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Accidents · NTSB ERA21LA295 · Final report

Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II accident near Point Harbor, North Carolina, July 19, 2021

On July 19, 2021 at about 10:48 pm local time, a 2009 Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II, registered N4529J, was destroyed in an accident during enroute near Point Harbor, North Carolina. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The noncertificated pilot’s decision to continue visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation over a large body of water and a high velocity impact with the water. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s inadequate oversight during their initial training and improperly signing off the student for solo flight when he lacked the proper student pilot and medical certificate.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 19, 2021 · about 10:48 pm local time
Place
Point Harbor, North Carolina · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II NO SERIES, built 2009
Registration
N4529J · registry record · serial 12683
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The noncertificated pilot, who was the owner of the helicopter, originated the afternoon flight from a private residence, completed a brief fuel stop at an uncontrolled airport, and then continued toward the destination. Shortly after takeoff following the fuel stop, the pilot called a friend near the destination via video chat and informed him that he would arrive in an hour. The friend reported that everything seemed normal with the pilot, and he did not mention any concerns pertaining to the weather or helicopter. About an hour later, 27 miles northwest of the destination, a witness saw the helicopter land in a field. The helicopter remained on the ground for a few minutes and when the witness approached the helicopter in their car, the helicopter quickly took off toward a large body of water and continued a flight path that was consistent with a direction to the planned destination. About an hour after the helicopter was last seen by this witness, family members alerted the United States Coast Guard (USCG) that the helicopter had not arrived at the destination. The USCG conducted a search for the helicopter based upon cellphone location data and the next day small fragments of wreckage were located on the surface of the large body of water. The pilot and passenger were also recovered, and both had sustained fatal injuries. The small fragments of wreckage located were consistent with an impact at high velocity. Based upon planned route of flight data collected from a flight planning application, cellphone location data, and the debris area, it is likely that after the brief off-airport landing, the pilot continued the flight toward the destination. A witness described conditions at the time as low clouds, misty, with restricted visibility across the water. An NTSB weather study found that near the location of where debris was found, about the presumed time of the accident, widespread light to heavy precipitation, low clouds, and reduced visibility were present. There was no record that the pilot received an online or telephone weather briefing. Had the pilot received a weather briefing, forecasts would have alerted him of possible instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and precipitation along his route. Given that the pilot informed his friend shortly after takeoff that he would arrive in 1 hour, and made no mention of the weather, it is likely that he was not aware of the IMC and precipitation. It is likely that the pilot performed an unplanned off-airport landing due to the weather conditions ahead, and instead of terminating the flight, he chose to continue in what had become IMC. The pilot’s attempted flight under visual flight rules in those conditions would have increased his likelihood of losing control of the helicopter due to spatial disorientation with no clear separation between the water surface and low clouds and obscuration of the horizon. The pilot was not qualified to operate the helicopter in IMC, the helicopter was not approved for flight into IMC, and in addition, he possessed limited training to operate the helicopter in general. These findings make a mechanical problem with the helicopter an unlikely factor in the accident, however, the limited amount of wreckage found precluded the investigation from examining the helicopter for any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The pilot’s flight instructor was aware of the accident cross-country flight; however, the pilot was not issued any of the required endorsements or prerequisite training to conduct the flight. The flight instructor reported that this was not the first flight the pilot conducted in which he was not properly endorsed or authorized for. The investigation was unable to determine if the pilot understood that he was not legally authorized to conduct solo cross-country flights or carry passengers. The flight instructor had authorized the pilot to perform solo flights, despite the student not holding the required student pilot and medical certificate. This deviation from regulations by the flight instructor likely contributed to the pilot’s subsequent deviations from regulations and his decision to conduct the accident flight despite not being properly trained or endorsed for the accident flight. Based on the pilot’s toxicology results, at least some of the detected ethanol was likely from sources other than consumption. Whether ethanol effects contributed to the accident cannot be determined from available evidence. Based on available medical and operational evidence, postmortem carbon monoxide production during prolonged water immersion likely increased the carboxyhemoglobin level in the pilot’s cavity blood after his death. It is unlikely that carbon monoxide effects contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. VFR encounter with IMC during enroute defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during enroute

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Qualification/certification › Student/instructed pilot
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather › Thunderstorm › Decision related to condition
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Rain › Decision related to condition
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low visibility › Decision related to condition
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Total instruct/training recvd › Student/instructed pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Student/instructed pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Instrument flight capability › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Flight time: 25 hours in all; 25 in this make and model; 10 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,500 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-AE1A5 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: AVC Mecklenburg VA at 9:26 pm
  • Destination: MQI Manteo NC
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 070° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 3 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,200 ft
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
  • Observation at 6:55 pm from MQI, 16 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KMQI 192255Z AUTO 07007KT 3SM -RA BKN032 BKN039 OVC065 23/22 A3001 RMK AO2 P0007 T02260220

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on June 8, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.