Mooney M-20E and Beech 76 mid-air collision near Carlsbad, California, September 17, 2002
On September 17, 2002 at about 8:00 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Mooney M-20E (N7199U) and Beech 76 (N1828A), were involved in a mid-air collision near Carlsbad, California (Palomar airport). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
failure of the pilots of both airplanes to maintain an adequate visual lookout and to see and avoid each other. A contributing factor was the failure of the controller to detect and resolve the conflict between the airplanes.
failure of the pilots of both airplanes to maintain an adequate visual lookout and to see and avoid each other. A contributing factor was the failure of the controller to detect and resolve the conflict between the airplanes.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 17, 2002 · about 8:00 pm local time
- Place
- Carlsbad, California · Palomar · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 3 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Mooney M-20E · all M-20Es on the register
- Registration
- N7199U · no longer on the register · serial 417
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Beech 76 · all 76s on the register
- Registration
- N1828A · no longer on the register · serial ME422
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Mooney M-20E final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Mooney and a Beech collided in midair on the downwind for right traffic to runway 24. A pilot in the Beech contacted Palomar ground control (GC) at 1247, requesting taxi from its fixed base operator (FBO) to runway 24. The pilot of the Mooney called Palomar tower at 1255:37, reporting 10 miles north of the airport for landing. The local controller (LC) instructed the Mooney pilot to enter right traffic for runway 24 and report downwind. The air traffic control tower had a digital bright radar indicator tower equipment (DBRITE) radar. The LC stated that the DBRITE location in the cab put it out of the line of sight of the majority of the LC's traffic scan, so using the DBRITE for reference required the LC to divert her attention from the traffic in the pattern and on the runway. She observed the Mooney's identity next to its target on the DBRITE. She put the Mooney on the arrival list, and continued working other traffic. Radar data indicated that the Mooney's target followed the coastline from Oceanside to a point about 3 miles northwest of Palomar. The airplane then turned eastbound and tracked toward the right downwind leg for runway 24. At 1258:08, the LC cleared the Beech for takeoff, and the pilot acknowledged. The Beech's first radar target appeared at 1258:39, and the airplane passed the departure end of the runway at 1259:02. The Beech immediately turned right crosswind. At 1259:27, the LC transmitted a traffic advisory to the Mooney, advising of the Beech on right crosswind turning to downwind. In the same transmission, the LC also advised the Beech pilot of the Mooney traffic inbound on the 45-degree entry to downwind. There was no response from either airplane. According to the LC, the airplanes collided immediately after this transmission. At 1259:36, the Mooney radar target crossed the path of the Beech target, at a mode C reported altitude of 1,300 feet mean sea level (msl), and the two targets merged. Measurement on the plot of the radar targets determined that the convergence angle was 124 degrees. One witness observed the Mooney, which was light brown with dark brown accents, bank to the right immediately prior to impact. Another witness reported that both airplanes appeared to turn at the last second, but both turned the same way into each other. Witnesses reported that the two airplanes merged, and then they saw a puff of white smoke. A piece of wing fell from the Mooney, and the airplane immediately went into a nosedive. The Mooney entered a rapid descent, striking the ground at 1259:43, approximately 300 yards from the estimated collision point. The Beech, which was white with blue accents, banked left and maintained that attitude for a few seconds. To some witnesses, the bank angle approached 90 degrees, while to others it appeared to go to an inverted position. Then the airplane's nose down attitude became steeper until it nosed vertically into the ground. The airplane landed about 100 yards from one witness, who did not observe any attempts at recovery. The last radar target, received at 1259:48, showed the airplane descending through a mode C reported altitude of 500 feet. During the period that the airplane was taxiing, the ground controller characterized the LC's workload as light to moderate, with no unusual circumstances in the traffic pattern. There were "a few" clouds west of the airport that were close enough to be a factor for departures. They could cause pilots to turn somewhat earlier than normal if necessary to maintain adequate clearance. Evaluation of all evidence determined that the conflict was detectable both visually and on the tower radar display. When the LC realized that they were in conflict, her actions were too late to provide the pilots with adequate time to maneuver to avoid a collision. The local controller's loss of situational awareness contributed to the accident. FAA order 7110.65 "Air Traffic Control" prescribed ATC procedures and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. Paragraph 3-1-1 instructed controllers to provide airport traffic control service based only upon observed or known traffic and airport conditions. A note stated that when operating in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR's), it was the responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. It also remarked that, due to the limited space around terminal locations, traffic information could aid pilots in avoiding collisions.