Lockheed-Martin F-16CG and Cessna 172N mid-air collision near Bradenton, Florida, November 16, 2000
On November 16, 2000 at about 8:48 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Lockheed-Martin F-16CG (USAF) and Cessna 172N (N73829), were involved in a mid-air collision near Bradenton, Florida. 1 person was killed; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the failure of the F-16 flight lead pilot and F-16 accident pilot to maintain an adequate visual lookout while maneuvering. Factors contributing to the accident were: the F-16 flight lead pilot’s decision to discontinue radar traffic advisory service, the F-16 flight lead pilot’s failure to identify a position error in his aircraft’s navigational system, the F-16 pilots subsequent inadvertent entry into class C airspace without establishing and maintaining required communications with air traffic control (ATC); and ATC’s lack of awareness that there was more than one F-16 aircraft in the formation flight, which reduced the ATC controllers ability to detect and resolve the conflict that resulted in the collision.
the failure of the F-16 flight lead pilot and F-16 accident pilot to maintain an adequate visual lookout while maneuvering. Factors contributing to the accident were: the F-16 flight lead pilot’s decision to discontinue radar traffic advisory service, the F-16 flight lead pilot’s failure to identify a position error in his aircraft’s navigational system, the F-16 pilots subsequent inadvertent entry into class C airspace without establishing and maintaining required communications with air traffic control (ATC); and ATC’s lack of awareness that there was more than one F-16 aircraft in the formation flight, which reduced the ATC controllers ability to detect and resolve the conflict that resulted in the collision.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 16, 2000 · about 8:48 pm local time
- Place
- Bradenton, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Lockheed-Martin F-16CG
- Registration
- USAF · no longer on the register · serial 89-2104
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Cessna 172N · all 172Ns on the register
- Registration
- N73829 · no longer on the register · serial 17267705
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG final · quoted from the NTSB record
A formation flight of two F-16s departed Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, on an IFR flight plan leading to the entry point for a low-altitude military training route located near Sarasota, Florida. The flight lead pilot was provided an air traffic control (ATC) frequency change from Miami Center to Tampa Approach. The flight was unable to establish communications with Tampa Approach because an incorrect radio frequency was given to the flight lead by Miami Center. The flight lead reestablished radio contact with Miami Center, cancelled the flight's IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules (VFR). The controller acknowledged the cancellation, advised the F-16 flight lead pilot of traffic in his vicinity, and asked the flight lead pilot if he wanted VFR flight following (a service that includes VFR radar traffic advisories on a workload-permitting basis.). The flight lead pilot declined. The Miami Center controller then informed Tampa Approach that the flight lead pilot had elected to terminate ATC services, but did not specify that there were two aircraft in the flight. Tampa Approach procedures did not require that the controllers use flight strips (which would have included the number of aircraft in the formation), so the Tampa controllers had no other information indicating that there were multiple aircraft present. Continuing their descent under VFR, the two F-16s assumed the "fighting wing" formation. This placed the accident F-16 on the left side of the lead aircraft and approximately 0.7 miles in trail. The accident F-16’s transponder was inactive, as is normal for formation operations, making the aircraft significantly less conspicuous on ATC radar than it would be with an operating transponder. At an unknown point in the flight, the F-16 lead pilot’s navigation system developed a position error and was indicating that the aircraft was several miles from its actual position. The pilot failed to recognize the error, and was attempting to visually locate the entry point for the training route based on the erroneous navigation data. Because of the lead pilot’s loss of situational awareness, the two F-16s inadvertently descended into the Class C airspace surrounding the Sarasota, Florida airport without establishing required communications with ATC. Meanwhile, a Cessna 172 pilot departed Sarasota under VFR and contacted Tampa Approach. The Cessna pilot was instructed by the developmental controller receiving instruction to maintain 1,600 feet, turn left to a heading of 320-degrees, and to follow the shoreline. At 15:47:10, he was instructed to climb and maintain 3,500 feet. Miami Center contacted Tampa Approach at 15:47:55, and asked for the altitude of the F-16s. Although the Tampa controller was not in contact with the F-16s, he was able to locate the flight lead on the radar display and informed Miami that the flight lead was at 2,000 feet. A conflict alert between the lead F-16 and the Cessna activated 10 times between 15:47:39 and 15:48:03. The developmental controller stated that he heard an alarm, but could not recall where it was. The controller providing the instruction did not recall if he saw or heard a conflict alert, and no conflict alert was issued. There was no alert generated between the accident F-16 and the Cessna because the conflict alert system requires that both aircraft involved have operating transponders. The developmental controller informed the Cessna pilot at 15:48:09 that he had traffic off his left side, but received no response. The controllers were unaware of the position of the other (accident) F-16 in the formation flight. At 15:48:53, the lead F-16 transmitted, "Mayday, mayday." At 15:49:14, the flight lead pilot followed with, "Mayday, mayday, mayday, F-16 down." Examination of the wreckage of both airplanes determined that the accident F-16's left wing and cockpit area collided with the Cessna 172's right forward side (nose) and cabin area.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172N final · quoted from the NTSB record
