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Accidents · NTSB LAX05FA045 · Final report

Cessna T310R accident near Flagstaff, Arizona, December 8, 2004

On December 8, 2004 at about 2:55 am local time, a Cessna T310R, registered N592DM, was destroyed in an accident near Flagstaff, Arizona. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's decision to attempt flight into known adverse weather conditions beyond the capability of the airplane and his failure to ensure that the airplane's wings were free of ice and/or snow contamination that accumulated while the airplane was on the ground, which resulted in an attempted takeoff with upper wing contamination that induced a subsequent stall/mush and a collision with the ground.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 8, 2004 · about 2:55 am local time
Place
Flagstaff, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Cessna T310R · all T310Rs on the register
Registration
N592DM · registry record · serial 310R0681
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The aircraft collided with an embankment 2 miles from, and about 200 feet lower than, the airport during a takeoff attempt in icing conditions. Examination of the ground scars and wreckage disclosed that the airplane collided with the berm in near wings level controlled flight while in a slightly nose high descending flight path. Evidence showed that both engines were developing symmetrical high power at impact. The aircraft was transporting cargo and medical specimens over a route the pilot flew every day according to a company schedule. The aircraft had arrived at 1826 from the previous stop on the scheduled route. According to witnesses at the airport who watched the airplane takeoff, either one or both of the engines were "very rough sounding." After the airplane departed runway 21, it made a shallow left turn, and then disappeared into the low clouds. One witness indicated that the airplane rotated approximately 5,000 feet down the nearly 7,000-foot-long runway. While on the ground after arrival, the pilot requested that the airplane be deiced. The line service technician accomplished this at 1855, 1 hour before the accident, with the pilot observing the procedure. When the technician arrived at the aircraft he noticed that the aircraft had "a considerable amount of ice built up" from the landing. He sprayed approximately 5 gallons of Glycol mix 50/50 to remove the ice and snow that was attached to the leading edges of the wings, spinners, and the snow that had accumulated on the top of the fuselage. During the procedure, light snow continued to fall. The accident airplane was not certified, nor equipped for flight into known icing conditions. Based on an evaluation of the weather data, IFR conditions, light snow showers, and conditions highly conducive to icing from the surface to 20,000 feet existed at the airport during the aircraft's landing, stay on the ground, and departure. There was a 95 percent probability of moderate clear to mixed icing from the surface to 10,800 feet. The pilot was aware of the icing conditions both at the airport and in the local area at the time of departure, and had received multiple weather briefings where the forecasted and observed icing conditions were clearly described. The operator reported that a truck was available to take the pilot's cargo onto the final destination should weather or mechanical reasons preclude completion of the flight. According to entries in a journal the pilot kept, there is evidence that the pilot perceived a great deal of pressure to fly in icing conditions with an under-equipped aircraft, and some of this pressure involved a perceived association between doing so and maintaining employment; however, there was insufficient information to determine whether the company culture condoned or encouraged this behavior. There was insufficient information from which to determine why the pilot chose to depart in icing conditions. Fatigue was not a factor in this accident. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified in the wreckage examinations.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,950 hours in all; 300 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 50 in the last 30 days; 1,350 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: October 1, 2004
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,032 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 1, 2004; 44 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,500 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental TSIO-520-B (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: FLG Flagstaff AZ at 2:50 am
  • Destination: PHX Phoenix AZ
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 230° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 1.5 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 300 ft
  • Temperature: 30°F (-1°C), dew point 28°F (-2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.03 inHg
  • Observation at 2:44 am from FLG, 2 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.