landed uneventfully at the destination airport where the cargo was offloaded. The first officer performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks; 300 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks (150 gallons in each side). The flight departed to return and when near the coastline, the flight was vectored to an airport other than the planned destination due to a issue with U.S. Customs. The flight landed uneventfully, and experienced a delay clearing customs. While on the ground before departure on the accident flight, the first officer reportedly performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks with the captain looking on. The first officer reported that each fuel tank had approximately 1,100 pounds of fuel, and he and the captain both agreed before takeoff as to the quantity of fuel on-board as indicated by the magna-sticks. No fuel was purchased. Following starting of both engines for the accident flight, the first officer checked the fuel quantity gauges indications against the magna-sticks indications he observed; the fuel quantity gauges indicated approximately 200 pounds more. The flight departed, proceeded eastbound, and climbed to approximately 2,100 feet msl. During a right turn from a southeast to westerly heading, the right engine experienced a loss of horsepower which decreased from 900 to zero. The right engine was secured as a precaution, and priority handling to the destination airport was requested with air traffic control. The left engine horsepower remained the same (900) for a period of 31 seconds following the right engine horsepower decrease, then increased to 2,200, and remained at that value for 1 minute 13 seconds. The left engine horsepower then began to decrease and dropped to zero. The airplane was turned to the east, then turned to the south and ditched. The captain and first officer evacuated but remained with the airplane, and made it to shore where the first officer advised his wife that something was wrong with the fuel gauges. Following recovery of the airplane, pressure testing of the left fuel tank revealed no evidence of preimpact leakage. Pressure testing of the right fuel tank revealed slight leakage past the fuel cap. Boroscope examination of the engines, and functional test of each engine ignition system, fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the installed magna-sticks revealed no evidence of preimpact failure. The left fuel tank was drained and found to contain 2 gallons of Jet A fuel, while the right fuel tank was drained and found to contain approximately 540 gallons of salt water and 1/2 gallon of Jet A fuel. Fuel consumption calculations performed by FAA personnel revealed that at the time of engine start for the accident flight, the fuel tanks contained approximately 714 pounds of fuel. According to a representative of the engine manufacturer, the amount of fuel drained from the engine components post accident was consistent with, "low residual fuel."

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 12,765 hours in all; 1,940 in this make and model; 3,081 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 6, 2001
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,569 hours in all; 271 in this make and model; 71 in the last 90 days; 3 in the last 30 days; 637 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: April 5, 2001
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 75,103 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, December 5, 2001; 1.7 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 58,156 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Allison 501-D13 (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Trans Air Link CORP

The flight

  • Departed from: KFLL Fort Lauderdale FL at 3:50 am
  • Destination: KOPF Opa-Locka FL
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 110° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 2,900 ft
  • Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
  • Observation at 3:53 am from KFLL, 9 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.