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Accidents · NTSB ERA24FA003 · Final report

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada 407 accident near Croydon, New Hampshire, October 8, 2023

On October 8, 2023 at about 11:32 pm local time, a 2009 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada 407, registered N802JR, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Croydon, New Hampshire. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s loss of control during the initial climb in dark night conditions due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in a steep banking descent into trees and terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of recent night flight experience, improper cockpit lighting settings, and his failure to use the helicopter’s stability augmentation system before and during the unusual attitude.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 8, 2023 · about 11:32 pm local time
Place
Croydon, New Hampshire · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada 407 NO SERIES, built 2009 · all 407s on the register
Registration
N802JR · no longer on the register · serial 53971
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident flight, a night visual flight rules positioning flight, originated at an off-airport landing site the pilot had landed the helicopter at two days before the accident. An onboard image recorder captured the accident flight, which was the first flight of the day for the pilot. The video revealed that after a normal preflight inspection and run-up, the pilot initiated a near-vertical (straight-up) takeoff. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot stated aloud that it was too dark, and the helicopter began flying in an uncoordinated manor. The pilot continued the climb and accelerated forward, and the helicopter entered multiple unusual attitudes, with the primary flight display (PFD) indicating that the helicopter was in an extreme nose-down, right-bank attitude. The PFD displayed multiple visual warnings prompting the pilot to correct the unusual attitude. The pilot made large cyclic applications during the maneuvers, continued to verbally express confusion, and the engine torque/power was increased to its maximum. The helicopter then entered a descending right turn for 15-20 seconds. Shortly before impact, an aural alert for terrain was sounded, red chevrons on the PFD continued to display, and the helicopter’s spotlight began illuminating the dark forest below. The video stopped recording about one second after trees were observed in the pilot’s windscreen. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Based upon the flight track data, onboard image recorder data, and astronomical data, the pilot initiated a visual flight rules flight into dark nighttime conditions over featureless terrain, which likely prevented the pilot from using visual references to the horizon. The pilot’s expressed confusion and large cyclic applications were likely the result of the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation. The onboard image recorder captured the pilot increasing the instrumentation and display lighting during the preflight inspection and he did not dim the instrumentation lighting before or during flight. Guidance from the FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook advises pilots to dim cockpit lighting for night operations to better identify outside terrain and hazard details. The guidance further outlined that taking off with cockpit lights that are too bright could cause reflections or glare off the windscreen, further reducing a pilot’s ability to fly by reference to the horizon outside. The pilot’s cockpit lighting settings likely contributed to the spatial disorientation. The pilot had available for his use an autopilot and stability augmentation system (HeliSAS) to help prevent the helicopter from entering unusual attitudes, in addition to helping the pilot exit an unusual attitude; however, the SAS mode was not engaged and remained in a standby mode for the entire flight. The SAS could have been engaged at the airspeed and altitudes through which the pilot was flying during accident flight. Review of the pilot’s experience found that an overwhelming majority of the pilot’s flight experience in the last 12 months was during daylight. Although, the operator did not record, nor where they required to record night currency, the pilot’s actions regarding lighting settings, his statement that it was “too dark,” and the ultimate loss of control due to spatial disorientation, likely indicate the pilot was not sufficiently current/proficient to fly the helicopter at night. The pilot had atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease that placed him at increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event. However, video evidence was not consistent with such an event occurring. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s medical conditions contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
  2. Loss of control in flight during initial climb defining event
  3. Loss of visual reference during initial climb

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Recent experience › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Response/compensation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Lighting system › Flight compartment lighting › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Auto flight system › (general) › Not used/operated

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 13,780 hours in all; 1,377 in this make and model; 13,699 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 22, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,990 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 25, 2023; 22 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 6,000 lb
  • Seats: 8
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls-Royce 250-C47B (turboshaft); 2,990 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: NONE Croydon NH at 11:31 pm
  • Destination: OQU North Kingstown RI

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Wind: from 180° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 9,500 ft; scat at 5,500 ft
  • Temperature: 50°F (10°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.60 inHg
  • Observation at 7:54 pm from VSF, 18 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KVSF 082354Z AUTO 18003KT 10SM SCT055 SCT070 OVC095 10/06 A2960 RMK AO2 RAB02E43 SLP026 P0001 60001 T01000061 10161 20100 53024 TSNO=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

19 documents, released by the NTSB on December 5, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
2 Memo for Record (Witness) PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
3 Memo for Record (Operator - Dir Ops) PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
4 Memo for Record (Operator - Check Pilot) PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
5 Attachment 1 - Pilot Experience Operator Documents PDF, 18 pages · our copy View Download
6 Memo of Record - President - Jbi PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
7 Helisas Manual Pages from Flight Manual Supplement PDF, 24 pages · our copy View Download
8 Memo for Record (Weather Conditions) PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
9 Airworthiness Factual PDF, 15 pages · our copy View Download
10 Operations Factual Report PDF, 12 pages · our copy View Download
11 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
12 Medical Factual Memorandum for Record PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
13 Electronic Device - Recorded Flight Data - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
14 Attachment 1 to Electronic Device - Recorded Flight Data - Specialist's Factual Report data file · our copy Download
15 Onboard Image Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
16 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 17 pages · our copy View Download
17 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
18 Evidence Control Form - Ecu PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
19 Evidence Control Form - Appareo Camera PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.