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Accidents · NTSB LAX04FA076 · Final report

Agusta A109A accident near Redwood Valley, California, December 24, 2003

On December 24, 2003 at about 3:32 am local time, a Agusta A109A (helicopter), registered N25RX, was destroyed in an accident near Redwood Valley, California. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's improper in-flight planning and decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into deteriorating weather conditions, which resulted in an inadvertent in-flight encounter with instrument meteorological conditions and a collision with rising terrain while attempting to reverse course.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 24, 2003 · about 3:32 am local time
Place
Redwood Valley, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Agusta A109A · all A109As on the register
Registration
N25RX · registry record · serial 7220
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Following an encounter with night instrument meteorological conditions, the emergency medical services (EMS) helicopter collided with rising hilly terrain while attempting to reverse course in a narrow mountain valley near Redwood Valley, California. The purpose of the flight was to pickup a patient at a rural hospital in a mountainous area for transport to a larger medical facility. When weather conditions would not permit reaching the rural hospital, common practice for the operator's flight crews was to fly to an intermediate airport with an instrument approach where the helicopter could meet ground transport of the patient and continue the evacuation. Prior to departure from home base, the pilot received a weather briefing from DUATS, which indicated that areas along the route of flight would experience light rain showers, as well as cloud layers that ranged from 1,500 feet above ground level (agl) to 6,000 feet agl ,and visibilities between 3 to 5 statute miles (sm). The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan from his home base to the intermediate airport. An employee of another EMS operator based at the intermediate airport said that there was rain and reduced visibilities at the airport, and that she told the accident medical crew by radio that they should come inside and wait for the ambulance to get to the airport because of the weather. Once the accident helicopter arrived at the intermediate airport, the helicopter was not shut down, the flight nurses got out and got back in, and helicopter departed the airport. Communications between a fire department dispatcher and the accident medical crew indicated that the accident flight was attempting to fly to the fire department's helipad located between the intermediate airport and the hospital. Recorded company communications indicated that a few minutes after the conversation with the fire department dispatcher, the accident flight was diverting back to the intermediate airport. There were no further communications with the accident crew. Witnesses in the area of the accident site all reported heavy rain and wind and poor visibilities due to a heavy fog in the area. Another witness about 2 miles south of the accident site reported hearing the helicopter flying very low over her house, just above the 100-foot tall treetops, about 12 minutes before the accident. The charge nurse at the rural hospital indicated that the weather was poor, and she had indicated to the operator's dispatch that the rural hospital would transport the patient to the intermediate airport. The accident area was located in a narrow valley with mountain peak elevations ranging up to 2,000 feet on either side of a major highway that ran in a north/south direction. The airframe and engines were inspected with no preimpact mechanical anomalies noted.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 14,143 hours in all; 1,670 in this make and model; 70 in the last 90 days; 27 in the last 30 days; 14,143 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,847.5 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, November 1, 2003; 17.3 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,600 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Rolls-Royce 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls-Royce 250-C20B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: UKI Ukiah CA at 3:25 am
  • Destination: Willits CA
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 130° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,500 ft
  • Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.79 inHg
  • Observation at 3:56 am from UKI

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.