Hughes 369D incident near Kahului, Hawaii, October 14, 2005
On October 14, 2005 at about 9:13 pm local time, a Hughes 369D (helicopter), registered N58267, suffered minor damage in an incident near Kahului, Hawaii (Kahului airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The fatigue cracking and failure of the tail rotor control rod during cruise flight, which resulted in a hard landing during the precautionary landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 14, 2005 · about 9:13 pm local time
- Place
- Kahului, Hawaii · Kahului · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hughes 369D · all 369Ds on the register
- Registration
- N58267 · no longer on the register · serial 390473D
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter was damaged during a hard landing following a loss of tail rotor control. The pilot was conducting a tour flight when tail rotor control was lost. He conducted an emergency landing and landed hard when the helicopter encountered a gust of wind. Examination of the tail rotor system revealed that the tail rotor control rod failed about 6.5 inches forward of its aft attach point, where the control rod attaches to the tail rotor pitch change bell crank. The control rod fractured perpendicular to its longitudinal axis and displayed a flat fracture surface. Metallurgical examination of the control rod fracture revealed that it failed as a result of fatigue cracking that propagated from the outside in. The crack origin could not be determined due to severe mechanical damage from relative movement between the fracture mating surfaces. Due to the damage, the size of the crack could not be determined, and therefore, an assessment of the crack's age could not be made. As a result, it was not possible to determine whether or not the crack would have been visible during the last inspection, which took place 91.2 hours prior to the accident. That inspection's checklist called for the removal and inspection of the tail rotor control rod.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,500 hours in all; 800 in this make and model; 166 in the last 90 days; 67 in the last 30 days; 3,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 24,575.2 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 1, 2005; 91.2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: OGG Kahului HI at 8:00 pm
- Destination: OGG Kahului HI
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 17 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
- Observation at 8:54 pm from OGG
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.