A formation flight of two F-16s departed Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, on an IFR flight plan leading to the entry point for a low-altitude military training route located near Sarasota, Florida. The flight lead pilot was provided an air traffic control (ATC) frequency change from Miami Center to Tampa Approach. The flight was unable to establish communications with Tampa Approach because an incorrect radio frequency was given to the flight lead by Miami Center. The flight lead reestablished radio contact with Miami Center, cancelled the flight's IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules (VFR). The controller acknowledged the cancellation, advised the F-16 flight lead pilot of traffic in his vicinity, and asked the flight lead pilot if he wanted VFR flight following (a service that includes VFR radar traffic advisories on a workload-permitting basis.). The flight lead pilot declined. The Miami Center controller then informed Tampa Approach that the flight lead pilot had elected to terminate ATC services, but did not specify that there were two aircraft in the flight. Tampa Approach procedures did not require that the controllers use flight strips (which would have included the number of aircraft in the formation), so the Tampa controllers had no other information indicating that there were multiple aircraft present. Continuing their descent under VFR, the two F-16s assumed the "fighting wing" formation. This placed the accident F-16 on the left side of the lead aircraft and approximately 0.7 miles in trail. The accident F-16’s transponder was inactive, as is normal for formation operations, making the aircraft significantly less conspicuous on ATC radar than it would be with an operating transponder. At an unknown point in the flight, the F-16 lead pilot’s navigation system developed a position error and was indicating that the aircraft was several miles from its actual position. The pilot failed to recognize the error, and was attempting to visually locate the entry point for the training route based on the erroneous navigation data. Because of the lead pilot’s loss of situational awareness, the two F-16s inadvertently descended into the Class C airspace surrounding the Sarasota, Florida airport without establishing required communications with ATC. Meanwhile, a Cessna 172 pilot departed Sarasota under VFR and contacted Tampa Approach. The Cessna pilot was instructed by the developmental controller receiving instruction to maintain 1,600 feet, turn left to a heading of 320-degrees, and to follow the shoreline. At 15:47:10, he was instructed to climb and maintain 3,500 feet. Miami Center contacted Tampa Approach at 15:47:55, and asked for the altitude of the F-16s. Although the Tampa controller was not in contact with the F-16s, he was able to locate the flight lead on the radar display and informed Miami that the flight lead was at 2,000 feet. A conflict alert between the lead F-16 and the Cessna activated 10 times between 15:47:39 and 15:48:03. The developmental controller stated that he heard an alarm, but could not recall where it was. The controller providing the instruction did not recall if he saw or heard a conflict alert, and no conflict alert was issued. There was no alert generated between the accident F-16 and the Cessna because the conflict alert system requires that both aircraft involved have operating transponders. The developmental controller informed the Cessna pilot at 15:48:09 that he had traffic off his left side, but received no response. The controllers were unaware of the position of the other (accident) F-16 in the formation flight. At 15:48:53, the lead F-16 transmitted, "Mayday, mayday." At 15:49:14, the flight lead pilot followed with, "Mayday, mayday, mayday, F-16 down." Examination of the wreckage of both airplanes determined that the accident F-16's left wing and cockpit area collided with the Cessna 172's right forward side (nose) and cabin area.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,279 hours in all; 705 in this make and model; 93 in the last 90 days; 29 in the last 30 days; 1,014 as pilot in command; 8 on instruments
- Last flight review: September 29, 2000
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,244 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 21, 2000; 640 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 42,300 lb
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Ge F110-GE-100 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: VAD Valdosta GA at 8:13 pm
- Destination: VAD GA
- Flight plan: VFR then IFR
- Runway 0
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 210° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.00 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 pm from SRQ, 5 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Cessna 172N from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,020 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: unk
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,631 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, November 13, 2000; 7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,300 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-320-H2AD (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: SRQ Sarasota FL at 8:41 pm
- Destination: SPG St. Petersburg FL
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 0
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under USAF the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
1990-08-07FTW90FA151 · accident near Elmendorf, TX · destroyed · minor injuries
1987-09-29MIA87IA264 · incident near Hampton, NY · no injuries
1987-06-02DEN87IA145 · incident near Casper, WY · no injuries
1987-05-22LAX87FA213 · accident near Tehachapi, CA · destroyed · fatal
1987-04-08NYC87IA118 · incident near Wrightstown, NJ · minor injuries
1984-10-18DCA85IA003 · incident near Seattle, WA · no injuries
1984-09-30DCA84IA001 · incident near Akron, OH · no injuries
1984-07-16DCA84IA030 · incident near Marietta, GA · no injuries
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.