Cessna 177 accident near Moneta, Virginia, September 13, 2015

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was conducting an aerial photographic flight with one passenger on board. The airplane had been filled with fuel the day before the accident flight. On the day of the accident, the airplane was flown to and landed at two airports before it departed for the accident flight. The airplane was not refueled before the accident flight. According to the passenger, during the accident flight, the pilot chose to land because the airplane was "low on fuel." Two witnesses stated that the airplane was high and fast on the approach. One witness stated that the airplane had a high groundspeed on the runway. The passenger stated that, during the landing, the wind "pushed" the airplane too far down the runway and that, when the airplane was about 80 percent of the way down the runway, the pilot attempted to perform a go-around. The passenger added that, during climbout, the engine did not sound normal, the stall horn sounded, and the airplane then impacted trees and that, after the airplane came to rest, fuel was "pouring onto them." A postcrash fire ensued. Examination of the airframe and engine did not find any abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. The examination revealed that one propeller blade was fractured in at least three segments, which was indicative of rotation at the time of impact. Although it is likely that the engine was developing power at the time of impact, the investigation could not determine the amount of power that was being developed or applied at that time. Although the pilot stated that the airplane was low on fuel and the passenger reported that the engine did not sound normal during the go-around, the amount of available fuel could not be determined. However, if the airplane was in a very low fuel state, the pilot might have felt a sense of urgency to get the airplane on the ground before the fuel was exhausted. He may have then rushed the approach to the airport, which led to the airplane being high and fast as it neared the runway and resulted in the need to go around late in the ground roll. The flap position was found at less than 10 degrees; however, according to the go-around checklist in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the flaps should be retracted to "1/2," which correlates to 15 degrees, until the airplane reaches an airspeed of about 75 mph. Therefore, it is likely that the flaps were in transit at the time of impact because the pilot had prematurely retracted the flaps. Further, the POH states that "application of maximum allowable power [during a go-around] will require considerable control pressure to maintain a climb pitch attitude. The addition of power will tend to raise the airplane's nose suddenly and veer to the left. Forward elevator pressure must be anticipated and applied to hold the nose in a safe climb attitude…" It is likely that the combination of the premature retraction of the flaps and insufficient forward pressure led to the pilot's inability to maintain pitch control, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Other NTSB records under N2835X the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time