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Accidents · NTSB ERA15LA328 · Final report

Gulfstream Aerospace G IV accident near Caribbean Sea, A1, April 10, 2015

On April 10, 2015 at about 10:45 pm local time, a 1993 Gulfstream Aerospace G IV, registered N450KK, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Caribbean Sea. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The in-flight failure of the cabin pressurization relief/safety valve (CPRV) due to an obstruction of the CPRV static port, which allowed the airplane to overpressurize. The reason for the initial overpressurization condition could not be determined.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 10, 2015 · about 10:45 pm local time
Place
Caribbean Sea, A1 · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Gulfstream Aerospace G IV UNDESIGNAT, built 1993 · all G IVs on the register
Registration
N450KK · no longer on the register · serial 1225
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot and copilot were conducting a repositioning flight. According to the pilot, during cruise at flight level 430, they observed a red "9.8 CABIN DFRN" warning message, indicating a maximum cabin differential pressure of 9.8 pounds per square inch differential or greater, followed by a red "DOOR MAIN" indication. The pilots donned oxygen masks and referenced the airplane's emergency checklist. They then heard a loud "bam" sound in the cabin and immediately initiated a descent. The pilots opened the cabin pressure outflow valve manually and leveled the airplane at 12,000 ft mean sea level. The pilots continued the flight unpressurized and landed without further incident. The day after the accident, the airplane was flown for a short and uneventful repositioning flight, after which it was examined and structural airframe damage, including a cracked floor beam, dimpled areas in the floor boards, damaged structure between ribs, and damaged wing links, was found. An examination of the outer fuselage revealed that the cabin pressurization relief/safety valve (CPRV) static port, located above the CPRV, was completely plugged with a foreign material resembling dried dirt from a mud dauber. According to the airplane manufacturer, a blocked CPRV static port would render the CPRV inoperative due to its inability to measure the cabin-to-atmosphere pressure differential. The cockpit aural warning speaker was also found inoperative, which may have delayed the pilots' ability to recognize the overpressurization condition. The airplane's digital flight data recorder indicated that the crew acknowledged the initial warning message 89 seconds after its illumination. No other mechanical anomalies were found with the airplane's pressurization system. The airplane's structural damage was not repaired after the accident; therefore, the reason for the overpressurization condition could not be determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Pressure/environ sys malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Aircraft structural failure during enroute (cruise)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Air conditioning system › Pressure sensor › Damaged/degraded
  • cause Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 13,902 hours in all; 48 in the last 90 days; 22 in the last 30 days; 9,539 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 15, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 19,825 hours in all; 48 in the last 90 days; 22 in the last 30 days; 11,744 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 15, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 7,473 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 12, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 75,000 lb
  • Seats: 16
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Rolls-Royc TAY 611SER (turbofan); 7,260 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls-Royc TAY 611SER (turbofan); 7,283 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SVMI Maiquetia at 8:45 pm
  • Destination: FXE Fort Lauderdale FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 100° at 12 knots
  • Sky: broken clouds at 27,000 ft; a few clouds at 3,500 ft
  • Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 10:56 pm from MUGM, 151 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

10 documents, released by the NTSB on October 18, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.