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Beech 76 final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Mooney and a Beech collided in midair on the downwind for right traffic to runway 24. A pilot in the Beech contacted Palomar ground control (GC) at 1247, requesting taxi from its fixed base operator (FBO) to runway 24. The pilot of the Mooney called Palomar tower at 1255:37, reporting 10 miles north of the airport for landing. The local controller (LC) instructed the Mooney pilot to enter right traffic for runway 24 and report downwind. The air traffic control tower had a digital bright radar indicator tower equipment (DBRITE) radar. The LC stated that the DBRITE location in the cab put it out of the line of sight of the majority of the LC's traffic scan, so using the DBRITE for reference required the LC to divert her attention from the traffic in the pattern and on the runway. She observed the Mooney's identity next to its target on the DBRITE. She put the Mooney on the arrival list, and continued working other traffic. Radar data indicated that the Mooney's target followed the coastline from Oceanside to a point about 3 miles northwest of Palomar. The airplane then turned eastbound and tracked toward the right downwind leg for runway 24. At 1258:08, the LC cleared the Beech for takeoff, and the pilot acknowledged. The Beech's first radar target appeared at 1258:39, and the airplane passed the departure end of the runway at 1259:02. The Beech immediately turned right crosswind. At 1259:27, the LC transmitted a traffic advisory to the Mooney, advising of the Beech on right crosswind turning to downwind. In the same transmission, the LC also advised the Beech pilot of the Mooney traffic inbound on the 45-degree entry to downwind. There was no response from either airplane. According to the LC, the airplanes collided immediately after this transmission. At 1259:36, the Mooney radar target crossed the path of the Beech target, at a mode C reported altitude of 1,300 feet mean sea level (msl), and the two targets merged. Measurement on the plot of the radar targets determined that the convergence angle was 124 degrees. One witness observed the Mooney, which was light brown with dark brown accents, bank to the right immediately prior to impact. Another witness reported that both airplanes appeared to turn at the last second, but both turned the same way into each other. Witnesses reported that the two airplanes merged, and then they saw a puff of white smoke. A piece of wing fell from the Mooney, and the airplane immediately went into a nosedive. The Mooney entered a rapid descent, striking the ground at 1259:43, approximately 300 yards from the estimated collision point. The Beech, which was white with blue accents, banked left and maintained that attitude for a few seconds. To some witnesses, the bank angle approached 90 degrees, while to others it appeared to go to an inverted position. Then the airplane's nose down attitude became steeper until it nosed vertically into the ground. The airplane landed about 100 yards from one witness, who did not observe any attempts at recovery. The last radar target, received at 1259:48, showed the airplane descending through a mode C reported altitude of 500 feet. During the period that the airplane was taxiing, the ground controller characterized the LC's workload as light to moderate, with no unusual circumstances in the traffic pattern. There were "a few" clouds west of the airport that were close enough to be a factor for departures. They could cause pilots to turn somewhat earlier than normal if necessary to maintain adequate clearance. Evaluation of all evidence determined that the conflict was detectable both visually and on the tower radar display. When the LC realized that they were in conflict, her actions were too late to provide the pilots with adequate time to maneuver to avoid a collision. The local controller's loss of situational awareness contributed to the accident. FAA order 7110.65 "Air Traffic Control" prescribed ATC procedures and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. Paragraph 3-1-1 instructed controllers to provide airport traffic control service based only upon observed or known traffic and airport conditions. A note stated that when operating in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR's), it was the responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. It also remarked that, due to the limited space around terminal locations, traffic information could aid pilots in avoiding collisions.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Mooney M-20E from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 1,300 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,600 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 1, 2002
- Maximum gross weight: 2,450 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: FCH Visalia CA
- Destination: KCRQ Carlsbad CA
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 220° at 7 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 29.80 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 pm from CRQ, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Beech 76 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,700 hours in all; 100 in this make and model; 184 in the last 90 days; 58 in the last 30 days; 1,600 as pilot in command; 1,300 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Dual student
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 250 hours in all; 20 in this make and model; 200 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,374 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 1, 2002; 30 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,900 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-AIGGD (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: KCRQ Carlsbad CA at 7:58 pm
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 24, 4,897 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.