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Accidents · NTSB LAX99FA225 · Final report

Cessna 402A accident near Van Nuys, California, June 23, 1999

On June 23, 1999 at about 9:46 pm local time, a Cessna 402A, registered N186BA, was substantially damaged in an accident near Van Nuys, California (Van Nuys airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's inadequate fuel management that resulted in fuel exhaustion and the subsequent collision with vehicles during a forced landing on a city street.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 23, 1999 · about 9:46 pm local time
Place
Van Nuys, California · Van Nuys · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 402A · all 402As on the register
Registration
N186BA · registry record · serial 402A0110
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airplane collided with two school buses during a forced landing on a city street. During a straight-in approach for landing, the pilot lost all power on his left engine. After switching to the left auxiliary tank the engine did not restart. About a minute later all power was lost on the right engine. No attempt was made to switch to the right auxiliary tank because the pilot felt the airplane was too low and he concentrated on making a forced landing on a city street directly in front of the airplane. After touchdown, the airplane's wing tip main fuel tanks collided with the front ends of two approaching school buses. The two main fuel tanks were ruptured in the accident and found empty. Only residual fuel was found in the lines, with 1 quart of fuel recovered from the left auxiliary tank and 4 gallons from the right auxiliary tank. Investigators could not determine the exact fuel load onboard before the first departure that morning; however, based on refueling records, the airplane would have had no less than 122 gallons. During the first leg of flight, a high cylinder head temperature reading led the pilot to make a precautionary landing at an airport just over halfway to the original destination; the total elapsed time at this landing was 1.3 hours. The pilot was then told to reposition the aircraft back to the point of departure. He said he relied on a preplanned flight plan provided by company dispatchers, and he did not recompute the fuel required for the return. No fuel was added before the return flight. The elapsed time on the return flight was 1.2 hours for a total of 2.5 hours. The pilot said that for both legs of the flight he set a fuel flow of 18 gallons per hour per engine (which is above the red line gage limit); the performance charts show that the proper fuel flow setting was 13.35 gallons per hour per engine. Even at the high fuel flow of 18 gph, investigators computed that the airplane should have had a minimum of 12 gallons at the time of the accident, and this fuel remains unaccounted for. The pilot said that at some point during the two legs he switched to his auxiliary tanks until the gauges read 2 and 5 gallons, and then switched back to his main tanks. He could not specifically recall how long he had been flying on the mains when he switched tanks, or on which leg the switch occurred. To avoid unwanted venting of fuel overboard, a specific fuel tank use sequence must be used. The engine driven fuel pumps supply 50 percent more fuel than is required to the metering valves for each engine, with the excess fuel returned to the corresponding main tank. The auxiliary tanks should not be selected until the main tanks have been used for at least 60 minutes so that the mains have room for the returned excess flow from the auxiliary tanks. No evidence of leakage or staining was found around the wing filler caps. Staining found on the pavement around both buses could not be differentiated between fuel and a fire suppressive agent. After the accident, both engines were started and test run with no anomalies noted.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,967 hours in all; 670 in this make and model; 142 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 1,850 as pilot in command; 652 on instruments
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 16,789 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, June 12, 1999; 10 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 6,300 lb
  • Seats: 9
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental TSIO-520-ECEB (piston); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Balter Worldwide CORP.

The flight

  • Departed from: IFP Bullhead City AZ at 8:28 pm
  • Destination: VNY
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 16R, 8,001 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 130° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 5,500 ft
  • Temperature: 190°F (88°C), dew point 102°F (39°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.00 inHg
  • Observation at 10:48 pm from VNY

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number LAX99FA225.