Cessna 177RG accident near Blk Canyon City, Arizona, November 13, 2003
On November 13, 2003 at about 4:25 pm local time, a Cessna 177RG, registered N431DL, was destroyed in an accident near Blk Canyon City, Arizona. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
a loss of engine power due to the failure of the single-drive dual magneto that resulted from inadequate lubrication of the breaker cam. Also causal was the improper maintenance by other maintenance personnel during a recent inspection, which should have detected the lubrication deficiency. A contributing factor in the accident that likely exacerbated the pilot's injuries was his decision not to wear the installed shoulder harness.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 13, 2003 · about 4:25 pm local time
- Place
- Blk Canyon City, Arizona · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 177RG · all 177RGs on the register
- Registration
- N431DL · no longer on the register · serial 177RG0762
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During cruise flight over mountainous terrain, a loss of engine power occurred and the airplane impacted trees during the subsequent forced landing attempt. The pilot radioed air traffic control personnel that the engine was losing power and would not sustain flight. He was attempting to make it to an airport when the airplane impacted trees in mountainous terrain. An airframe inspection was conducted with no discrepancies noted that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was equipped with a single-drive dual magneto that remained secure at its mounting pad. During manual rotation of the crankshaft, investigators could hear the "snapping" of the coupling, but no spark was observed at any of the leads. Magneto-to-engine timing could not be established because the contacts were not breaking electrical continuity. A functional check by the magneto manufacturer revealed that both magneto primary circuits had short-circuited to ground in all magnet positions, which was consistent with the breaker points not opening. Disassembly revealed that the plastic cam followers were melted and smeared in the direction of normal cam rotation. The breaker cams, made of sintered iron material, are supposed to be impregnated with oil per the service manual or production instructions for lubrication purposes at each overhaul. The oil lubricates the surface of the breaker cams over the cams service life. Four months prior to the accident the single-drive dual magneto had been removed, and the mechanic at a local fixed based operator had internally timed the magneto, then had completed a ground run and full operational check. The accident flight occurred 38.2 hours after this maintenance operation. According to the manufacturer, to internally time the magneto, maintenance personnel have to partially disassemble the magneto and physically touch the cam and breaker points. In accordance with the Service Support Manual instructions for the magneto, during this process the breaker cams and contact points should be inspected for lubrication, wear, burning, or melting. The on-scene examination revealed that the pilot was not wearing his shoulder harness, which remained stowed in the stowage sheath above the pilot's cabin door. The airframe manufacturer indicated that the airplane had been delivered new in 1975 with shoulder harnesses as standard equipment for the pilot and co-pilot. The coroner listed the cause of death as blunt force craniocerebral trauma due to an airplane crash.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 28,360 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,220.9 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 1, 2002; 69.9 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,800 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360-A1B6D (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: FLG Flagstaff AZ at 3:40 pm
- Destination: DVT Phoenix AZ
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 210° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
- Observation at 3:53 pm from DVT, 33 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
