Beech A36 accident near Farmington, Pennsylvania, December 11, 2015
On December 11, 2015 at about 7:22 pm local time, a 1984 Beech A36, registered N72054, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR pattern base) near Farmington, Pennsylvania (Nemacolin Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane after a cabin door came open in flight, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's misuse of amphetamine.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 11, 2015 · about 7:22 pm local time
- Place
- Farmington, Pennsylvania · Nemacolin Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech A36 UNDESIGNAT, built 1984 · all A36s on the register
- Registration
- N72054 · no longer on the register · serial E-2181
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot and two passengers were departing on a cross-country flight. Witness statements and data from an onboard GPS indicated that, after takeoff, the airplane turned left and entered the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern for the departure runway. The airplane climbed to a maximum altitude about 500 ft above ground level (agl), then entered a gradual descent as it continued downwind and entered a left base leg. Witnesses noted that the landing gear was extended. The final data points from the GPS indicated that the airplane was conducting a tight turn from the base to final legs of the traffic pattern at a low airspeed and an altitude about 200 ft agl. The airplane crashed in a heavily wooded area near a golf course. It is likely that, during the final turn, the airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack and experienced an aerodynamic stall. A passenger, who was severely burned but able to egress the airplane following the accident, advised first responders that the cabin door had opened just after takeoff. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunction of the airplane or engine prior to the accident. The forward cabin door's upper latching mechanism (hook) was not fully extended; the slot in the upper fuselage frame, which the hook engaged when the door was closed, showed no evidence of tear-outs; and the door handle mechanism was not fully in the locked position. These findings are consistent with the cabin door being open at the time of impact. The airplane's pilot's operating handbook (POH) advised that the forward cabin door could unlatch in flight if not properly secured; this could occur during or just after takeoff. Although the door would open about 3 inches, the flight characteristics of the airplane would not be affected, with the exception of a reduced rate of climb. The POH advised that, if the door opened in flight, the pilot should "return to the field in a normal manner." Twenty-two years before the accident flight, the airplane manufacturer published a mandatory service bulletin after receiving reports of the lower aft latch pin on the cabin door retracting in flight due to misrigging and/or vibration. When the latch pin retracted, it would force the entire door latching mechanism to reverse, allowing the door to open. This service bulletin, which had not been accomplished on the accident airplane, would have modified the forward cabin door to reduce the possibility of a cabin door opening in flight. Toxicological testing on specimens from the pilot identified amphetamine at 0.310 ug/ml and 0.347 ug/ml in blood and 1.828 ug/ml in urine. This is well above any therapeutic range, which is less than 0.20 ug/ml. Generally, levels above 0.20 are the result of misusing amphetamine to maximize its psychoactive effects. In addition, phenylpropanolamine was detected in the pilot's urine, which suggests that he obtained the drug from non-pharmaceutical sources. An autopsy identified thickening of the heart walls and minimal coronary artery disease; however, this was unlikely to have caused acute symptoms. The thickening of the heart walls was likely caused by the increased workload related to repeated episodes of increased heart rate and blood pressure resulting from amphetamine use. It is possible that these two conditions (thickened heart and significant levels of amphetamine) combined to cause a sudden arrhythmia (a specific risk with amphetamine) which could have caused palpitations or fainting, resulting in the pilot's loss of control of the airplane. Such an event would not have left evidence that could be identified on autopsy. It could not be determined whether the pilot was experiencing the euphoria of early phase response to amphetamine or the dysphoria of coming down from its effects. In either case, the effects are significantly impairing and affect the ability to concentrate, make safe decisions, and perform. Regardless of the reason the door opened in flight, the airplane should have remained airworthy and controllable. Although the pilot was attempting to return to land as prescribed by the POH following a door opening event, he did not safely manage the airplane's airspeed and angle of attack and lost control of the airplane. The investigation could not determine whether the pilot's impaired judgement or an acute arrhythmia caused by his misuse of amphetamine led to his inability to safely land the airplane; however, in either case, the pilot's misuse of amphetamine contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Miscellaneous/other during prior to flight
- Miscellaneous/other during initial climb
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Physical › Impairment/incapacitation › Illicit drug › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Doors › Passenger/crew doors › Not specified
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,261 hours in all; 2,663 in this make and model
- Last flight review: November 1, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,448.5 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, November 11, 2015
- Maximum gross weight: 3,651 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental IO-550-B78 (piston); 4,448 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: PA88 Farmington PA at 7:20 pm
- Destination: GAI Gaithersburg MD
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 23, 3,980 ft by 49 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 250° at 11 knots, gusting 19
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 1,300 ft
- Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 7:25 pm from 2G4, 17 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
